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Abstract

Interdependent infrastructure recovery modeling and simulation are complicated
due to various interdependent connections and complexities. Current efforts have
identified both operational and restoration interdependency subtypes and coupling
strategies that have not been integrated into one comprehensive model. This research
presents a model that simultaneously integrates nine interdependency subtypes and four
coupling strategies in a multi-objective format to provide the most tailorable and
comprehensive network-based recovery model available. This research also created a
defense-centric interdependent infrastructure database by modifying the existing
CustomizabLe ARtificial Community (CLARC) database. This research then addressed
assumptions regarding recovery work management in order to address the impact of work
crew structure and training’s impact on cost, recovery time, and system operability.
These efforts were accomplished by creating mixed-integer programs and then testing
them with the defense-centric infrastructure database with a simulated flood event. The
results of the scenario showed that exclusion of certain interdependencies could cost over
$4M additional for marginal improvement in infrastructure operability. Additionally, it
was shown that using interdependent relationships can be used to overcome inaccessible
infrastructure data. Finally, the results showed that team composition can influence
recovery cost, time, and operability both negatively and positively. These models benefit
emergency managers and infrastructure owners alike.
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INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY USING
MULTILAYERED NETWORKS AND OPTIMIZATION

I. Introduction
Built and social infrastructure networks – comprising in part telecommunications,
electrical energy, transportation, emergency response services, drinking water,
wastewater, and other social services – are a complex system-of-systems or network-ofnetworks that is foundational to our society (Almoghathawi et al. 2017; Department of
Homeland Security 2013). The management of this socio-technical and cyber-physical
network-of-networks is complex and makes decisions regarding the supply of public
services challenging. One of the primary purposes of built infrastructure is to provide a
service at an optimized balance of cost, performance, and risk (Hall et al. 2016). The
disruption of these services and the associated recovery of the infrastructure systems is
complicated by interdependencies within the underlying infrastructure network-ofnetworks.
The influence of interdependencies between infrastructure networks has been
shown multiple times to affect operations and recovery activities within the last couple of
decades. A small sampling of events over the past two decades are sufficient to
substantiate this claim. In 2000 to 2001, a disruption in the electrical power grid in
California impacted the oil and gas industry, which prolonged disruption in the electrical
power network (Fletcher 2001). The September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center highlighted both physical and non-physical interdependencies with an example of
the latter being an administrative policy levied on the aviation infrastructure, which
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ultimately resulted in $1.4 billion lost in revenue due to a three-day airport closure
(Faturechi et al. 2014). In 2003, a large scale blackout showed how an initial fault in the
power lines combined with a fault in the alarm control system caused cascading failures
along the electrical distribution grid resulting in over 50 million people in the United
States and Canada without power for up to two days (Minkel 2008). Natural disasters to
include the following list have time and again showcased the interdependent nature of
built socio-technical and cyber-physical infrastructure networks (Comerio 2014; Givetash
2020; National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) 2018; Ramirez-Meyers et al.
2021).
•

2005 Hurricane Katrina in Florida and Louisiana

•

2011 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan and subsequent Fukushima nuclear disaster

•

2012 Superstorm Sandy in New Jersey and New York

•

2017 Hurricane Harvey in Texas

•

2017 Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico

•

2019 to 2020 Australian wildfires

•

2020 wildfires in California

•

2021 freezing temperatures in Texas
Therefore, it is proposed that a better understanding of interdependencies of

infrastructure networks will lead to more informed and efficient infrastructure recovery.
The focus of this research is to create a multi-objective interdependent
infrastructure recovery model. This model seeks to balance competing objectives of
minimizing recovery costs, repair time, and disruption to services. These three objectives
– cost, repair time, and operability – create an infrastructure recovery trilemma. This
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recovery trilemma has parallels to the infrastructure operations trilemma of cost,
performance, and risk, as well as the construction trilemma of cost, quality, and speed.
This model also seeks to simultaneously integrate nine interdependency subtypes and
four coupling strategies to more accurately evaluate real, complex, and interdependent
infrastructure relationships. The intent of the model is to support decision making by
emergency managers and asset owners during recovery operations.
The remainder of this chapter provides the motivation for this research, defines
the problem statement, and lists the corresponding research objective and questions. A
brief overview follows, explaining the methodology used, the limitations of the modeling
efforts, and the key contributions of the present work. The final section in this chapter
outlines the rest of the document.
1.1. Research Motivation.
The general motivation for research to develop an interdependent infrastructure
recovery model is to improve the resilience of the underlying network-of-networks.
Resilience of interdependent infrastructure networks is an emerging field with various
definitions, approaches, and methods (Attho-Okine 2016). The resilience of infrastructure
networks typically is defined as a network’s ability to withstand, adapt to, and recover
from a disruption (Barker et al. 2017). This full-breadth definition of resilience is often
segmented into the vulnerability and recoverability aspects of resilience (Almoghathawi
et al. 2017). The focus of this work is on the recoverability aspect of resilience.
The specific motivation for seeking to enhance resilience through an evaluation of
interdependent infrastructure recovery stems from three primary sources. First, disruptive
events involving interdependent infrastructure networks are unique and some
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interdependencies only manifest themselves during the recovery operations (Sharkey et
al. 2016). Therefore, not focusing on recovery operations would preclude analysis of
certain interdependencies. Second, the underlying interdependencies of infrastructure
networks make overall systems complex and vulnerable to cascading and escalating
failures (Buldyrev et al. 2010; Rinaldi et al. 2001). These issues of complexity and
vulnerability are primary reasons recovery after disaster or disruption is still an open
question and an issue worth evaluating (National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)
2018). Third, certain defense elements within our nation have identified resilient
infrastructure as critical in today’s complex security environment (Department of
Homeland Security 2013; United States Department of Defense 2018, 2019). This has led
to a desire by the United States Air Force to seek for more resilient infrastructure
solutions (Headquarters United States Air Force 2019). The combined elements of the
unique nature of interdependencies during recovery, the lack of current solutions to solve
these complex problems, and the national security imperative make this research
important and relevant.
1.2. Problem Statement
No interdependent infrastructure recovery model has sought to integrate all
known interdependency subtypes and coupling strategies within a single multi-objective
model. Furthermore, interdependent infrastructure recovery models have not been
defense-focused, which has often led to assumptions that may be irrelevant or
inappropriate for defense recovery operations.
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1.3. Research Objective
The primary research objective is to develop a defense-focused interdependent
infrastructure recovery model that will balance cost, repair time, and operability when
presenting recovery strategies. This model incorporates multiple objectives, operational
interdependencies, restoration interdependencies, and recovery operations constraints.
The goal in developing this type of model is to increase resilience of interdependent
infrastructure networks by focusing on the recovery aspects of resilience.
The following are investigative questions, which have guided this research and
have made the desired research objective attainable.
1. How can multiple and various interdependency subtypes and coupling strategies
be simultaneously incorporated into an interdependent infrastructure recovery
model?
2. How do multiple and various interdependency subtypes and coupling strategies
affect the cost, repair time, and operability of disrupted infrastructure networks
3. How does work crew management including flexible team composition, training,
and education of recovery personnel affect the recovery of interdependent
infrastructure networks?
1.4. Brief Overview of Methodology
This section briefly describes the model development based on integrating several
different components. Then it describes the modification and use of an interdependent
infrastructure database to provide a relevant defense-focused application. Finally, it
describes the modification of the original model to incorporate work crew management’s
effect on recovery operations.
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Previous work has identified multiple operational interdependency subtypes to
include physical, cyber, geospatial, and logical (Rinaldi et al. 2001). Additionally, a
distinction has been made between operational interdependencies and restoration
interdependencies, which comprise at least five additional subtypes (Sharkey et al. 2016).
Furthermore, four coupling strategies have been identified that impact whether or not a
dependent node or arc is operable based on various conditions (González et al. 2016). A
network-based multi-objective mixed-integer program (MIP) that combines elements of
both network design problems and scheduling problems is presented as an effective
model for recovery operations.
The CustomizabLe ARtificial Community (CLARC) Database is a regional-sized
dataset exhibiting over 2,600 network-to-network interdependencies between 5 civil and
5 social infrastructure networks (Sharkey et al. 2018). This dataset was reduced to
approximately 10% and constructed as a multiplex network-of-networks. This reduced
dataset approximates the size of a medium to large Air Force Installation. A simulated
flood event damaging 5-7 % of infrastructure systems was used to evaluate the effect of
operational and restoration interdependencies and coupling strategies on cost, repair time,
and operability.
Most current infrastructure restoration models typically use parallel teams or
infrastructure-specific teams to model recovery work crews. A unique formulation of the
original MIP presented in this work was modified to allow for flexible teaming structures
and various skill-levels. This model allows for unbalanced teams, the concept of massing,
and creates a preemptive environment. All of these elements are able to affect recovery
operations.
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1.5. Assumptions and Limitations
Infrastructure networks are not all designed, constructed, or operated uniformly.
This means that interdependencies among infrastructure networks will be different based
on every unique set of infrastructure networks, albeit some commonalities may also exist.
Therefore, modeled interdependencies hold only for the specific scenario and set of
networks modeled and cannot generally be extended to effects that would be repeated in
all systems that contain the modeled infrastructure systems. However, the capability to
model complex interdependent infrastructure networks is extendable to all similar
modeling and simulation efforts.
The use of a network-based model assumes all commodities within a given
infrastructure flow similarly, which is contrary to the physics of certain systems.
However, the use of network flow models in particular have been used as a reasonable
representation of infrastructure networks and provide a sufficient balance between model
complexity and reality (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Nurre et al. 2012). Other specific
modeling assumptions and limitations are addressed in the applicable chapters discussing
the models or in the associated appendices.
1.6. Key Contributions
This research contributes to the interdependent infrastructure recovery body of
knowledge in the following ways:
1. Provide a defense-centric dataset for analysis of recovery models dealing with
interdependent infrastructure systems;
2. Novel use of network-to-network interdependencies and coupling strategies to
overcome inaccessible infrastructure data;
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3. Novel interdependent infrastructure recovery model incorporating multiple
interdependency types and multiple coupling strategies; and
4. Novel extension of the base interdependent infrastructure recovery model by
relaxing prevalent assumptions concerning work crew management.
1.7. Document Outline
The remainder of this document is broken into several chapters. Chapter 2 details
the relevant literature regarding interdependency subtypes, coupling, and previous
modeling efforts. Chapter 3 explains the database used, the errors found, and the concerns
that were addressed in the modified version. Chapter 4 presents an abbreviated version of
the base model that highlights how coupling strategies can help overcome missing
infrastructure data. Chapter 5 presents the base model, which integrates 9
interdependency subtypes uses the modified database to evaluate the effect of
interdependencies. Chapter 6 presents an extension to the base model by changing
underlying assumptions about the how recovery work crews are managed. Chapter 7
explores the boundaries and limitations of the models created in this research. Chapter 8
concludes this present work and identifies future work.

8

II. Literature Review
This chapter summarizes relevant literature and the progress made thus far in
interdependent infrastructure recovery (IIR) modeling. The first section goes over
definitions and terms used throughout this document to include dependency,
interdependency, interdependency subtypes, and coupling strategies. The next section
details modeling efforts encompassing interdependent infrastructures in general and then
focuses on network-based IIR modeling. The third section provides a synthesis of key
characterizations of IIR modeling. The last section discusses data access and availability.
2.1. Defining Interdependencies and Coupling Strategies
Interdependencies and coupling strategies are fundamental concepts of the present
work. The first subsection discusses the differences between dependency and
interdependency. The second subsection details the two main types of interdependencies
used in this present work – operational and restoration – and then explains 10 different
subtypes. The third subsection summarizes multiple coupling characterizations and then
four different coupling strategies employed in this research.
2.1.1. Dependency vs. interdependency
Rinaldi et al. (2001) made a clear distinction between dependence and
interdependence. Dependence means that an infrastructure relies on goods or services
from another infrastructure system. Electrical power systems provide an example of
dependencies under normal operating conditions. The electrical power system relies on
transportation infrastructure for petroleum product delivery, it relies on
telecommunication infrastructure for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) management, and it relies on water infrastructure for emissions control and
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cooling. The transportation, telecommunication, and water infrastructures, in turn, rely on
the power system infrastructure for traffic management, information system operation,
and water distribution, respectively. This mutual dependency creates an interdependency
or a bi-directional dependency between two infrastructure systems (Figure 2.1).

Fig. 2.1. Some examples of interdependencies, which establish a two-way connection
between systems either directly or through other systems (Rinaldi et al. 2001)

Some interdependencies are direct relationships and others are indirect
relationships. An example of an indirect interdependency is illustrated in Figure 2.1
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between the water and oil infrastructures. The oil infrastructure depends on the water
infrastructure for oil and lubricant production and environmental management during the
production process. The water infrastructure does not directly depend on the oil
infrastructure, but does depend on both the electric power and telecommunication
infrastructures which depend on the oil infrastructure. Therefore, an indirect
interdependency exists between oil and water infrastructures.
Another definition of interdependency stems from the distinction between the
prefixes intra and inter, meaning within and between, respectively (MerriamWebster.com 2021). The presence of a connection does not immediately form an
interdependence. Rather two infrastructure systems are interdependent if and only if the
state of each is dependent on the other (Rinaldi et al. 2001). Therefore, a strategy
employed by many when capturing any type of interdependence is to capture all
dependencies between components of infrastructure systems (Almoghathawi et al. 2019;
Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; González et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2007; Sharkey et al. 2015). By
capturing all dependent relationships between infrastructure systems, all interdependent
relationships are also captured. This more generalized interdependency definition of
dependence between systems ensures that all direct and indirect interrelationships are
included. This is the definition used in the present research.
2.1.2. Types and subtypes of interdependency
Two primary categorizations of interdependency types are used – operational and
restoration. Rinaldi et al. (2001) suggested that interdependencies vary widely from
system to system, but that there were four different subtypes of operational
interdependencies to include physical, cyber, geospatial, and logical. Sharkey et al.
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(2016) claimed there were at least five different restoration interdependency subtypes
impacting system recovery to include traditional, effectiveness, and options precedence,
time-sensitive options, and resource competition. González et al. (2016) also highlighted
a uniquely restorative aspect of the geospatial interdependence subtype, which is called
geospatial repair. Table 2.1 provides a description and an example of each operational
interdependency subtype as established by Rinaldi et al. (2001)
Table 2.1. Description and examples of operational interdependency subtypes
Subtype

Description

Example

Physical

One system’s output is another
system’s input and is
established by flow of
commodities or materials.

Electricity from the electrical power
network supplying power to a
pump in the water network,
which is used to distribute water
in the water network.

Cyber

The state of an infrastructure
system depends on
information, which is
transmitted through the
telecommunication
infrastructure.

SCADA systems controlling the
natural gas and electrical power
grid which send information
through the telecommunication
infrastructure to alter the flow of
natural gas to meet electrical
power production demand.

Geospatial

Based on physical proximity and
occurs when a local event can
cause a change in the state
across all infrastructure
systems.

A power line and communication
line are strung under a bridge and
the disaster on the bridge could
cause effects in all systems
(Kennedy 2003).

Logical

An interdependent relationship
between two systems that is
not physical, cyber, or
geographical (e.g., control
schemaa, economic
influencesb, societal and
policy influencesc).

A national security incident
involving the aviation industry,
which caused a policy that shut
down airport traffic for multiple
days (Faturechi et al. 2014).

a

See Rinaldi et al. (2001); b see Zhang et al. (2018); c see Pederson et al. (2006)
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As mentioned previously, these four operational interdependency subtypes are not
the only operational interdependency subtypes listed in the literature. Ouyang (2014)
compiled five different lists of interdependency subtype definitions from literature.
Ouyang then used ten emergency events that exhibited interdependencies between
systems from historical disasters to assess the interdependency definitions. According to
Ouyang’s assessment, only Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) definitions could be used to classify all
ten interdependency relationship examples. Three of the six definition lists could classify
70% of the emergency events and one list could classify only 40%. Figure 2.2 illustrates
how Rinaldi et al.’s framework was able to classify all the events exhibiting
interdependent relationships; however, 60% of the events were classified by the catch-all
logical interdependency subtype. This shows that although Rinaldi et al.’s framework is
sufficient, a large portion of interdependent manifestations in a network fall under the
logical interdependency subtype.

Fig. 2.2. Ouyang’s (2014) assessment of interdependency subtype definitions showed
that Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) definition could classify all interdependent relationships
considered with 60% classified as the logical interdependency subtype
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Of particular interest to the present work are the interdependencies that only
appear during the restoration of the disruptive event (Ouyang 2014; Sharkey et al. 2015,
2016). Table 2.2 provides a description and an example of each restoration
interdependency subtype. Figure 2.3 illustrates the four precedence relationships (i.e.,
traditional precedence, effectiveness precedence, options precedence, and time-sensitive
options) described in Table 2.2.
In sum, by combining operational interdependency subtypes from Rinaldi et al.
(2001) and restoration interdependency subtypes from Sharkey et al. (2015, 2016) and
González et al. (2016), a more comprehensive IIR model can be established. This results
in a total of ten interdependency subtypes. No model to-date has incorporated all of these
interdependency subtypes within a single model, though some existing models could
handle some of the different interdependency subtypes with some modifications or
additional sets of constraints (González et al. 2016).
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Table 2.2. Description and examples of restoration interdependency subtypes
Subtype

Description

Example

Traditional
precedence

A restoration task in system 𝐵 cannot Case 1 is when power needs to
be restored in order to test a
take place until a restoration task in
piece of equipment that went
system 𝐴 is completed. This
down.
happens typically because either 1)
system 𝐵 requires the restoration
Case 2 is when downed power
of the service from 𝐴 or 2) the task
lines need to be cleared before
in system 𝐴 prevents the task in
debris from an obstructed
system 𝐵 from starting.
roadway can be cleared.

Effectiveness
precedence

A restoration task in system 𝐵 is not
as effective until a restoration task
in system 𝐴 is accomplished. This
could mean a longer processing
time or more resources are needed
to accomplish it.

Restoring power to a nearby
pumping station in order to
remove excess water from a
flooded street. The alternate
execution is with small pump
trucks with lower flowrate and
lower capacity.

Options
precedence

A service can be restored in system 𝐵
as long as one of many possible
solutions in some other system
(e.g., system 𝐴, 𝐶, etc.) is restored.

A facility may continue to
operate if either the power is
restored or a generator is
installed.

Timesensitive
options

Either power needs to be restored
A restoration task in system 𝐴 must
by a certain deadline or the
be performed by a certain deadline.
generator needs to be refueled
If the restoration task in system 𝐴
on a critical facility.
is not or will not be completed by
that deadline then a new task, say
in system 𝑍, must be accomplished
by that deadline.

Resource
competition

Any number of systems are in need of Three buildings each in need of a
shared resources.
mobile generator and only
having one.

Geospatial
repair

Two or more restoration tasks are colocated and can share in the burden
of site preparation.
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Disruption in a water main
coincides with road that
subsided during an
earthquake.

Fig. 2.3. Precedence diagrams for four of the six restoration interdependency subtypes
explained in Table 2.2

2.1.3. Coupling strategies
Infrastructure may be coupled or connected in a variety of ways, which will often
determine their response. Table 2.3 summarizes several different coupling
characterizations and the subsequent interdependent infrastructure response.
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Table 2.3. Description of coupling characterizations and associated system response
Coupling Characterization

Description and System Response

Tight or loosea

A tight coupling exists when a failure in system 𝐴
nearly instantly affects system 𝐵.

(Inflexible or adaptive)

A loose coupling exists between systems 𝐴 and 𝐵, when
a disruption in one has some degradation in the other.
That degradation may be full or partial and delayed or
gradual.
Linear or complexa,b,c

A linear coupling is predictable and manifests a planned
response due to design and the absence of feedback
loops.
A complex coupling is sometimes unpredictable and
manifests irregular or unplanned response during
normal procedures often due to the presence of
feedback loops.

Deterministic or
randoma,c,d,e,f,g

A deterministic coupling may be established through
consultation with infrastructure managers or designed
into the system and elicits a planned response.
A random coupling is a fabricated relationship often
used due to lack of interdependency data, available
infrastructure data, or to generate some network
topological configuration.

String or meshd

These couplings are listed as a separate characterization
of coupling, but with no description or example given
in the literature.

a

See Rinaldi et al. (2001); b see Fletcher (2001); c see González et al. (2016); d see
Haimes et al. (2007); e see Lee et al. (2007); f see Karakoc et al. (2019); g see Lewis
(2009)

Additional relevant topics introduced by Rinaldi et al. (2001) associated with
coupling was the concept of coupling order and nth-order effects. Coupling order
indicates whether two infrastructure systems are directly coupled or whether they are
coupled through one or more other infrastructure systems. This directly leads to the
concept of nth-order effects, which is that disruption between two systems have rippling
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or cascading effects into other systems. Cascading effects and failures have been one of
the principle thrusts of interdependent infrastructure research (Buldyrev et al. 2010; Chai
et al. 2016; Department of Homeland Security 2009; Kong et al. 2019; Loggins and
Wallace 2015).
González et al. (2016) provided a mathematical definition for four different linear
or deterministic coupling strategies. The authors mentioned these types of coupling can
describe node-to-node coupling for all operational interdependency subtypes that behave
in the described manner. The authors presented only one coupling strategy combined
with only the physical interdependency subtype in their model formulation. All four of
these coupling strategies are the ones used in this research and are briefly presented
below.
To describe these coupling strategies let there be a set of nodes belonging to a
particular infrastructure, denoted as 𝒩 𝑘 . Let an interdependent set of nodes belonging to
a different infrastructure be denoted as 𝒩 𝑘̃ . Finally, let there be a node-based component
in either system designated as 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 or 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ , representing the parent and child node,
respectively. With these things established, González et al. (2016) explained the four
coupling strategies as follows:
•

Case 1, one-to-one: a component 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ is only functional when a specific
singular component 𝑖 = 𝑖 ∗ is functional, where 𝑖 ∗ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 .

•

Case 2, one-to-any: a component 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ . is functional when at least one
component of a subset is functional, namely 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ∗𝑘 where 𝒩 ∗𝑘 ⊆ 𝒩 𝑘 .
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•

̃

Case 3, one-to-all: a component 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is functional only if every component
from a subset, 𝒩 ∗𝑘 ⊆ 𝒩 𝑘 , is functional.

•

Case 4, one-to-many: a component 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ depends partially on the functionality
of a subset of components, 𝒩 ∗𝑘 ⊆ 𝒩 𝑘 . The dependence on each component 𝑖 ∈
𝒩 ∗𝑘 is not necessarily the same. Thus, each node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ∗𝑘 provides a fraction of
the functionality of 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ .
While these four coupling strategies do not completely encompass all

possibilities, they describe various realistic connections between infrastructure systems.
One coupling that seems to be missing is the many-to-many relationship. However, this
can be achieved by establishing multiple one-to-many relationships. Further discussion
on coupling and its effect on IIR will be presented in Chapter IV.
The presence or absence of various coupling strategies within a network will
impact the formulation of an IIR model. No formulation known includes various coupling
strategies to be inherent in the formulation. This integration is a necessary complexity to
approximate more closely the variety of coupling that exists within real interdependent
infrastructure systems.
2.2. Modeling Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery
This section provides a general overview of IIR modeling and simulation efforts.
The first subsection discusses the various types of methods used for modeling and
simulation of interdependent infrastructure systems in general. The following subsection
discusses network-based models. Then the third subsection analyzes IIR models relevant
to the present work.
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2.2.1. Types of interdependent infrastructure modeling methods
Several reviews of interdependent infrastructure models have been conducted,
which highlight several different methods to try and model these complex systems and
networks (Eusgeld and Kröger 2008; Griot 2010; Ouyang 2014; Pederson et al. 2006;
Satumtira and Dueñas-Osorio 2010). Largely, the various approaches can be categorized
as empirical methods, agent-based methods, system dynamics, economic theory,
network-based methods, and other methods. Each of these will be briefly summarized.
Empirical methods relate to combing through historical infrastructure failure or
disaster data and using data analytics to determine failure patterns and failure indicators.
This method then leverages this information to perform risk analysis and forecasting.
This approach is typically done at an infrastructure system level with little finer
granularity. It is often done by scouring news feeds and reports after a disaster has
happened. Ouyang (2014) highlighted three shortfalls of this method including
misreporting, no standardized data trying to be collected from event to event, and being
very event-dependent. This means there may be issues trying to extrapolate data and
information from one disaster to simulate a similar disaster in another area on different
networks. Some issues including construction standards and socio-economic imbalance
can play into the complexity of trying to use system specific data elsewhere.
Agent-based methods are a bottom-up approach that model both systems and
users in the system as agents (Rinaldi et al. 2001). This method is highly promising as a
method that can be used to model such complicated networks; however, it comes at a cost
of building from the ground up (Pederson et al. 2006; Satumtira and Dueñas-Osorio
2010). A weakness of this method is that every agent has assumptions made about it
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regarding the agent’s behavior (Ouyang 2014). To compound this problem further, there
is often a lack of data to validate the assumptions being made to govern the interactions
of the agents.
System dynamics is a top-down approach used at a system-level. It leverages a
series of differential equations to describe the system-level behaviors. This has
limitations of not being able to evaluate the impact of a component on the system. Some
issues identified by Ouyang’s (2014) review are the high reliance on subject matter
experts, the semi-quantitative nature, the large amounts of data (typically not accessible)
for parameter calibration, and conceptual validation.
Economic theory employs either the Leontief’s input-output inoperability model
or computable-general-equilibrium based methods. The first method adopts a systemscale economic model to determine and assess interdependencies (Haimes et al. 2007).
While typically only at a system-level, some application has been made on a community
scale with higher granularity (Valencia 2013). A large advantage of this method is the
accessibility to data for use in the model. This modeling method has also been used for
restoration resource allocation scheduling (Zhang et al. 2018). A major issue with this
method is since the interdependency is derived from macro-scale economic data the
values in the adjacency matrix only measure interdependency strength during normal
operations and are limited, at best, as approximations during recovery and restoration
activities (Ouyang 2014). Additionally, when evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
using the computable-general-equilibrium based methods, Ouyang (2014) commented on
the lack of substantiating data to derive some of the parameters.
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Network-based approaches are a promising area of interdependent infrastructure
system modeling. Network-based models are typically either topology-focused or based
on a network flow method. A topology focus seeks to evaluate any number of things
(e.g., failure propagation, performance, resilience) based on the structure of the network
or networks (Lewis 2009). An advantage to this method is there is minimal data
requirements, since the networks are typically generated using certain parameters to
create random networks with desired attributes. However, a huge limitation is the
applicability these models can provide, since they are randomly constructed, which most
civil infrastructure networks are not (Ouyang 2014). A network flow method seeks to
account for the services flowed by the individual infrastructure systems. This is typically
a bottom-up approach and provides insight into component-scale interaction. The
downside to component-scale analysis is the level of detail and the amount of data, which
is typically sensitive and not easily accessible (Ouyang 2014). Some efforts have been
made to make datasets available for interdependency modeling using network flow
models, but there are not many (González 2017; Loggins et al. 2013).
Other methods include hierarchal holographic modeling (HHM), high level
architecture (HLA), petri nets, dynamic control system theory, and the Bayesian network
methods (Ouyang 2014). Haimes et al. (2007) provided an example of what an HHM
framework would look like, however it is difficult to apply to interdependent
infrastructure systems due to complexity, which becomes complicated and infeasible.
Eusgeld et al. (2011) produced a layout of a model using HLA methods for a SCADA
and other systems under control in a unique coupled or aggregated approach. As noted by
Ouyang (2014), HLA is the only method so far that has capability to model the entirety of
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the resiliency problem, but has yet to be done. This is due to the fact that the HLA
theoretically is a construct that interfaces with various models and is therefore a means to
define relationships between various model types (IEEE Computer Society 2010). Petri
nets are a four-tuple mapping of places, transitions, inputs, and outputs. It is similar to
network models and is sometimes used in conjunction with them (Yianni et al. 2016).
Dynamic control systems theory describes infrastructure systems and their
interdependencies by the use of transfer functions into a frequency domain and then the
interdependency can be computed by the norm. Bayesian networks is based on an acyclic
graph which uses arcs as conditional dependencies and nodes as infrastructure systems.
From the two most promising model types (i.e., agent-based models and networkbased models), network-based models were selected for this research. A particularly
useful analysis completed by Ouyang (2014) developed example resilience strategies and
then determined which models were best suited to those strategies from literature. The
analysis covered the resistive, absorptive, and restorative capacities of a system. Since the
present research deals with recovery from a degraded state, the resilience strategies based
on restorative capacity offered an area of potential research. Specifically, network-based
flow models were chosen because they offered several desirable traits, including an area
of research for improving organizational structure to increase effective restoration
activities, the ability to model various interdependency types, and the ability to model
multiple states of the system. There is also a need to develop more accessible datasets for
network-based modeling purposes, which presents an area for further contribution. Table
2.4 summarizes these desirable attributes of network-based models as adapted from
Ouyang (2014).
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Table 2.4. Network-based models have gaps in organizational structure associated with
recovery, need improvement to accessible data sources, and can model multiple
interdependency types and states of the system (adapted from Ouyang 2014)
Restorative resilience strategy with minimal research
Adjust and improve the organizational and administrative structure to accelerate
restoration decisions and coordination, such as sharing information among
stakeholders, establishing the fusion center to coordinate the participants
during emergency scenarios

Additional considerations for network-based models
Accessibility of input data
(High, Medium, Low)

Value
Low

Operational interdependency subtypes
(P-physical, C-cyber, G-geospatial, L-logical)
Maturity
(High, Medium, Low)

P, C, G, L
High

System states able to model

Yes or No

Original Stable State

Yes

Disruption (state transition)

Yes

Disrupted State

Yes

Recovery (state transition)

Yes

Recovered Stable State

Yes

2.2.2. Network-based models
Network-based models generally seek to describe a network or graph, 𝒢,
comprised of a set of nodes, 𝒩, and a set of arcs, 𝒜. The graphs may be either directed
or undirected, but in most instances dealing with infrastructure systems, they are directed
and represent the physical infrastructure systems. Occasionally some sort of mapping
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function is employed to map arcs to pairs of nodes (Lewis 2009). In the case of
interdependent infrastructure systems, this is usually modeled as a multilayered network
(Bianconi 2018; Boccaletti et al. 2014; Kennedy 2003; Kivelä et al. 2014).
Bianconi (2018) describes various multilayered approaches to analyze complex
networks including multi-plex, multi-slice, and network-of-networks. These variations
deal with the mapping of network components between layers and whether they are
mapped one-to-one in multi-plex and multi-slice structures or whether there is no one-toone mapping. The use of a supernetworks and supraadjacency matrices are able to detail
network-to-network connections. In general, interconnections and interdependencies are
strictly bipartite between two different pairs of infrastructure systems (e.g., system 𝐴 and
system 𝐵). This leads many to model the interdependencies as a binary variable or
parameter between a pair of infrastructure systems (González 2017; González et al. 2016;
Lee et al. 2007; Sharkey et al. 2015).
Another element of modeling interdependent network flow models is the concept
of multicommodity flow, where the infrastructure services are modeled as the
commodities (Ahuja et al. 1993). This has led to several extensions of the
multicommodity flow model to construct network flow models developed with the
express purpose of modeling interdependent infrastructure networks during disruptions
(Guha et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2009). A unique method proposed by Holden et al. (2013)
used multi-function node operations to simulate the interdependencies among systems by
allowing commodity conversion in a multicommodity network flow construct. This
approach has some benefits in the ability to capture various aspects of commodity
demand, flow through, conversion of one commodity to another, storage, and waste or
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discharge. This approach flattens a multilayer network into one giant single layer
network, which may have some disadvantages as well. Infrastructure data is often layered
in data structures and are examined in the present work as multilayered systems.
Network models have not only been used to model interdependencies, but have
been used for measuring resilience (Attoh-Okine 2016). Resilience-focused modeling has
resulted in network measures that seek to quantify interdependence and resilience
(Almoghathawi et al. 2017; Hosseini et al. 2016). This has led to work trying to quantify
the cyber-physical-social interdependencies (Barker et al. 2017). An extension of Barker
et al.’s (2017) work models community resilience and seeks for social equity in
restoration resource distribution (Cutter 2016; Karakoc et al. 2020; Ramirez-Marquez
2019).
Other efforts have sought to model incremental network design, which in some
sense is similar to recovery operations. Averbakh and Pereira (2012) helped establish
some mathematical framework which was further employed in efforts to incrementally
build or design a network (Baxter et al. 2014; Kalinowski et al. 2018). Some applications
of this method are similar to restoration efforts.
Of particular interest is the application of network flow models in restoration of
networks. Guha et al. (1999) looked at the recovery of power systems after disruptions.
Ang (2006) likewise studied disrupted power systems and sought to find optimal
recovery strategies. Nurre et al. (2012) developed an integrated network design and
scheduling problem, which others have similarly built upon (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013;
Iloglu and Albert 2018; Sharkey et al. 2015). Iloglu and Albert (2020) used a maximal
covering problem construct in order to look at restoration activities.
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While not an exhaustive review of network-based literature, the preceding
summary establishes network-based flow models as a capable tool for addressing
network restoration. The primary focus of this research is on network-based restoration
activities within interdependent infrastructures. Therefore, the next subsection details
several models considered as network-based IIR models.
2.2.3. Network-based interdependent infrastructure recovery models
This subsection details models that can be considered as network-based IIR
models. This assessment is based on four inclusion criteria to include the models being
network-based, recovery-focused, containing multilayered infrastructures, and exhibiting
interdependency. Table 2.5 describes each of the inclusion criteria.
Table 2.5. Description of inclusion criteria that is used to classify models as networkbased interdependent infrastructure recovery (IIR) models
Inclusion Criteria

Description

Network-based

Model or problem formulation must exhibit network
flow, or flow of one or more commodities across a
network of nodes and arcs (vertices and edges).

Recovery-focused

Model or problem formulation must include element of
scheduling or repair to damaged components of the
network(s).

Multilayered infrastructures

Model or problem formulation must include multiple
infrastructure systems or layers that can be
simultaneously evaluated.

Interdependency

Model or problem formulation must address
interdependencies (i.e., operational, restoration)
between the multiple layers within the overall
system of systems.

Each network-based IIR model is discussed briefly using a modified
interdependent infrastructure assessment framework proposed by Griot (2010). The most
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meaningful modifications include detailing how interdependencies are handled and which
interdependency subtypes are modeled. While only summaries of this assessment are
captured in this chapter, Appendix B includes assessment notes on each model included
in this research. The common assessment framework allows model comparison to
highlight both unique and common features. Particular emphasis will be given to the
formulations of Gonzalez’s (2017) time-dependent interdependent network design
problem (td-INDP) and Sharkey et al.’s (2015) interdependent integrated network design
and scheduling (IINDS) problem. These two models provided the most comprehensive
base in which to build the model presented later in this research.
Lee et al. (2007) developed the interdependent layer network (ILN) model. The
objective of this model was to find the least cost recovery strategy by minimizing the cost
of flow, the unmet weighted demand, and service disruption caused by interdependencies.
This was achieved by creating a deterministic mixed-integer program (MIP). This model
was built with the idea of modeling a similar event to the attack on and subsequent
disaster that resulted from the collapse of the World Trade Center. The model considered
power, telecommunications, and subway infrastructure systems on a dataset built with the
help of infrastructure managers within New York City. Interdependent layers were
connected by a dependency variable which created a binary relationship between the two
infrastructure systems. This model proved to be able to generate optimal recovery
strategies where all the damage and resources are known. Limitations of this model are
that it required an “acceptable timeframe” for recovery operations, without specifically
calling out what that was (Lee et al. 2007). This model could not support a scenario in
which resources changed over time or if damage occurred at multiple points in time.
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Variations or adaptations of this model also exist (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Loggins et al.
2019).
Building off of the work of Nurre et al. (2012), who presented the integrated
network design and scheduling (INDS) problem, Cavdaroglu et al. (2013) built upon the
work from the ILN and added elements of restoration task assignment and scheduling.
The objective of this model also was to find least cost recovery strategies by seeking to
minimize the cost of flow, unmet demand, unmet demand based on interdependencies,
recovery costs of arcs, and assignment costs. The authors similarly employed a
deterministic MIP, combined with some data pre-processing to try and shrink the instance
size. They employed a specialized heuristic to find solutions rather than solving to
optimality. This was largely due to the time index substantially increasing the number of
constraints and computer limitations with memory management. Similar to Lee et al.
(2007), the authors wanted to use a similar computing power to what would be expected
from an emergency manager using a laptop. The scenario tested was some unspecified
disruption to the power infrastructure and the effect on the telecommunications network.
This model was effective in combining and fully integrating restoration planning and
scheduling efforts for interdependent infrastructure systems. The formulation also
provided a way to measure how well the services were being recovered throughout the
process, rather than just at the end. Limitations with this model were assumptions that all
workers had sufficient skills to accomplish any task no matter the network, one work
group could accomplish any task, and no actual assignment costs were used based on an
assumption of an organic workforce.
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Sharkey et al. (2015) built upon the model proposed by Cavdaroglu et al. (2013)
and Nurre et al. (2012) to develop the interdependent integrated network design and
scheduling (IINDS) problem. The objective of this model was to more fully understand
the timing of recovery by selecting nodes and arcs to restore, scheduling repairs by
parallel work groups, and maximizing the cumulative performance of the network over a
finite period of time. This work added several unique elements to include the concept of
decentralized execution and the value of information sharing, integration of operational
and restoration interdependencies, and perspectives on interdependent infrastructure
datasets. The authors solved this problem by creating a deterministic MIP, solving it to
optimality. Various heuristics were used to simulate the different information-sharing
scenarios. Multiple binary interdependency variables were used to capture the various
types of interdependencies. The authors critiqued one dataset, due to it being energy-lead,
and therefore not completely telling of the ‘inter’-dependency between other systems.
This led to the use of a different, customizable dataset. Advantages of this model include
the ability to quantify the benefit of information sharing in a decentralized restoration
construct and the integration of multiple restoration interdependencies. Limitations of this
model include the assumption of instant and perfect information-sharing versus real-life
estimations of recovery from different stakeholders and the absence of including various
operational interdependencies.
Sharkey et al.’s (2015) objective function uses a node and time weight in order to
ensure critical nodes are recovered. The objective is to maximize performance, which
essentially measures the amount of demand met. Interdependency constraints are
formulated to address the function of supply, demand, and transshipment nodes in the
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interdependent (or child) infrastructure. Only two of five identified restoration
interdependency subtypes were evaluated. The only operational interdependency
subtypes used were physical and geospatial, with the geospatial being incorporated into
the damage simulation.
Gonzalez (2017) developed what he called the time-dependent interdependent
network design problem (td-INDP) model. This model served as a basis for subsequent
work by the author to include the iterative INDP and stochastic INDP described later
(González et al. 2016, 2017). The objective of td-INDP model seeks to find the least cost
recovery strategies. This is achieved by first maximizing commodity flow through the use
of surplus and deficit costs, which are being minimized. The objective function also seeks
to minimize the costs associated with reconstruction activities, cost of flow, and by
capturing cost savings in preparation for reconstruction efforts based on the geospatial
repair interdependency subtype. This was achieved by developing a deterministic MIP,
which was both solved to optimality and solved using various decomposition strategies.
This model had a particular advantage of being capable of handling multiple operational
interdependency subtypes, though only physical and geographical were used in the
problem instance. This model used a one-to-any coupling strategy even though the
authors suggested the model had the capability of incorporating other coupling strategies.
The authors even presented some partial formulations of different coupling strategies.
The problem modeled examined interdependencies between gas, water, and power
networks after a simulated earthquake causing various levels of damage. The advantages
of this model include the ability to handle multiple operational interdependency subtypes
and coupling strategies. The limitations of this model include the lack of logical and
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cyber interdependency subtypes, the lack of explicit formulation to handle various
interdependency subtypes and coupling strategies within any given infrastructure system,
and the assumption of complete and perfect knowledge at the time of disruption.
Gonzalez (2017) included surplus and deficit cost parameters, which essentially
act as weights to ensure flow of commodities is restored as a first priority. This objective
then seeks to maximize performance, which is measured as commodity demand met, by
the use of penalty costs. This is a technique used by others as well who are seeking for
least-cost recovery strategies (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2007). A distinct
difference in the scheduling constraints presented in the td-INDP is that they are not
employed in the context of a scheduling problem. Rather, they are employed as a general
restoration constraint. This generality means that it can encompass more than time
required and team assignment, but also does not explicitly include those things. This
generalization creates flexibility within the recovery model, but also lacks clarity and
details that other models provide. This is done by virtue of an assumption that the work
started in any given time will be completed in that time period. Therefore, the
functionality of a node or arc is determined by whether or not it was selected for repair in
one of the time periods under analysis.
Gonzalez et al. (2016) constructed the iterative INDP (iINDP), which removed
the time index and instead used the time periods as iterations in the INDP. This heuristic
solution to the td-INDP proved to change the computational burden from exponential to
linear, significantly improving the flexibility to use for near real-time employment in
disaster recovery. This heuristic also added a way to address previously fixed variables,
by offering an iterative update to parameters. The authors noted this may provide a closer
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approximation to the changing nature associated with recovery operations. Other model
elements were very similar to the td-INDP and are not reported here. The advantages of
this model were the significant reduction of computational time with an expanding time
horizon and allowing the periodic update to parameters. Limitations include splitting the
time horizon and use of a heuristic, which might not accurately depict the optimal
solution. However, the heuristic did show convergence with the optimal solution. This
model also had the distinct limitation of assuming non-realistic recovery times.
Gonzalez (2017) then incorporated uncertainty and developed the stochastic
INDP (sINDP). This approach changed the strictly deterministic approach into one that
included stochastic elements by utilizing stochastic embedded optimization. This was
done over a number of discrete events using Monte Carlo simulation. This was
constructed within a modified MIP, which included certain parameters that changed over
the various events. The main advantage of this formulation was the addition of a set of
scenarios which added uncertainty to parameters including the supply and demand of
commodities, availability of resources, and the use of resources in recovery operations.
This enabled a model user to adjust the levels of uncertainty. Disadvantages to this model
remain the same as from the td-INDP, and although uncertainty is added, the model still
assumes complete and perfect knowledge at the time of disruption and unrealistic
recovery times.
Almoghathawi et al. (2019) developed a multi-objective restoration model. The
multiple objectives of this model were to maximize the resilience, which was measured
as a ratio of recovered performance versus performance without disruption, and finding
the least-cost recovery strategy. Maximizing the resilience of the system was achieved by
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using an 𝜀-constraint method while minimizing the costs associated with the restoration
process, commodity flow, disruption, and unmet demand. This was done by developing a
deterministic MIP of discrete events over certain ranges. They analyzed power and water
systems by using a fictional dataset generated using algorithms. The primary advantage
of this model was the formulation and inclusion of a resilience measure in the objective
function that allowed the future exploration of the balance between “withstanding a
disruption” and “recovering from a disruption,” which represent the two primary
dimensions of resilience (Almoghathawi et al. 2019). Limitations of this model consist of
only one crew being assigned to a task with no allowance for multiple crews to be
assigned, no partial disruption or degraded conditions, only looking at physical
interdependency, and using a fictitious dataset.
From this review of network-based IIR models it is clear that significant progress
has been made toward the integration of network design (selection of nodes and arcs to
repair) and scheduling (assigning work crews) for the purpose of restoring interdependent
infrastructure systems. More work needs to be accomplished and several aspects or
characterizations of recovery operations were found during this analysis and are
explained in the following section.
2.3. Characterization of Recovery Operations
Based on the literature and models evaluated three primary objectives were
discovered which form a recovery operations trilemma. Additionally, several
assumptions repeatedly characterized recovery operations and have implications in the
modeling and simulation of IIR. The first subsection discusses the recovery operations
trilemma and the second subsection discusses the characterizing assumptions.
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2.3.1. The recovery operations trilemma
Three primary objectives were discovered to include minimizing the cost of
recovery, minimizing the time of recovery, and minimizing the loss of operability. Each
of these objectives are briefly discussed and then are combined in the recovery operations
trilemma.
Finding least cost recovery strategies was the most prevalent objective. Gonzalez
et al. (2016) included specific fixed recovery costs for every node or arc that was
damaged and selected for repair. The sINDP formulation included uncertainty and
variability of recovery costs (González 2017). Most authors used fixed costs, though this
is unlikely the case in true disaster recovery when scarce resources may drive recovery
costs up (González et al. 2016; Sharkey et al. 2016).
Finding the quickest way to recover infrastructure systems was also a prevalent
objective. What was not as common was realistic times associated with tasks. Gonzalez
et al. (2016) used an assumption that a certain number of work tasks could be
accomplished within a given time period. They varied the number of work tasks that
could be accomplished within a given time period from 3 to 12, disregarding the notion
that some activities take longer than others. Only one set of authors included a notion that
some tasks under certain conditions make take longer than necessary (Sharkey et al.
2015).
Finding a recovery solution that minimized loss of operability or maximized
system performance was a common objective. One way to think about this objective is by
discussing the type of repair performed. Type of repair refers to two different ideas found
in the literature, namely 1) a notion of expedient or temporary repair versus full repair
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and 2) partial repair leading to partial operability. Lee et al. (2007) made a clear
distinction that the temporary repairs were representative of quick fixes and not full
repairs. Full repair of damaged facilities in terms of cost and time can be significantly
higher than the immediate burden of expedient repair which restores some level of
operability. Partial work was not permitted in any models prior to a work crew being
assigned to a new restoration task; every model assumed a non-preemptive environment
(Pinedo 2016). Some models took into account completion of certain restoration tasks
spanning multiple time periods (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Nurre et al. 2012; Sharkey et al.
2015). A common surrogate of operability or performance was meeting demand.
These three objectives are actually competing objectives and form a recovery
operations trilemma. One definition of trilemma is a difficult decision between three
options, where the person deciding can only pick two (“Trilemma” 2021a; “Trilemma”
2021b). This decision tradespace parallels the construction/project management trilemma
of cost, speed, and quality (Atkinson 1999) or the infrastructure asset management
trilemma of cost, performance, and risk (International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) 2014). The basic idea in terms of optimality is a Utopian point in one of these three
objectives will not result in a similar Utopian point in the other two, leading to the need
for a compromise solution or Pareto optimal solution (Arora 2017).
Table 2.6 summarizes which objective functions the above-mentioned IIR models
used. From this brief analysis 5 included cost, 3 included time, and 3 included some form
of operability.
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General Objective Description

Lee et al. (2007)

Cavdaroglu et al.
(2013)

Sharkey et al.
(2015)

González et al.
(2016)

González (2017)c

Almoghathawi et al.
(2019)

Table 2.6. Matrix of IIR models compared to cost, time, and operability objectives

Minimizing cost

X

X

-

X

X

X

Minimizing repair time

Xa

-

X

-

Xa

-

Minimizing operability loss

X

-b

X

-b

-b

X

a

Implicit inclusion by use of time dependent index; b pseudo inclusion by using
penalty costs based on unmet demand; c includes td-INDP and sINDP models

2.3.2. Characterizing assumptions
Several assumptions characterized how recovery operations were modeled and
have implications in the resulting recovery strategies. These assumptions include teaming
structures, sufficient resources, negligible transit time, work efficiency, no degraded
conditions, no external support, compressed phases of recovery, and success of recovery.
This subsection explains each of these characterizing assumptions followed by an
assessment of which models addressed any of these assumptions.
Teaming structures used in recovery operations have typically employed parallel
teams capable of handling any restoration task necessary (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Nurre
et al. 2012). This means that regardless of the infrastructure system, it is assumed that the
right personnel are in every team to handle any task on any network. A closer
representation of reality is teams, whether equal in manpower or not, are designated for a
given infrastructure system (Almoghathawi et al. 2019; Sharkey et al. 2015). This equates
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to specific skill sets working on compatible infrastructure systems (e.g., electricians
doing work on the electrical power infrastructure and plumbers working on water
infrastructure). A different approach allows for flexible teaming structure, tailored to
meet the restoration task. This requires more granularity of requirements from the
restoration activities, which would likely be available after initial assessments are
completed.
Sufficient resources noted from the IIR models were mainly temporal or monetary
while all other resources were assumed to be sufficient. The resources of recovery time
and cost are appropriate and important. These two resources were addressed by the
objectives of the various models. However, the assumption and reliance on adequate
resources always being available may be inappropriate. The work by Gonzalez et al.
(2017; 2016) had an unspecified resource association in the model formulation. The text
suggested it was a general formulation that could account for any number of resources
required for the restoration activity. Although, this inclusion was unique, no resource
management or accounting was noted except that the constraints required what was used
for recovery had to be less than what was available. It is suggested that low-quantity and
high-demand material, vehicles, and equipment should be considered in IIR models
incorporating resource requirements.
Negligible transit time is a self-explanatory assumption and was not addressed by
any of the IIR models. Rather, it was mentioned by Aksu and Ozdamar (2014) and Yan
and Shih (2009). A concept of administrative delay could be added to account for transit
time between recovery task locations. It is also possible that certain equipment assets
travel at much lower speeds, making this perhaps more impactful and something to
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quantify if the assumption of sufficient resource availability is removed. Depending on
the length of time periods or the length of restoration tasks, this may or may not be
negligible (Aksu and Ozdamar 2014).
Work efficiency assumes that the rate of repair remains constant despite certain
conditions that could prolong an activity. The following could affect the efficiency of a
work crew, all of which are typically assumed away: skill level or proficiency, skill
matching, degraded work conditions (i.e., hazardous work conditions, contamination,
chemical spills, and confined spaces), and other procedures that require work stoppage
(i.e., military alarm response during attacks and shelter in place protocol). Sharkey et al.
(2015) are the only set of authors to include any concept of work efficiency based on
slower efficiency due to another task not being accomplished. As noted previously, some
authors did assume there was skill matching by assigning work crews within a given
infrastructure system, while others did not even mention whether or not this mattered.
No degraded conditions assumes that no adverse work conditions exist which
decrease work efficiency or could cause work to stop. Sharkey et al. (2015) somewhat
challenged the no degraded conditions assumption, which he referred to as effectiveness
precedence. The only other set of authors that addressed degraded conditions was Holden
et al. (2013). Holden et al. were the only authors that allowed for operations to continue
in a degraded condition. No specifics were given, but by allowing for partial
functionality, they were able to show how long a disaster scenario could be endured
before encountering a breaking point of a predetermined level of service. An additional
consideration of interest to the military could be activities associated with operating in a
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environment.
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No external support assumes that all resources, personnel, and material are on
hand and within the management of the modeled organization(s) (Cavdaroglu et al.
2013). Most authors did not address whether or not this happened except for Cavdaroglu
et al. (2013) which specifically stated that all crews were part of the management team’s
inherent resources and therefore all assignment costs were zero, simplifying the model.
However, as pointed out by Lee et al. (2007), recovery operations are collaborative and
often require resources from outside an organization. This is the role of the Emergency
Operations Center, if one exists, in the disaster response and recovery.
Compressed phases of recovery assume complete and total knowledge at the time
of disruption disregarding the normal flow of information and stages of disaster recovery.
Gonzalez et al. (2016) and Sharkey et al. (2015) allude to the various stages of recovery
but still assumed complete and total knowledge. In the case of a disaster, there are often
many uncertainties and information accumulates piecemeal. This is reflected as the
sloped decline on the resiliency curve by Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012) in contrast
to other models, which show an abrupt drop (Attoh-Okine 2016). While the failure might
indeed be abrupt, often the damage information is not instantaneous; however, sensor
integration may change this in the future (Sotres et al. 2017). This assumption was only
partially addressed by Sharkey et al. (2015) when addressing the traditional precedence
and including information sharing analysis.
Success of recovery is an assumption that takes out the uncertainty of reality by
assuming every repair effort is successful. González (2017) was the only author that
added any element of uncertainty, though he did not specifically address the success of
repair efforts. Therefore, no IIR models addressed this assumption and all models
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assumed that following recovery the node or arc restored is fully functional. This may
very well be a valid assumption, but it does not always reflect reality. It is highlighted as
a characterizing assumption since it was mentioned and may or may not be valid
(Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Sharkey et al. 2015).
Table 2.7 shows which IIR models challenged, in some respect, the prevailing
assumptions. From this analysis all the characterizing assumptions had three or fewer
models challenging the prevailing assumptions to some level. No models challenged all
the assumptions. Three characterizing assumptions were not challenged by any IIR
models, specifically negligible transit time, no external support, and success of recovery.
Each one of these prevalent assumptions represent areas of potential research.

Lee et al. (2007)

Cavdaroglu et al.
(2013)

Sharkey et al.
(2015)

González et al.
(2016)

González (2017)a

Almoghathawi et al.
(2019)

Table 2.7. Indication of which IIR models challenged characterizing assumptions

Teaming structures

-

X

X

-

-

X

Sufficient resources

-

-

-

X

X

-

Negligible transit time

-

-

-

-

-

-

Work efficiency

-

-

X

-

-

-

No degraded conditions

-

-

X

-

-

-

No external support

-

-

-

-

-

-

Compressed phases of recovery

-

-

X

-

-

-

Success of recovery

-

-

-

-

-

-

Characterizing Assumption

a

Includes td-INDP and sINDP models
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2.4. Interdependent Infrastructure Model Data and Validation
A revealing result of the foregoing analysis was the complication over data
involving interdependencies and their subsequent availability. This was also complicated
by no clear method of validation established for these models. These two problems will
be briefly described based on their importance to the current research.
2.4.1. Data availability
Mentioned by several authors is the lack of data on interdependencies, mostly due
to data availability (Almoghathawi et al. 2017, 2019; Buldyrev et al. 2010; Ouyang
2014). This led some to the creation of unique datasets (González et al. 2016; Lee et al.
2007; Sharkey et al. 2015). Others used fictious datasets that were either theoretical
(Holden et al. 2013) or generated (Almoghathawi et al. 2019).
Sharkey et al. (2015) described this problem at some length and criticized a
dataset that had been used previously as being biased in terms of identified
interdependencies (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2007). This led the authors to seek
another customizable dataset that was representative of a real system, but could provide
the necessary peculiarities for their modeling effort (Loggins et al. 2013).
Several issues surrounding data availability have been identified, but limited
solutions exist. One of the main issues is the sensitive nature of certain infrastructure data
(Lee et al. 2007). This is complicated by the complex management of various
infrastructure systems and some infrastructure system data being able to lead to
competitive advantage by some users (Rinaldi et al. 2001). Some data that is available is
at the wrong level of granularity and forces models to analyze interdependencies at a
higher abstraction (Barr et al. 2016; White et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2018). Some data-
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sharing initiatives have been employed at the national level with limited success
(Department of Homeland Security 2013; Peretti 2014). There is a need for data to
perform meaningful analysis and to truly understand the implications of
interdependencies in operation and restoration activities (Eusgeld and Kröger 2008;
Ouyang 2014). This remains a challenging area of all interdependent infrastructure
modeling and simulation efforts.
2.4.2. Model validation
Ouyang’s (2014) review of various modeling and simulation efforts for
interdependent infrastructure resilience highlighted two ways in which validation is
typically undertaken. The first method of validation is to compare model outputs to
previous models and historical data. The second method of validation is to use empirical
methods on historical events to develop key metrics or indicators used for validation.
Both of these methods are useful, but may be insufficient. Systems are changing and the
interconnections from historic events are not necessarily the ones that will be relevant in
the future. Historical data may have a problem reflecting the evolutionary change in the
complex adaptive systems that constitute interdependent infrastructure systems (Ouyang
2014; Rinaldi et al. 2001). Use of empirical methods to develop metrics still has
challenges to determine how best to use these metrics in decision-making and in response
and restoration activities (Ouyang 2014).
Current validation strategies seen in the literature involve 1) comparison with
other models, 2) heuristics versus a mathematical model, and 3) a human-in-the-loop
structure. This last method was employed by Lee et al. (2007) and Gonzalez et al. (2016).
Improvements in model validation may be hard to make, since even a model that suggests
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optimal recovery strategies is only optimal based on the assumptions and biases
programmed into it. However, some effort of scaled real-world simulation may be
profitable, and implementation by the Department of Defense “pull-the-plug” exercises
might be a way to validate some aspects of models in the future (United States
Department of Defense 2019).
2.5. Summary of Literature Review
From this literature review, certain areas have little to no documented research.
These areas include integrating all known interdependency subtypes and coupling
strategies in a simultaneous manner and challenging common assumptions. The
following list compiles areas where further research is desired, though not all will be
addressed in the present work.
•

No IIR model-to-date has included, inherent in the formulation, the four
operational interdependency and six restoration interdependency subtypes.

•

No IIR model-to-date has included, inherent in the formulation, the four coupling
strategies.

•

No IIR model-to-date has included a preemptive environment.

•

All IIR models use strict binary operability variables and do not allow for partial
operability.

•

There are only a few interdependent network model datasets and none exist which
are defense- or military-focused

•

IIR models have only challenged some of the prevalent characterizing
assumptions which have the potential to impact recovery solutions and objectives.
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III. The Customizable Artificial Community (CLARC) Database1
3.1. Introduction
The CustomizabLe ARtificial Community (CLARC) Database represents a
region-sized database for modeling and simulation of interdependent infrastructure
systems (Little et al. 2020). This database has been used by multiple authors mainly
exploring recovery of interdependent infrastructure systems following a disruption
(Loggins et al. 2019; Loggins and Wallace 2015; Sharkey et al. 2015). The CLARC
Database consists of 1,305 nodes representing 47 different nodal asset types across ten
infrastructures and 4,764 arcs representing 21 different linear asset types across five
infrastructures. This database also has 2,631 interdependent relationships between
infrastructures, where infrastructure A depends on infrastructure B. These interdependent
relationships are defined by the database creators to exist when a node in infrastructure A
has a demand in infrastructure B. This definition also assumes the demand in
infrastructure B is required for the operation of the node in infrastructure A. These
relationships are representative of node-to-node interdependencies mostly of a physical or
cyber nature (Rinaldi et al. 2001).
These technical notes summarize data inconsistencies found within the CLARC
Database, identifies two underlying concerns, and presents suggested improvements.

1

The contents of this chapter were independently submitted for publication by Moore and Jacques to
ASCE’s Journal of Infrastructure Systems on 10 June, 2021. The submitted article was titled “Technical
Notes on Using and Improving the CLARC Database for Interdependent Infrastructure Modeling and
Simulation.” Additional notes and explanations are found in Appendix A of this dissertation.
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3.2. Corrections to Use the CLARC Database
Data irregularities were identified and corrected addressing minor issues within
the Clarc_County_Social_Ver4.accdb as found in Sharkey et al. (2018). These issues
included missing demand, erroneous demand, mislabeling, missing location information,
and other arc inconsistencies. Each one of these types of issues are explained briefly in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Explanation of data inconsistencies found in CLARC Database
Type Issue

Explanation

1

Missing
Demand

When an asset had zero demand for a certain commodity while
other like assets had a non-zero demand. Missing demand was
discovered by filtering by data fields Definition and Name and
comparing the demand across like assets.

2

Erroneous
Demand

When an asset had demand for a certain commodity that didn’t
make logical sense. Erroneous data was detected when
examining stated interdependencies between systems.

3

Mislabeling Mismatch of naming convention which can cause confusion.
Found through line-item evaluation by examining other
parameters such as capacity or demand.

4

Missing
Locations

Data field Census_Tract was empty on certain assets. This field
was used to simulate damage when using HAZUS-MH in
multiple papersa.

5

Other

Self-explanatory. Several of the issues are duplications of arcs.

a

See Loggins and Wallace (2015) and Sharkey et al. (2015) for examples

There were 322 data errors discovered across five different types of issues. Table
3.2 summarizes correction type, quantity, infrastructure layer, and identifies the asset
Name or Definition when appropriate. The data field Name is used with a numerical
indicator following the root name (e.g., Wastewater_Treatment_Plant_7). The data field
Definition represents the asset type and is used for brevity when appropriate. The
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transportation and emergency response infrastructure layer is abbreviated as TER in the
CLARC Database and in these notes.
Table 3.2. Summary of 322 data errors found in CLARC Database
Type
1
1
2
2

Qty
1
5
34
34

Infrastructure
Wastewater
Wastewater
Water
Wastewater

Asset Definition or Name
Notes (if applicable)
Wastewater_Treatment_Plant_7
Pump_Station_61 & 208 to 211
ATM_1 to 34
ATMs do not require water
ATM_1 to 34
ATMs do not produce
wastewater
Def.: CF_Dist_Line,
Def. changed to
Name(root):
Power_Traffic_Line
Power_Traffic_Line
Waste_to_CF_269 & 270
Changed to
Water_to_CF_354 & 355
Def.: Local,
Def. changed to
Name(root): Trans_CF_Conn
Trans_CF_Conn
Waste_Main_Pipe_367 to 377
Not labeled as bi-directional
pairs; Renamed as
Waste_Main_Pipe_366 to
371
Waste_Main_Pipe_223
Arc is supposed to be bidirectional arc between
nodes 9508 and 9319
rather than duplicate loop
on node 9508
Power_Traffic_Line
Waste_Main_Pipe
Trans_CF_Conn
Waste_to_CF
Water_to_CF
Waste_Main_Pipe_380
Duplicate arc based on
change to
Waste_Main_Pipe 223
Trans_CF_Conn_403 & 415
Duplicate arcs,
and Trans_CF_Conn_405 &
Trans_CF_Conn_415 &
416
416 were deleted

3

30

Power

3

2

Water

3

10

TER

3

11

Wastewater

3

2

Wastewater

4
4
4
4
4
5

4
1
55
64
64
1

TER
Wastewater
TER
Wastewater
Water
Wastewater

5

2

TER

5

2

Communications Signal_83 & 152
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Reciprocal arcs missing; not
added

In summary, these errors were mostly minor, but serve as an improvement upon
the original dataset. In addition to these errors, some underlying concerns arose and are
explained in the following subsection.
3.3. Concerns and Suggested Improvements in Using CLARC Database in Modeling
and Simulation
Two underlying concerns with the original data became apparent when using the
CLARC Database for modeling. The first concern was the lack of telecommunication
infrastructure connectivity. Of the 45 non-telecommunication node types, only four had a
communication demand, namely: ATM, Gas_Station,
Emergency_Communication_Center, and Census_Point. The remaining 41 nodal asset
types that had no communication demand; however, 34 of the remaining 41 were
identified as having day-to-day and emergency telecommunication requirements. Table
3.3 lists all 34 assets and examples of possible telecommunication requirements.
The second concern was the lack of people or workers as a commodity within the
TER infrastructure layer. The TER commodities within the system are EMS, Police, and
Fire. While these listed commodities are critical emergency response commodities that
use the roadways, they also must compete with essential workers, repair crews, and the
general populace. During response and recovery phases of an emergency, the general
populace provides the work crews to sustain response and recovery efforts. Additionally,
large portions of the populace may or may not be simultaneously trying to evacuate an
area due to a natural hazard event thus creating congestion and infrastructure capacity
competition. This competition is not part of the model due to the absence of supply and
demand of people as a commodity throughout the network. Table 3.4 lists the
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modifications and additions within the demand portions of the nodes to address these
additional communications and personnel demands. These suggested modifications must
also be accompanied by viable delivery pathways (i.e., new arcs) as necessary. These
concerns and suggested improvements enhance the reality of modeling efforts using the
CLARC Database.
Table 3.3. 34 nodal assets have day-to-day and emergency telecommunication
requirements not captured in the original dataset
Node Asset Types

Information & Telecommunication
Requirements
Airport
Air Traffic Control, radar, telephone, internet
Banking_Central_Office
ATMs, bank transactions, telephone, internet
Bus_Terminal
WIFI, telephone, internet
Central_Office
Telephone, internet
Child_Residential_Facility
Telephone, internet
College
WIFI, telephone, internet
EMS_Station
911 calls, dispatch, telephone, internet
Ferry
Telephone
Fire_Station
911 calls, dispatch, telephone, internet
Fuel_Terminal
SCADAa, telephone
Group_Home
Telephone, internet
Hospital
WIFI, dispatch, telephone, internet
Hotel
WIFI, telephone, internet
b
Industry
SCADA, telephone, internet
Jail
Telephone, internet
Nursing_Home
Telephone, internet
Police_Station
911 calls, dispatch, telephone, internet
Pump_Station
SCADA
c
School
Telephone, internet
Shelter
Telephone
d
Substation
SCADA
Wastewater_Treatment_Plant
SCADA, telephone
Water_Treatment_Plant
SCADA, telephone
Well_Site
SCADA
a
SCADA – supervisory control and data acquisition; b Represents 8 different industry
types; c Represents 3 different school types; d Represents distribution and transmission
types
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Table 3.4. Suggested Communication and People demand data by node type

Infrastr.
PWR

Asset
Dist_Substation
Steam_Plant
Trans_Substation
WTR
Water_Treatment_Plant
Well_Site
WWT
Pump_Station
Wastewater_Treatment_Plant
TER
EMS_Station
Fire_Station
Police_Station
Banking_ATM
Banking_Central_Office
Fuel_Gas_Stations
Fuel_Fuel_Terminals
Hospital
Travel
Airport
Bus_Terminal
Ferry
Hotel
Education
Jail
School_High_School
School_Middle_School
School_Elementary_School
College
Healthcare Child_Residential_Facility
Group_Home
Shelter
Nursing_Home
Industry
Emergency_Communication_Center
Industry_Chemical_Plant
Industry_Solar_Plant
Industry_Battery_Plant
Industry_Xray_Plant
Industry_Distribution_Center
Industry_Software_Company
Industry_Steel_Company
Industry_Lumber_Yard
Residential Census_Point
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"Communication"
Orig.
New
1
10
1
5
1
1
5
10
24
24
1
1
10
1
5
5
95
475
5
5
10
24
48
48
24
475
24
24
5
48
1
24
475
475
238
238
95
48
95
24
1
500

"People"
New
10
5

5
10
25
25
10
5
5
100
500
5
5
10
25
50
50
25
500
25
25
5
50
25
500
500
250
250
100
50
100
25

3.4. Conclusions
The CLARC Database is a well-matched dataset for interdependent infrastructure
modeling and simulation. The 322 listed corrections to the original database should serve
to profit any future use of the dataset.
Two large concerns were apparent due to telecommunication connectivity and the
absence of people as a commodity within the standard dataset. These concerns are able to
be overcome with the information and suggestions expressed to include the connectivity
needed and the assets that require personnel for delivery of infrastructure services.
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IV. The Lite Base Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Model (LiteBIIRM) 1
4.1. Introduction
Changes in infrastructure management and protection are evident in current trends
with Industry 4.0, Smart Cities, and City of the Future initiatives (American Society of
Civil Engineers 2019; Rutgers and Sniderman 2018). Collectively these changes require
massive quantities of data which can be hard to acquire or access. While certain strategies
have been employed to overcome data access challenges, it remains a significant
problem.
The work presented herein addresses current work that proves useful when
encountering access issues for modeling and simulation of interdependent infrastructure
systems. It explores two of the six dimensions of interdependent infrastructure systems
called interdependency type and coupling (Rinaldi et al. 2001). This paper then leverages
these concepts of interdependency type and coupling as a way to overcome incomplete
data. This is accomplished by modifying a commonly used interdependency parameter to
incorporate these two elements, which allows for complex interdependencies to be
created based on the available infrastructure data. This work's applicability is shown by
comparing the results of recovery following a disaster for a network with all required
infrastructure data and a network with a significant portion of the data missing.

1 The contents of this chapter were independently submitted and accepted for publication by Moore,
Jacques, and Schuldt to INFORM’s Winter Simulation Conference 2021 on 9 April, 2021. The submitted
conference paper was titled “Leveraging Network Interdependencies to Overcome Inaccessible Civil
Infrastructure Data.”
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4.2. Literature Review
This section details relevant literature for two topics important to this research.
The first topic concerns current methods to overcome incomplete data for infrastructure
modeling and simulation (M&S). The second topic is handling operational
interdependencies by the use of an interdependency parameter in network-based
mathematical programs. This work combines these two topics by showing how
interdependency parameters and coupling strategies can help overcome partial or
incomplete infrastructure data.
4.2.1. Overcoming inaccessible infrastructure data for M&S
Issues with access to infrastructure data typically stem from one of three reasons:
the data is sensitive, proprietary, or lacks sufficient quality (Ouyang 2014). Sensitive
infrastructure information is the type of information that could cause security concerns
for a community if mishandled or inappropriately used. Geospatial coordinates of water
storage access points are an example of this. Proprietary infrastructure information is the
type of information that allows a private company providing an infrastructure service
(e.g., drinking water, electricity, etc.) some business advantage for sole ownership and
control of the information. Proprietary information is also not specifically mandated for
public disclosure. Data quality concerns may stem from sparse or randomly collected
data, lack of standardization in data collection, and subjective data. This last issue is
deeply concerning, seeing how emerging technology uses data to inform so many
decisions, and data quality is not always readily apparent.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the United
States Government has taken steps towards securing a data repository, and they have
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incentivized critical infrastructure information (CII) sharing through the Protected CII
(PCII) Program ( CISA 2005). The PCII was initiated in 2002, with the passing of the CII
Act, and updated in 2006 when additional regulations were added to ensure proper
handling and use of CII (CISA). However, industries and communities are still reluctant
to exchange data and/or relinquish proprietary data (Peretti 2014).
These governmental efforts are commendable; however, the data is also not
widely available for use or research. Therefore, researchers and practitioners in the area
of infrastructure M&S have come up with different ways to overcome the access to data
issues. Ouyang (2014), in a review article on M&S for critical interdependent
infrastructure, identified three workarounds: 1) empirical data harvesting from historical
events, 2) random or characteristic-specific generated networks, and 3) representative
data that seeks to take real systems and remove sensitive or proprietary information.
While none of these are ideal, they have made substantial research and improvements
possible. The present work uses the third option by using a representative dataset.
4.2.2. Operational interdependency parameter in network-based programming
Rinaldi et al. (2001) identified six dimensions of infrastructure interdependent
relationships; however, only two are critical for the present work. These two are
interdependency type and coupling. In their study, they provided a useful classification of
the types of interdependencies that affect network operations. These are physical (i.e.,
dependency based on the flow of materials), cyber (i.e., dependency based on the flow of
information), geospatial (i.e., dependency based on proximity), and logical (i.e., any other
dependency). These authors also described the coupling as being either tight or loose and
either linear or complex. Tight coupling suggests a strict interdependency between
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systems (e.g., an electrically driven water pump). A loose coupling suggests there is an
effect of one system on another, but it may not be directly felt (e.g., mining operation
disruption may slow road repair and maintenance, but not immediately due to the buffer
of raw material). Linear relationships behave proportionally, while complex relationships
are not proportionally related or the proportions change over time.
González et al. (2016) introduced an idea of how to view these two dimensions in
their presentation of the interdependent network design problem (INDP). While the
authors only presented one coupling strategy, they described four variations that can
cover most situations. These four strategies can be described as one-to-one, one-to-any,
one-to-all, and one-to-many couplings. The authors suggested that multiple
interdependency types and coupling strategies could be implemented if necessary;
however, the method for employing multiple types and coupling strategies was to make
independent sets of constraints with new variables and new interdependency parameters
related to different types and coupling strategies. The four different coupling strategies
will be discussed in more depth in the following section.
Other authors modeling interdependent infrastructure recovery have also used an
interdependency parameter to describe whether infrastructure systems are interdependent.
Lee et al. (2007) used a series of connector parameters which allowed them to establish
node-to-node and node-to-arc relationships, both types being a one-to-one style of
coupling. This formulation was a build-as-you-go type of formulation depending on what
relationships were needed, and it also used special sets extensively. Cavdaroglu et al.
(2013) used a binary variable equal to 1 if the slack of unmet demand at the parent node
was zero, allowing the child node to be operable. This parameter did not include various
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interdependency types or couplings, thereby reflecting only a one-to-one relationship.
Sharkey et al. (2015) used a binary variable similar to Cavdaroglu et al., except that their
binary variable was arc-to-arc instead of node-to-node and didn’t require all demand to
be met, but rather a sufficient amount of demand. This, in essence, allowed for some
degradation of service before the interdependency rendered the child node inoperable.
This also represents a one-to-one relationship. In contrast to these methods,
Almoghathawi et al. (2019) and Karakoc et al. (2019) used an operability variable instead
of an interdependency parameter to relate physically interdependent infrastructure
systems. These examples also represent a one-to-one and node-to-node relationship.
There is currently no model that employs both interdependency types and
coupling strategies as an inherent part of the interdependency parameters or constraints.
This paper proposes a way to implement such an integration. This modified
interdependency parameter is then used to show how it can help overcome situations with
partial infrastructure data.
4.3. Methodology
This section pulls together the formalization of coupling strategies and integrates
those strategies in a combined network design and scheduling problem. First, the general
notation used in the mixed-integer program (MIP) is given. Second, coupling strategies
are explained in detail, given a mathematical expression, and provided with anecdotal
context. Third, the MIP integrates the coupling strategies and interdependency types into
the formulation to addresses the combined network design and scheduling problem.
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4.3.1. General notation for MIP
The combined network design and scheduling problem is based on a graph,
𝒢(𝒩, 𝒜), comprised of nodes and arcs divided into layers indexed by 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. Each
infrastructure layer has one or more commodities indexed by 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 . The network is
assumed to be damaged, which means that subsets of nodes and arcs within each layer
have become inoperable. These nodes and arcs must be repaired by assigning work crews
and repairing the nodes and arcs. Table 4.1 summarizes the relevant notation for the MIP.
Table 4.1. General notation for the MIP comprising sets, variables, costs, and other
parameters for flow and scheduling
Sets
𝒦
𝒩
𝒩𝑘
𝒩 ′𝑘
𝒜
𝒜𝑘
𝒜 ′𝑘
ℒ𝑘
𝒲𝑘
Ψ
Ξ
𝒯

Description
The set of infrastructure
layers.
The set of nodes, indexed as 𝑖.
The subset of nodes.*
The subset of damaged
nodes.*
The set of arcs, indexed (𝑖, 𝑗).
The subset of arcs.*
The subset of damaged arcs*.
The set of commodities.*
The set of work crews.*
The set of interdependency
types, indexed as 𝜓.
The set of coupling strategies,
indexed as 𝜉.
The set of 𝑇time periods
evaluated, indexed as 𝑡.

Variables
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡

𝑘
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡

Parameters
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

Description
The variable of flow of 𝑙 in
arc.
Binary variable equal to 1 if
work crew 𝑤 assigned to
repair arc or node.
Binary variable equal to 1 if
arc or node was repaired by
work crew 𝑤.
The variable between 0 and 1
of operability of node or arc.
The variable of unmet demand
of 𝑙 at node.
The variable of surplus of 𝑙 at
node.

The amount of supply or
demand of 𝑙.
𝑘
The cost of flow of 𝑙 in arc.
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
The capacity of arc for all
The cost rate of assigning 𝑤.
commodities.
𝑘
The cost of repairing arc or
𝑝𝑖𝑗
or 𝑝𝑖𝑘
The processing time for repair
node.
of arc or node.
𝑘
𝑘
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 or 𝜇𝑖𝑡
The value (cost equivalent
𝜇𝐴 or 𝜇𝐵
Priority weight between 0 and
priority) of arc or node.
1 for objectives 𝐴 and 𝐵.
* Superscript 𝑘 means in infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦; subscript 𝑡 means at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. Asterisk
is used only for sets but pertains to variables and parameters as well.
Costs
𝑘
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑘
𝑎𝑤𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑞𝑖𝑡
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An additional parameter and set dealing with the integration of the coupling
strategies and the interdependency types are detailed in the following subsection.
4.3.2. Operational interdependency parameter and coupling strategies
̃

Let 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉 be a parameter that takes on a value from 0 to 1, describing a parentchild relationship between parent node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 and child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ based on some
interdependency type 𝜓 ∈ Ψ and coupling strategy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ. This operational
interdependency parameter effectively integrates the elements of previous work, which
allows for a node-to-node pairing. This parameter expands upon previous work by adding
characterization of interdependency type and coupling. This means that a node can have
more than one type of interdependency relationship between node pairs. This also
expands the interdependency relationship of a child node to one or more parent nodes.
Before describing the coupling strategies in depth and describing how they affect
the interdependency parameter, it is worthwhile to define the sets Ψ and Ξ. The set Ψ =
{𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝑐𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑟, 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙}, which encompasses the operational
interdependency types identified by Rinaldi et al. (2001). The set Ξ =
{𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑜𝑛𝑒, 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑎𝑛𝑦, 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦}, where each of these relationships is
explained below. An additional subset, used as a filtering set, is advantageous in the
̃

𝑘𝑘
programming of the MIP. Let 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 be a subset of nodes in a given network 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, that

have an operational interdependent relationship of some type 𝜓 with another node 𝑖̃ ∈
̃

̃

𝑘𝑘
𝒩 𝑘̃ in a different network 𝑘̃ ∈ 𝒦 based on some coupling 𝜉, where 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 ⊆ 𝒩.

The one2one coupling describes when a child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ can be functional only
if a parent node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is functional. This effectively means that when 𝜉 = 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑜𝑛𝑒,
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̃

𝑘𝑘
𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 is a singleton set for a given interdependency type 𝜓 (Figure 4.1). The one2any
̃

𝑘𝑘
coupling is the case when at least one of any number of nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 must be

functional for the child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ to be functional (Figure 4.2). The one2all coupling
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
is where all nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 must be functional for the child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 to be

functional. This means that each one2all parent-child relationship receives an equal
portion of the interdependency parameter, where the sum of all parts equals one (Figure
4.3). Finally, one2many coupling means that a portion (not necessarily equal) of the
interdependency parameter is associated with each parent-child relationship, where the
̃

sum of all parts equals one (Figure 4.4). Therefore, let 𝜔𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝑡 be the portion of
̃

̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
functionality or weight between nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 and 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 , where ∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘𝑘̃ 𝜔𝑖𝑖̃𝜓𝑡 =
𝑖̃ 𝜓𝜉

̃

𝑘𝑘
|𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 | , ∀𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 when 𝜉 = 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦.

Each one of these coupling relationships will also depend on the operability or
functionality of the parent nodes. This is represented by 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , which in the present work is
allowed to take on a value between 0 and 1. A parent node is inoperable when 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 = 0,
partially operable when 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 < 1, and fully operable when 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 = 1. In Figures 4.1 –
4.4 below, interdependent relationships are illustrated with either inoperable or fully
operable nodes. Partial operability in parent nodes is reflected by partial operability in
child nodes.
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Fig. 4.1. Illustration of one2one coupling between two infrastructures 𝑘 and 𝑘̃; a) when
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 is functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 may be functional depending on other
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
conditions; b) when node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 is not functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 is not functional

based on the interdependent relationship

Fig. 4.2. Illustration of one2any coupling between two infrastructures 𝑘 and 𝑘̃; a) when
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
any node(s) 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 are functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 may be functional depending on
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
other conditions; b) when all nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 are not functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 is not

functional based on the interdependent relationship
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Fig. 4.3. Illustration of one2all coupling between two infrastructures 𝑘 and 𝑘̃; a) when all
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 are functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 may be functional depending on other
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
conditions; b) when any node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 is not functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 is not

functional based on the interdependent relationship

Fig. 4.4. Illustration of one2many coupling between two infrastructures 𝑘 and 𝑘̃; a) when
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
all nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 are functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 may be functional depending on
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
other conditions; b) when some nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 are functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 may be
̃

partially functional based on a weighting factor (𝜔𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝑡 ) and depending on other
̃

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
conditions; c) when all nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 are not functional, then node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 is not

functional based on the interdependent relationship
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Table 4.2 summarizes these relationships and provides the mathematical
representation of the interdependency parameter. The MIP is presented following this
summary. It is important to note that although parent node(s) may be functional, that does
not directly equate to the child node's functionality. The child node must also have its
demand met, must not be damaged, or if damaged, must be repaired to be functional;
therefore, in the following figures, it is stated that the child node may or may not be
functional.
Table 4.2. Interdependency coupling strategies 𝜉 affects the
̃

interdependency parameter 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 by changing possible values
Coupling, 𝜉
One2one

̃

𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 *

Description
𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ is only functional when a specific
̃
𝑘𝑘
singular node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 .is functional and

1

̃

𝑘𝑘
𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 is a singular set.

One2any

𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ is functional when at least one node
of a subset is functional, namely some
̃
𝑘𝑘
node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉.

1

One2all

𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ is functional only if every node from
̃
𝑘𝑘
a subset 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 is functional.

1

One2many

𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ depends partially on the functionality
̃
𝑘𝑘
of a subset of nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 ; each node
̃

𝑘𝑘
𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 provides a fraction of the
functionality.
̃
̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
̃
* This holds for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 , 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 , 𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯

̃

𝑘𝑘
|𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉|
̃

𝜔𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝑡
̃

𝑘𝑘
|𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉|

Of note, strict adherence to the one2all coupling relationship is most effectively
achieved with binary restrictions on operability. Another method of modeling is based on
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the understanding that one2all relationships are multiple one2one relationships and is
discussed in greater detail in the results section.
4.3.3. MIP formulation
The following presentation describes the multiple objectives used in a weighted
objective function followed by the applicable constraints.
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦 (∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘[∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 (𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑤𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡 ) +
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡 + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
)] + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)

(4.1)

𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
) (4.2)

Minimize 𝜇𝐴 𝐴 − 𝜇𝐵 𝐵.

(4.3)

Subject to
−,𝑘
+,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑗:(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
− ∑𝑗:(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
− 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈

𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.4)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.5)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.6)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.7)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.8)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.9)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(4.10)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(4.11)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(4.12)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(4.13)
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min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡

≤ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑗
]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑗
−1]

𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝜏=1

(4.15)

𝑘
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≤1+

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘+1 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘 +1 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑖

(4.14)

𝑖𝑗

(4.16)

̃
∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘𝑘̃ 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑡 , ∀𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ , 𝑘̃ ∈ 𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝜉 ∈ Ξ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.17)

−,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.18)

𝑘
𝑘
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.19)

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.20)

0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.21)

𝑘
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.22)

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.23)

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.24)

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.25)

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(4.26)

𝑖̃ 𝜓𝜉

Equation (4.1) includes repair and assignment costs for damaged arcs and nodes,
followed by the flow costs. Equation (4.2) represents a weighted operability, which is set
as a competing objective in (4.3). Basic flow balance is shown in (4.4). Multicommodity
flow is capacitated and flow is restricted in three different ways based on operable startnodes, end-nodes, and arcs in (4.5-4.7), respectively. A repaired asset can become
operable, as shown in (4.8-4.9). Assets can only be repaired once and assigned to one
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crew, as shown in constraints (4.10-4.11) and (4.12-4.13), respectively. Damaged assets
are only repaired after they have been assigned and sufficient processing time has
occurred, as shown in (4.14-4.15). Constraint (4.16) shows work crews may only be
assigned to one repair task at a time.
Constraint (4.17) represents the operational interdependency constraint, which
uses the interdependency parameter to determine child node operability. Constraint (4.18)
suggests that a node is proportionally operable to the met amount of demand. The
Constraints (4.19-4.26) represent the side constraints based on variable definitions.
4.4. Results and Discussion
This section describes the infrastructure network, the missing telecommunications
data, and the results when comparing optimization results with full and partial datasets.
4.4.1. Simulated military base
Using the CLARC database as a starting point, the data was reduced to about 10%
of the original size while still preserving the diversity of operations and asset types (T.
Sharkey et al. 2018). This was done to recreate a representative military base with bidirectional system-to-system interdependencies inherent in the CLARC database. The
resultant reduced dataset was then constructed in a multiplex fashion, reflecting nodes
into layers where they had a demand, supply, or transshipment function.
An issue with the telecommunication infrastructure data was found due to only 4 of 47
different nodal asset types having any communication demand. For example, facilities
such as Fire Stations, Police Stations, Schools, Hospitals, and others had no
communication connections (i.e., arcs) and no demand. However, these facilities are
essential in recovery operations and are controlled largely by communicating with an
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Emergency Control Center (Lee et al. 2007). This issue represents partial infrastructure
data within a given layer, which was overcome using two different methods.
4.4.2. Overcoming telecommunications data gap with operational
interdependencies
The first method to overcome the partial telecommunication data represents
working with data owners and receiving the necessary data. This was accomplished by
creating a geospatial context for the reduced dataset and physically drawing each
connection to create a full representation of the complete infrastructure systems. This
became the full dataset. The second method used the partial data provided and created
various interdependency relationships to influence operability in lieu of acquiring
additional infrastructure data. This became the partial dataset with additional
interdependencies. The cost to produce such interdependencies is the time to
communicate with stakeholders on the actual or perceived connection and dependency to
establish the appropriate coupling relationship. The number of additional
interdependencies needed will be dependent on the amount of infrastructure data missing.
An example of overcoming missing infrastructure data by using an
interdependency is a Fire Station that requires communication to receive 911 emergency
calls. If this service is not available, then the emergency responders will not respond
because they are unaware of the call. Thus, the operability of one of two
telecommunication nodes (part of the partial telecommunications data) would allow the
Fire Station to remain as a supply node for the fire and emergency service commodity.
However, if both telecommunication nodes were inoperable, then the Fire Station would
also be inoperable since this represents no ability to send and receive 911 emergency
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calls. While actual systems have additional backups, this is used for illustration purposes
and as a proof of concept.
This example of the Fire Station depending on the telecommunication network is
an example of a one2any coupling based on a cyber (i.e., data and information flow) type
interdependency. This process was applied to every node that should have a
communications demand within a full dataset. The result was three variations of the
network: 1) dataset with full telecommunication data, 2) dataset with partial
telecommunication data and additional interdependency relationships, and 3) dataset with
partial telecommunication data without additional interdependency relationships. The
third set serves as a basis to judge the addition of interdependent relationships to
overcome infrastructure data gaps.
4.4.3. Comparison of optimization results
Comparing the full dataset and the partial dataset with additional
interdependencies shows the use of interdependencies as a viable option for overcoming
partial data. The time horizon for this comparison is 12 8-hour time periods. While not
the primary focus of this research, the model was programmed in GAMS v31.1.1 and
used CPLEX 12.10. All tests were conducted on a desktop computer with an Intel Xeon
CPU E5-1620 operating at 3.60 GHz with 16 GB of RAM. The average computational
time for the tests with partial data and additional interdependencies averaged at less than
8 mins, while the tests with the full dataset averaged at 18 mins.
Table 4.3 summarizes the number of nodes, arcs, and interdependent relationships
between the two different simulations. The full dataset represents 227 more nodes and
arcs than the partial dataset, whereas the partial dataset with additional interdependencies
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represents 102 more interdependency relationships than the full dataset. The same
damage was simulated in both simulations, even though additional arcs or nodes that
were not in the partial dataset could have been damaged in the full dataset.
Table 4.3. The full dataset represents more nodes and arcs, while the
partial dataset represents more interdependency relationships
Feature
Nodes
Arcs
Interdependencies

Full Dataset
507
886
123

Partial Dataset
432
734
225

The two different datasets were evaluated over varying objective function
weights, establishing Pareto optimal values or a Pareto front. Due to the disparity in the
number of assets, the overall operability objective value for the full dataset was 1.25
times higher than that of the partial dataset across the Pareto fronts. There was one
anomaly when cost was weighted the most and operability the least (i.e., 𝜇𝐴 = 0.9, 𝜇𝐵 =
0.1), which resulted in the operability objective function value being 1.57 times greater
than the partial dataset. After acknowledging the slight difference in the magnitude of the
operability objective function values, the overall trends were identical.
In the case with balanced objective functions (i.e., 𝜇𝐴 = 𝜇𝐵 = 0.5), the full
dataset showed an increase in operability from 65.8%, representing immediate operability
following the disruption, to 68.1% within the first four time periods. Then the model
showed a significant jump in operability at time period 5 to 89.4%, where it remained for
the time periods being evaluated. This signifies that the bulk of the optimal recovery
trying to balance operability and cost was achieved by time period 5, or 40 hours
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following the disruption, based on 8-hr time periods. The partial dataset showed similar
trends, with slight deviation in the percent operable. The partial dataset showed an
increase in operability of 65.6% to 68.2% in the first four time periods and an increase to
91.8% at time period 5 and beyond. The partial dataset deviation from the full dataset in
the first four time periods ranged from -0.2% to +0.3%. With the jump in operability at
time period 5 the percent deviation also increased to +2.6% from time period 5 on. Partial
data without the additional interdependencies underestimated the recovery from as great
as -6.0% to as little as -3.8%, never achieving as accurate results as the partial dataset
with additional interdependencies. Figure 5 illustrates how the partial dataset with an
increased number of interdependency relationships closely approximates the operability
of the system during recovery. The final operability percentage in these scenarios ranged
from 86.1% to 91.8% and didn’t progress to 100% operability due to the presence of
redundant flow pathways and the desire to balance cost and operability. Additionally,
𝑘
𝑘
nodes and arcs that have extremely low value, denoted by 𝜇𝑖𝑡
or 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
, and high costs
𝑘
𝑘
repair costs, denoted by 𝑞𝑖𝑡
or 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
, tend to be excluded from optimal results. This can be

beneficial to emergency repair crews to ensure emphasis on the critical aspects of the
system, prior to addressing non-critical components.
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Fig. 4.5. Partial data simulation with additional interdependencies more closely
approximated a full dataset than the partial data without additional interdependencies
The partial dataset employed only one2one and one2any coupling strategies since
this most accurately reflected the same relationships that existed in the full dataset. The
partial dataset scenario was also run by modifying the MIP to restrict the operability
𝑘
variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 and 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, to binary values with no significant changes to the operability

objective value, being within 3% at the greatest point of deviation. In fact, the strict
adherence to the one2one, one2any, and one2all coupling strategies may be best seen
when operability is modeled as binary variables. If operability is modeled as binary
variables, the same formulation as presented above holds for all coupling strategies
except one2many, which inherently is incompatible with binary operability variables.
In contrast, the inclusion of all the coupling strategies with a non-binary
operability variable, as in the current work, also becomes problematic when desiring
strict adherence to all the coupling strategies. The use of non-binary operability variables
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means that child node partial operability is possible based on parent node partial
operability. Effectively this creates an upper bound on child node operability based on
full or partial parent node operability and the associated coupling strategy. A child node
in one2one relationships has an upper bound based on the parent node operability. A
child node in one2any relationships may be fully operable so long as one node is fully
operable or the sum of all parent nodes' partial operability amount to one or more. A child
node in one2all relationships has an upper bound of some fraction of parent node partial
operability. A child node in one2many relationships has an upper bound of some partial
operability based on the sum of partial operability of the parent nodes.
A comparative example between binary and non-binary operability variables for
one2all relationships illustrates the difference. A one2all coupling between three parent
nodes and one child node results in an inoperable child node if any one of the three parent
nodes is inoperable when operability is binary. In the case of non-binary operability, the
node may experience operability up to 2/3 operability based on one node being
inoperable and the other two being fully operable. To achieve strict adherence to the
one2all coupling strategy with non-binary variables, a modification is made to constraints
̃

(4.17) by removing the summation over the set 𝒩𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘
𝜓𝜉 . This can be accomplished by
employing conditional constraint generation when programming the MIP.
Despite the need to slightly adjust the MIP presentation to accommodate one2all
relationships, the use of non-binary operability variables adds a significant level of reality
to the simulation. In very few instances will the termination of telecommunication
services result in complete inoperability. Therefore, partial operability is a closer
approximation to reality. This also allows the use of a pseudo node which can establish a
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baseline operability level regardless of the loss of service. For example, if an industry is
still 80% operable with the loss of internet and telephone services. A one2many
relationship can exist between 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ and any number of nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , with 80% of the
̃

weight times the cardinality of the set 𝒩𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘
𝜓𝜉 for some interdependency type 𝜓 ∈ 𝛹
residing in the relationship with pseudo node 𝑖 ∗ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 .
An additional scenario was built based on the partial dataset, which included a
partial operability baseline of 80% despite lack of telecommunication services except for
the emergency responders, which rely on telecommunications to send and receive 911
emergency calls. This scenario resulted in a near-perfect match because only three
facilities in the power infrastructure system met the conditions to have 80% operability
versus being reduced to zero. A different damage scenario could highlight this better, but
consistency for comparison was chosen over introducing a different damage scenario.
This shows the ability to incorporate all the various coupling strategies and
leverage the one2many relationship to help model complex relationships that result in
some impact to operability but do not render a node inoperable. This effectively assigns a
lower bound to operability based on interdependencies.
During the construction of these datasets, it was assumed and then shown in
analysis that this model's applicability only worked if the actual known
telecommunication nodes were damaged or inoperable. Suppose the service disruption
was from a telecommunication node in the partial and full datasets downstream to the
point of interest, thereby only belonging to the full dataset. In that case, this method could
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not show similar disruption as can be seen in the full dataset. This lack of granularity
points to the limitations of using interdependencies in lieu of a full dataset.
4.5. Conclusion
This paper detailed issues concerning access to data and then highlighted how
interdependencies could be leveraged to overcome partial infrastructure data. This was
shown in using a representative full and partial dataset for a military base-sized system of
networks. The results showed comparable operability projections between the two
methods. Additionally, some flexibility was gained to model complex interactions by
using more robust interdependencies. The modification to commonly used
interdependency parameters integrated multiple interdependency types and coupling
strategies, which had not been done as an inherent part of a model before this work. Some
limitations exist in not capturing the same granularity of knowledge on damaged assets
that can be gleaned from full datasets.
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V. The Base Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Model (BIIRM)1
5.1. Introduction
Infrastructure systems are becoming more complex and increasingly
interdependent. These interdependencies have implications on how best to recover
infrastructures following a disruption. Complexity due to interdependencies is increasing
due to trends in urbanization and incorporation of cyber-physical systems (Chee and Neo
2018; Jenkins et al. 2017; Thoung et al. 2016). Efforts such as City of the Future and
Industry 4.0 drive complex interconnections in order to realize the enhanced service level
being advertised (ASCE 2019; Hanley et al. 2019). The complexity is exacerbated by the
different types of interdependencies and dimensions used to describe and analyze
infrastructure networks (Haimes et al. 2007; Rinaldi et al. 2001). All of this is driving
higher and higher degrees of infrastructure interdependence.
A small sampling of several large-scale infrastructure service disruptions over the
last two decades is sufficient to highlight the interdependent nature of the underlying
infrastructure networks. From 2000 to 2001, disruption in the electrical power grid in
California ended up impacting the oil and gas industry, including the provision of natural
gas back to the power-generating elements of the electrical grid. This disruptive event
showed the propagation of failure in one infrastructure system to another infrastructure
system and then further degradation to the original system (Fletcher 2001). The
September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center highlighted a non-physical

1

The contents of this chapter were independently submitted for publication by Moore, Schuldt, Grandhi,
and Jacques to ASCE’s Journal of Infrastructure Systems on 11 May, 2021. The submitted article was
titled “Impact of Operational and Restoration Interdependencies on Recovery Time, Cost, and Disruptive
Effect in Multilayered Infrastructure Networks.”
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interdependence between administrative policy and the aviation industry’s ability to
provide services, which ultimately resulted in $1.4 billion in lost revenue due to a threeday airport closure (Faturechi et al. 2014). In 2003, a large scale blackout showed how an
initial fault in the power lines combined with a fault in the alarm system (i.e., information
control system) caused additional failures in the electrical distribution grid, resulting in
over 50 million people in the United States and Canada without power for up to two days
(Minkel 2008). Natural disasters to include 2005 Hurricane Katrina in Florida and
Louisiana, 2011 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan and subsequent Fukushima nuclear disaster,
2012 Superstorm Sandy in New Jersey and New York, 2017 Hurricane Harvey in Texas,
and 2017 Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico have time and again showcased the
interdependent nature of infrastructure systems in the provision and recovery of
infrastructure services (Comerio 2014; NIAC 2018).
This paper provides an overview of relevant modeling efforts focused on the
recovery of interdependent infrastructure systems. This paper establishes the need for a
model that simultaneously incorporates multiple interdependency relationships, which
impact infrastructure operations and restoration following a disruptive event. This paper
makes two contributions to the academic literature. First, a mixed-integer program (MIP)
is proposed as a way to integrate the three most common objective functions found in
infrastructure restoration literature in a multi-objective construct and the nine different
interdependency subtypes into a single model. Second, the proposed model is tested
against a modified realistic dataset and a simulated natural disaster. The damage scenario
is tested in various situations, both altering the weights of the multiple objectives and
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varying the inclusion of interdependency relationships. The results will demonstrate the
value of including multiple interdependencies when modeling recovery operations.
5.2. Literature Review
Efforts to incorporate more than one infrastructure in modeling have been
increasing over the last twenty years. These interdependent infrastructure recovery
modeling improvements are crucial to understanding the importance of interdependency
types, coupling strategies, and principal objectives of recovery operations. Traditionally,
infrastructure systems have been modeled as independent systems with little evaluation
of one infrastructure system’s effects on another (Buldyrev et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2007).
However, this has since become an emerging field of study (Bianconi 2018). This
increase in examination of multiple infrastructures within a given model is critical to
defining and quantifying the effects of interdependent relationships.
The application of network-based models in restoration is not new, but progress
toward interdependent recovery is still in a nascent stage. Guha et al. (1999) looked at the
recovery of power systems after disruptions. Ang (2006) likewise studied disrupted
power systems and sought to find optimal recovery strategies. Nurre et al. (2012)
developed an integrated network design and scheduling problem, which others have
similarly built upon (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Iloglu and Albert 2018). Iloglu and Albert
(2020) used a maximal covering problem construct to evaluate restoration activities.
While these models show continual improvement in network modeling to address
restoration, they were not specifically focused on interdependent infrastructure recovery.
Although not the primary focus of this paper, some models have focused on
interdependency’s role on preventive interventions which could be a promising
76

application of this research (Benmokhtar et al. 2020; Kammouh et al. 2021; Robert
Professor et al. 2013). A brief overview of interdependency types is essential before
examining interdependent infrastructure recovery models.
5.2.1. Types of interdependencies
Interdependency relationships that are of interest to this study can be classified as
operational interdependencies (affecting the operations of infrastructure networks) and
restoration interdependencies (affecting the restoration of disrupted infrastructure
networks). Rinaldi et al. (2001) expressed a comprehensive set of operational
interdependencies subtypes, including physical, cyber, logical, and geospatial
interdependencies. Physical relates to the flow of commodities and asset functionality,
cyber relates to information flow through the telecommunications network, geospatial is
based on proximity, and logical is any other type of relationship. Using these definitions,
Ouyang (2014) categorized 10 critical infrastructure interdependencies based on
historical disaster scenarios. During this same analysis, no other set of operational
interdependency subtype definitions could categorize all 10 historical examples. Rinaldi
et al.’s four interdependency subtypes largely affect the operations of infrastructure
networks and constitute the operational interdependency types used in the present work.
Sharkey et al. (2016) identified five different restoration interdependencies
subtypes that only influence the recovery of disrupted networks and deal with recovery
task scheduling and resource management. These include traditional precedence,
effectiveness precedence, options precedence, time-sensitive options, and competition for
resources. Traditional precedence requires task A in network one to be accomplished
before task B in network two can be started (e.g., de-energize power lines before tree
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cleanup). Effective precedence means if task A in network one has not been completed,
work on task B in network two can continue at a slower rate or an extended processing
time (e.g., restoring power to pump house speeds flooded road recovery versus pumping
by truck). Options precedence means at least one task of two or more in a network(s)
must be completed before task B in a different network is allowed to start (e.g., either
power is restored or a generator is brought before a water pump can be used to clear
floodwater). Time-sensitive options must be done by a certain deadline, or an additional
recovery task will be generated (e.g., restore power to lift station by a certain time or a
cleanup task will be needed). Competition for resources can affect restoration activities
(e.g., one generator needed at two geographically separated locations). The restoration
interdependency subtype of competition for resources is not considered in this work
based on the assumption of sufficient resources due to the minimal damage event
simulated; however, an example of this type of relationship is expressed in the work of
González et al. (2016).
Additionally, Gonzalez et al. (2016) also identified a way in which the geospatial
interdependency can be construed as a restoration interdependency by taking into
consideration cost savings from scheduling adjacent work and only expending resources
once for site preparation (e.g., excavation for the repair of co-located utilities that were
both damaged in an earthquake). Four of the five restoration interdependency subtypes
(excluding competition for resources) identified by Sharkey et al. (2016), plus the
geospatial repair subtype identified by Gonzalez et al. (2016), affect the restoration of
interdependent infrastructure networks and comprise the restoration interdependencies in
this work.
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5.2.2. Relevant interdependent infrastructure recovery modeling efforts
Although interdependent infrastructure recovery modeling is still an emerging
science, some significant progress has been achieved. Lee et al. (2007) developed the
interdependent layer network (ILN) model, which sought to find the least cost recovery
strategy by minimizing the cost of flow, the unmet weighted demand, and service
disruption caused by interdependencies. Using a MIP, this model generated optimal
recovery strategies while considering physical, logical, and geospatial operational
interdependencies; however, it did not include any restoration interdependencies. The
ILN model has been influential and other authors have used and modified it for various
interdependent infrastructure recovery applications (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Loggins and
Wallace 2015).
Sharkey et al. (2015) built upon the model proposed by Cavdaroglu et al. (2013)
and Nurre et al. (2012) to develop the interdependent integrated network design and
scheduling (IINDS) problem. This model’s objective was to understand the timing of
recovery, scheduling repairs with parallel workgroups, and maximizing the network's
cumulative performance over a finite period of time. This work added several unique
elements, the most important to the present work is the identification and addition of
restoration interdependencies, of which only traditional precedence and time-sensitive
options were modeled. This model was limited by the absence of three restoration
interdependency subtypes – effective precedence, options precedence, and geospatial
repair – and two operational interdependency subtypes – logical and cyber.
Gonzalez et al. (2016) developed what they called the interdependent network
design problem (INDP) and other variations to include the consideration of time
79

dependency, iterative heuristics, and stochastics based on parameter uncertainty
(González 2017). These models seek to find the least cost recovery strategies. These
models can handle multiple operational interdependency types based on certain coupling
strategies of interdependent layers, though only physical and geospatial operational
interdependency subtypes were used in the problem instances. This model’s limitations
include the lack of cyber and logical operational interdependency subtypes, the lack of
explicit formulation to handle various interdependency subtypes simultaneously, and the
exclusion of most restoration interdependency subtypes.
Almoghathawi et al. (2019) developed a multi-objective restoration model
seeking to maximize resilience while finding the least-cost recovery strategy. They
analyzed power and water systems by using a fictional dataset generated using
algorithms. The primary advantage of this model was the explicit inclusion of a resilience
measure in the objective function that allowed the future exploration of the balance
between “withstanding a disruption” and “recovering from a disruption.” This model’s
limitations consist of considering only physical operational interdependencies, no
restoration interdependencies, and using a fictitious dataset.
None of the aforementioned models address the multiple objectives and listed
operational and restoration interdependencies (Table 5.1). Every model examined
included one or more of the three primary objective functions. The most likely reasons
that not all models have included all three primary objectives are due to the facts that 1)
models are typically purpose-built for some stakeholder-specific objectives and 2) there
has not been a formalization of these primary objectives found in restoration literature.
The most common objective between these models was least-cost recovery, followed by
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minimal recovery time and minimal disruptive effect. Lee et al. (2007) included cost,
unmet demand, and weighted time in one objective function, which essentially combined
elements of all three objectives. Almoghathawi et al. (2019) used two objectives but
included an element of weighted time, which is considered as combining elements of all
three objectives.
Table 5.1. No model currently addresses the three most common objectives and all
operational and restoration interdependency subtypes
Criterion
Model1a Model2b Model3c Model4d Model5e BIIRM
Objective Function
Least cost





Recovery time



f
Disruptive effect




Operational
Interdependency

Physical






Cyber

Logical


Geospatial





Restoration
Interdependency

Traditional precedence


Effectiveness precedence

Options precedence

Time-sensitive options


Geospatial repair



a
b
c
d
e
Lee et al. (2007); Sharkey et al. (2015); González et al. (2016); González (2017);
Almoghathawi et al. (2019); f included by virtue of time dependent indexing

Least cost, repair time, and disruptive effect are not the only objectives that are
possible in recovery operations, they have a striking similarity to the construction or
project management trilemma of cost, quality, and time. While there are critics of this
approach (Atkinson 1999), it has guided project management for over 70 years and
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perhaps has influenced these restoration objectives. There is validity in seeking least cost
recovery strategies since financial resources are finite. Optimizing repair time is an
objective that is critical for time-sensitive operations, such as defense sector
infrastructure with mandated uptimes and limited uninterrupted power supply (Theony
2020). Minimizing disruptive effect of critical assets ensures that infrastructure is
supporting life-saving functions (O’Rourke 2007; White et al. 2016). Therefore, these
common objective functions are assumed to have utility and value to stakeholders
involved in recovery operations.
The models listed in Table 5.1 don’t fully address all interdependency subtypes
for four reasons. First, the models have focused on some of the operational
interdependency subtypes and not considered the restoration-specific interdependency
subtypes since they were formalized only within the last five years (González et al. 2016;
Sharkey et al. 2016) and have not been integrated into all restoration models. Second,
exploration of operational interdependency subtypes has been limited by data
accessibility issues, which continues to be a problem within interdependent infrastructure
restoration modeling (Buldyrev et al. 2010; National Infrastructure Advisory Council
(NIAC) 2018; Ouyang 2014; Peretti 2014; Rinaldi et al. 2001). Third, different model
purposes and goals have limited the need to include all the various types of
interdependency subtypes. Some of the models mentioned could have possibly been
adapted or expanded to include additional interdependency subtypes but how they were
presented in the literature was insufficient to incorporate all the various subtypes. The
limitation of inherently incorporating all known interdependency subtypes is exacerbated
by inconsistent nomenclature and categorization. For example, Lee et al. (2007) used a
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different set of operational interdependency subtypes, which can be considered as both
physical and logical from the subtypes used in this study. These problems have led to no
other model making the integration of all known interdependency subtypes an inherent
part of the model.
The present work seeks to address the absence of a model which considers all the
various interdependency types identified within the context of the most common
objective functions. The proposed model is designated as the base interdependent
infrastructure recovery model (BIIRM). The BIIRM provides a starting point for future
models that seek to incorporate interdependent infrastructure analysis in modeling and
simulation efforts.
5.3. Notation and Formulation of the BIIRM
This section lays out the MIP development, which is denoted as the base
interdependent infrastructure recovery model (BIIRM). The section starts by describing
the general BIIRM notation to include sets, variables, and parameters. The section then
describes the three BIIRM objectives followed by three sets of constraints. The first main
section of constraints is focused on network flow of commodities and scheduling damage
repair. The next section of constraints incorporates operational interdependencies. The
final section of constraints incorporates restoration interdependencies.
The multilayered nature of the BIIRM employs both multiplex structuring (i.e.,
one-to-one nodal reflections in various layers) and multi-slice structuring (i.e., adds
element of time) (Bianconi 2018). The combination of these multilayered structures
allowed for the analysis of operational and restoration interdependencies. These
multilayered structures will be employed for a network comprised of 150 key
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infrastructure assets and the associated linear assets to establish connectivity across five
infrastructure layers. This network is described in detail following the formulation of the
BIIRM.
5.3.1. General notation
To describe the overall system, let 𝒢(𝒩, 𝒜) be a digraph consisting of a set of
nodes, 𝒩 and a set of arcs, 𝒜 indexed as 𝑖 and (𝑖, 𝑗), respectively. To further define this
digraph, sets must be defined regarding infrastructure layers, commodities, node and arc
subsets, work crews, spaces, operational interdependency types, and time periods.
Let 𝒦 be a set of infrastructure layers constructed in a multiplex fashion and let
ℒ 𝑘 be a subset of commodities that are restricted to flow only within the infrastructure
layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, where ∪𝑘∈𝒦 ℒ 𝑘 = ℒ. Similarly, let 𝒩 𝑘 and 𝒜𝑘 be subsets of nodes and
arcs, respectively, that play an active role in the flow of commodities within a given
infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, meaning ∪𝑘∈𝒦 𝒩 𝑘 = 𝒩 and ∪𝑘∈𝒦 𝒜𝑘 = 𝒜. Also, let 𝒩 ′𝑘
and 𝒜′𝑘 be the damaged subset of nodes and arcs respectively, where 𝒩 ′𝑘 ⊆ 𝒩 𝑘 and
𝒜′𝑘 ⊆ 𝒜𝑘 . Let there be a work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 who work within a given infrastructure
layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, where ∪𝑘∈𝒦 𝒲 𝑘 = 𝒲. Let there be a collection of spaces 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 that are
mutually exclusive and comprehensive of the region of interest, where every node is in
one and only one space, and every arc is in at least one space. Therefore, the set of spaces
𝒮 helps define the geospatial operational interdependencies. Let Ψ be a set of other
operational interdependency types, including physical, cyber, and logical. This additional
indexing based on operational interdependency subtype is what allows for layered
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relationships to exist between node pairs to handle complex interdependent operations.
Also, 𝒯 is the set of time periods used in the evaluation of the model.
The preceding sets deal with the model at large, but specific interdependency sets
are also required to describe the various relationships. In all restoration interdependency
relationships included in this model, there is assumed to be a parent-to-child relationship,
where the child task in infrastructure layer 𝑘̃ ∈ 𝒦 depends on the parent task(s) in
infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. Either a node or arc may play the role of parent or child, thus
creating node-to-node, node-to-arc, arc-to-node, and arc-to-arc relationships, indexed as
(𝑖, 𝑖̃), (𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)), ((𝑖, 𝑗), ̃),
𝑖 and ((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) respectively. These parent-to-child
relationships are defined as node-based or arc-based depending on the parent asset type
being a node or arc, respectively. Therefore, for the four different restoration
interdependency subtypes defined by Sharkey et al. (2015) that are used in this model, we
have node-based traditional precedence (𝑁𝑇𝑃), effectiveness precedence (𝑁𝐸𝑃), options
precedence (𝑁𝑂𝑃), and time-sensitive options (𝑁𝑇𝑆). There are equivalent sets for the
arc-based relationships designated as sets 𝐴𝑇𝑃, 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝐴𝑂𝑃, and 𝐴𝑇𝑆. These eight
different sets provide a comprehensive manner in which to describe four of the five
restoration interdependency subtypes used. These special sets are similar to those
described by Sharkey et al. (2015), even though only two restoration-specific subtypes
were fully used. The geospatial repair subtype is described based on the repair of an arc
or node. The presentation of the mathematical formulation for the restoration
interdependency constraints is abbreviated by only explaining the relationships used in
the scenario described later.
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There are decision variables within the model responsible for the flow of material,
assigning recovery tasks, completing recovery tasks, operability, and recovery task
𝑘
location. The flow of materials is designated by 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
, which is the flow of commodity 𝑙 ∈

ℒ 𝑘 across arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 within infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝑘
Assignment of recovery tasks is designated by a binary variable 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
or 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
[Greek

alpha], which is equal to 1 if work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 is assigned to start work at time period
𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 and continue working until finished repairing node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘
respectively within infrastructure 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, and 0 otherwise. In an effectiveness precedence
𝑘
relationship, there is an additional binary assignment variable denoted as 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 or 𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

[Greek alpha], which employs a subscript 𝑒 on the node or arc index to denote an
assignment with an extended processing time. The completion of a recovery task is
𝑘
𝑘
denoted by the binary variable 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
or 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
, which is equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc

(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 in infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 is completed by work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 at the start
𝑘
of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯, and 0 otherwise. The binary variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 or 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
denotes the

operability of a node or arc, which is equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 or arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 in
infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 is operable by the start of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯, and 0 otherwise.
Operability is controlled by whether the node or arc is damaged, the repair is completed,
and any operational interdependencies with other networks. The location of recovery
activities is controlled by binary variable 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , which is equal to 1 if a recovery task (nodeor arc-based) is started in space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 in time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Parameters within the model can be divided into those that affect the cost, flow,
scheduling, operational interdependencies, and restoration interdependencies. Cost
86

parameters can be further delineated into site preparation, repair, assignment, and flow
costs. The site preparation cost is defined as 𝑔𝑠𝑡 , which represents the average cost of
preparing a site 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. The repair costs are defined for all 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 and
𝑘
𝑘
𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 as 𝑞𝑖𝑡
and 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
for any node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 and arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , respectively, which is

generated from a unit cost table based on the type of facility and an assumed reference
size (DoD 2020). The assignment cost represents the national average for a general
laborer working on that type of infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 and is
𝑘
𝑘
defined as 𝑎𝑤𝑡
[Latin a] for every work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 . The flow cost, 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
, is based on

the infrastructure owner’s cost for operations and maintenance of flowing commodity 𝑙 ∈
ℒ 𝑘 along arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜 𝑘 of infrastructure 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
The flow and scheduling parameters are defined for supply and demand, flow
capacity, normal processing time, and extended processing time. For all 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 and 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯
the supply or demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 of a particular node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is defined by
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
, where if 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0 it is a demand node, if 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 0 it is a transshipment node, and if
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
> 0 it is a supply node. For ease of notation, subscripts are added to 𝒩 𝑘 to denote a

further subset indicating demand, transshipment, and supply by 𝒩𝐷𝑘 , 𝒩𝑇𝑘 , and 𝒩𝑆𝑘 ,
𝑘
respectively when necessary. Flow is capacitated through an arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 by 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
for

all shared commodities 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at time period
𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. For all 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 each damaged node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 has an associated
𝑘
normal processing time, 𝑝𝑖𝑘 of 𝑝𝑖𝑗
, respectively. Similarly, there is an extended

processing time for those nodes and arcs that are included in an effectiveness precedence
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𝑘
relationship defined as 𝑒𝑖𝑘 or 𝑒𝑖𝑗
, respectively. These sets, variables, and parameters

provide the background to discuss the formulation and development of the BIIRM.
5.3.2. Infrastructure recovery objectives
The literature focuses on minimizing cost, disruptive effect, and repair time. Costs
associated with recovery of a disrupted system include repair costs, assignment costs, site
preparation costs, and costs of flowing commodities. The equation associated with the
cost objective follows.
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 (∑𝑠∈𝒮 𝑔𝑠𝑡 𝑧𝑠𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑘∈𝒦 (∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 (∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′ 𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑤𝑡 )) +
𝑒 𝑤𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ))) + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)).

(5.1)
The cost objective has 10 terms, as shown in (5.1). The first term is the cost of site
preparation. The second and third terms are the arc-based repair costs associated with
either normal or extended recovery assignments, respectively. The fourth and fifth terms
are the assignment costs for arc-based work, depending on whether a normal or extended
processing time is used. The sixth and seventh terms are the node-based repair costs, and
the eighth and ninth terms are the node-based assignment costs similar to the arc-based
ones. The tenth term is the flow cost of commodities throughout the entire network.
The second primary objective is minimizing disruptive effect and is shown in
(5.2). Various forms of this objective are presented in literature which seek to ensure
demand is met at critical nodes or that critical nodes and arcs are operational. In contrast
to using only unmet demand, which restricts applicability to a subset of nodes, the
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inclusion of all nodes and arcs based on operability allows the model to target critical
assets that are not strictly listed as a demand node. Therefore, the surrogate used for
minimizing disruptive effect is to maximize the operability at the critical nodes and arcs
𝑘
𝑘
based on the nodal weight, 𝜇𝑖𝑡
, and arc weight, 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
. Weights are assigned by a

collaboration of stakeholders to reflect the value infrastructure or infrastructure services
provided.
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
). (5.2)

The third primary objective is reducing the time required to recover critical assets.
Time is integrated into nearly all the variables and parameters, which is a similar
integration of this objective, as shown in the works of Lee et al. (2007) and
Almoghathawi et al. (2019). The time index allows for capturing the importance of time
and ensuring rapid recovery of critical assets. Of note, the nodal and arc weight
parameters that signify an asset’s criticality are also indexed by time, thus allowing a user
to define when certain critical assets are most needed or relevant in the recovery process.
The two explicitly defined objectives 𝐴 and 𝐵, along with the implicit time
objective, are weighted in a combined overall objective function. This combination
enables recovery personnel to tailor recovery to emphasize cost, operability, or speed.
Having described the notation and objective functions, the BIIRM can be presented. This
will be done by introducing the overall objective, the network flow and scheduling
constraints, the operational interdependency constraints, and the restoration
interdependency constraints.
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5.3.3. Network flow and scheduling
The following is the summarized version of the BIIRM based mainly on nodebased constraints for the network flow and scheduling portion. Any additional arc-based
constraints are noted where applicable but are shown in Appendix D. Restoration
interdependency constraints use the applicable asset-to-asset relationship, which is
defined in each subsection with additional relationships show in Appendix D.
Minimize 𝜇𝐴 𝐴 − 𝜇𝐵 𝐵.

(5.3)

Subject to
−,𝑘
+,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑗:(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
− ∑𝑗:(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
− 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈

𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.4)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.5)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.6)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.7)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.8)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(5.9)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(5.10)

min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑗
−1]

+ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≤1+

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘+1 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘 +1 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑖

𝑖𝑗

(5.11)

(5.12)

The combined objective function balances minimizing cost and disruptive effect
while addressing time by using a time index within the two objective functions (5.3). A
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general flow balance equation for all nodes is presented in (5.4). Two slack variables are
−,𝑘
used to capture unmet demand of a specific commodity (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
) and surplus of a specific
+,𝑘
commodity (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
). Flow is restricted based on starting node, ending node, and arc

operability as shown in (5.5-5.7), respectively. A damaged node may become operable
once repairs are complete (5.8). A damaged node can be repaired only once, as shown in
(5.9). Only one work crew can be assigned to repair a node, limiting any compounding
positive or negative effect that could be possible with multiple crews being assigned
(5.10). A damaged node cannot be completed until it has been assigned and the normal
processing time has elapsed (5.11). A work crew can only be assigned to one restoration
activity at a given time until the work task is completed (5.12). Equations (5.8-5.11) have
corresponding arc-based equivalents not shown above, which substitute the arc indices
for the node index.
These flow and scheduling constraints provide the base recovery model similar to
other integrated network design and scheduling problems used in infrastructure recovery
(González et al. 2016; Nurre et al. 2012; Sharkey et al. 2015). Specifically, Equations
(5.4-5.7) were adapted from González et al. (2016) and Equations (5.10-5.12) were
inspired by Sharkey et al. (2015). However, both operational and restoration
interdependencies must be integrated to address interdependencies.
5.3.4. Integrating operational interdependencies
Operational interdependencies affect the operations of the infrastructure networks
̃

by the propagation of failure. The controlling parameter, 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝑡 , is a time-indexed parent̃

𝑘𝑘
child node pairing between infrastructure layers. A new set 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
is used as a subset of
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parent nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , which have an operational interdependency relationship with a
given child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ based on some operational interdependency type 𝜓. This
parameter takes on values of 1 or a fractional amount based on the number of parent
nodes in the pairing when an operational interdependency exists between the node pairs
consisting of parent node(s) 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 and child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ . This means if two parent
nodes are required for a child node to operate, then the interdependency parameter would
be equal to one half.
̃
̃
̃ ̃
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘𝑘̃ 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓
𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑦𝑖̃𝑡 , ∀𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.13)

−,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.14)

𝑖̃ 𝜓

The operability of a child node depends on the parent node's operability and the
operational interdependency relationship parameter, which is shown in (5.13) and
adapted from González et al. (2016). For example, in a simple physical interdependent
relationship between 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 and 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ , the operational interdependency parameter
̃

𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝑡 would be equal to 1, and therefore, the child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ depends on the
operability of the parent node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 . If the parent node is a demand node, it is essential
to ensure that the demand must be met in order for the parent node to be operable, as
shown in (5.14).
5.3.5. Integrating restoration interdependencies
Restoration interdependencies include traditional precedence, effectiveness
precedence, options precedence, time-sensitive options, and geospatial repair constraints.
The first four subtypes exhibit various asset-to-asset relationships as follows: traditional
precedence utilizes arc-to-arc relationships, effective precedence utilizes node-to-arc
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relationships, options precedence utilizes arc-to-node relationships, and time-sensitive
options utilize node-to-node relationships. Each asset-to-asset type of relationship is
possible for the first four restoration interdependency subtypes with slight variations to
the subsequent constraints. Geospatial repair is handled differently and is addressed
following the presentation of the first four restoration interdependency subtypes.
5.3.5.1. Traditional precedence
Traditional precedence is when a parent recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 must be
accomplished before a child recovery task at arc (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘̃ can be started, which is the
arc-to-arc or ((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) relationship in the arc-based traditional precedence (𝐴𝑇𝑃) set.
̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.15)

Based on the definition of traditional precedence, the parent arc must be
completed ahead of the child arc before the child arc can be started, as shown in (5.15).
When the parent asset is a demand node, demand must be met to start the child
restoration task and maintain the total demand throughout the restoration activity. While
these are not shown due to the arc-to-arc relationship, similar constraints are shown in the
effective precedence relationship.
5.3.5.2Effectiveness precedence
Effective precedence is when a parent recovery task at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 must be
accomplished for a child recovery task at arc (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘̃ to proceed at a normal
processing time; however, if the parent node is not completed, then the child recovery
task at arc (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘̃ can still proceed on at an extended processing time. It should be
noted that when programming these relationships, it is as if there is a traditional
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precedence relationship for the normal processing time and an extended processing time
if the traditional precedence conditions are not met.
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
,

∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
1−

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

(5.16)
̃

𝑘
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.17)

The difference between traditional and effective precedence is the child node's
ability to be completed before the parent node, so long as the child task is processed at
the extended processing time (5.16). The traditional precedence restriction of meeting
demand at the parent node before starting on the child arc is still effective for the
assignment variable associated with normal processing time, as shown in (5.17).
Effective precedence relationships adjust several equations already previously
presented. The equations that are modified based on the addition of the extended
assignment variables are numbered the same as they were previously but are given an
asterisk to indicate a slight modification to allow for the extended processing time
assignment.
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝑡 ) ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑒𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝜏=1

𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), 𝑖) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(5.10*)

𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , (𝑖̃, 𝑖) ∈
(5.11*)

min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

∑
(

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑗
−1]

𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝜏=1

(𝑖̃,𝑖)∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),𝑖)∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

𝑘
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
+

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑗
−1]

𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

∑
(

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
(𝑖̃,(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
𝑒 𝑤𝜏
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘+1 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘 +1 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑖

𝑖𝑗

≤1+

(5.12*)

These modified constraints describe how only one work crew can be assigned to
repair a node either at a normal or extended processing time (10*). A damaged node
cannot be completed until it has been assigned and the normal or extended processing
time has elapsed (5.11*). For example, a damaged node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 (e.g., Fire Station) with
a normal processing time of two time periods and an extended processing time of three
𝑘
time periods at time period 4 could be repaired (i.e., 𝛽𝑖𝑤4
= 1) so long as the repair was

assigned in time periods 1 or 2 at a normal processing time or in time period 1 at an
extended processing time. A work crew can only be assigned to one restoration activity at
a given time until it is completed, regardless of whether the work crew is working at a
normal processing time or at an extended processing time (5.12*). Therefore, returning to
the Fire Station example, there were three options to assign a work crew in order to make
sure the Fire Station was operable by time period 4, but only one of the three options can
be picked based on (5.12). Additionally, since the Fire Station was in an effectiveness
precedence relationship there is one other task that has to be complete prior to normal
processing time, therefore the options are trimmed down to at most two options – normal
processing assignment at time period 2 (based on mandatory task for normal processing
time equal to one time period) or extended processing time assignment at time period 1.
Equations (5.10*) and (5.11*) have corresponding arc-based equivalents.
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5.3.5.3. Options precedence
Options precedence is when at least one parent arc must be completed before a
child recovery task can begin. This precedence relationship is achieved by summing over
the parent-child pairs similar to the traditional precedence, as shown in (5.18). Similar to
traditional precedence, node-based relationships must ensure demand is met at parent
nodes and remains throughout the child recovery task’s duration.
̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑((𝑖,𝑗),𝑖̃)∈𝐴𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. (5.18)

Mathematically traditional precedence completion (5.15) can be thought of as a
special case of options precedence (5.18). However, in describing restoration activities
they are used differently. Traditional precedence relationships are often used in a chain of
events (e.g., Task A before B, Task B before C, and so on). Options precedence are
almost exclusively used as a single event where there are two or more tasks that could
satisfy the precedence relationship. Therefore, both restoration interdependencies are
used separately.
5.3.5.4. Time-sensitive options
Time-sensitive options are those in which a parent node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 must be operable
̃

or child recovery task at node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘̃ must be accomplished by a certain deadline, 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 .
̃

𝜃𝑘𝑘

̃

̃

𝑖𝑖̃
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝜏 ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 + ∑𝜏=1

(5.19)

∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘̃ − 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘̃ − 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.

(5.20)

The child recovery task must be completed by the deadline or the parent node
must be operable (5.19). By definition, the child recovery task cannot be assigned until
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the normal processing time before the deadline so that one task is completed by the
deadline (5.20).
5.3.5.5. Geospatial repair
Nodes and arcs are also geospatially located within at least one space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮. Each
space is mutually exclusive and comprehensive. This restoration interdependency subtype
allows for cost savings during recovery operations by selecting tasks within a
geographical region, where recurring costs for mobilization and site preparation can be
avoided. This selection process assumes the crews work in a collaborative environment
and are managed by a central authority (Lee et al. 2007).
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝑔𝑖𝑠
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝑡 ) ≤ 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(5.21)

When a recovery task at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 is assigned at either a normal or extended
processing time, then a variable indicating work in that region is used to indicate some
site preparation costs will be necessary (5.21). Equation (5.21) has a corresponding arc
equivalent similar to others used in this model. This concludes the abbreviated
formulation of the BIIRM.
5.4. Computational Results
This section discusses the infrastructure data used, the unique damage scenario
used to showcase operational and restoration interdependencies, and the subsequent
analysis of the optimal recovery strategies over a series of scenarios.
5.4.1. Modified CLARC data and damage scenario
A realistic dataset was used based on a modified version of the CLARC County
dataset including the social infrastructure systems (Little et al. 2020; Sharkey et al. 2018).
The CLARC dataset represents a county or regional-scale database; however, a municipal
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size dataset was desired to parallel the size of a military installation. Therefore, a 10%
sampling size was taken based on asset type within the CLARC database while ensuring
that at least one of each asset type was represented to preserve the diversity of operations
by assets. This resulted in a network approximately the same size and scope as a military
installation. This dataset will be referenced as the BIIRM dataset.
The data was then reconfigured into a multiplex construct, a one-to-one mapping
of a given node as it is reflected in any layer in which that node functions as a supply,
transshipment, or demand node (Bianconi 2018). Each arc is assumed to operate and exist
only within a given layer. Reflecting nodes based on demand across multiple layers
increased the overall node count (if counting reflected nodes separately) well beyond the
original 10% sampling. While the reflection of nodes, increases the number of nodes used
for a given instance the multiplex structure is revealing of whether or not operational
interdependencies exist. The original CLARC database notes 2,631 instances where one
infrastructure depends on another (Sharkey et al. 2018). The construction of the database
into a multiplex structure maintained all uni-directional dependencies, but highlighted the
703 interdependencies within that number based on nodes having different functions (i.e.,
demand, transshipment, supply) within different reflected infrastructure layers. This
insight was critical in setting up the interdependency constraints correctly.
Additional significant changes to the dataset included integrating cost information
from DoD cost tables (DoD 2020), additional communications infrastructure information
to support cyber interdependencies, and addition of another transportation and emergency
response commodity of people, which are considered the workforce for the various assets
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within the networks. Table 5.2 summarizes the nodes, arcs, and additions made to the
dataset.
Table 5.2. The BIIRM dataset with reflected and new nodes and
arcs due to increased communication infrastructure data

Infrastructure
Information Communication Technology
(ICT)
Electrical Power (PWR)
Transportation and Emergency Response
(TER)
Wastewater (WWT)
Water (WTR)
Subtotals
Total Nodes

10% Sampling
Nodes Arcs
3
39

Reflected
and New
Nodes
Arcs
100
152

9
83

116
366

110
158

4
24

39
19
153
639

94
89
704

62
56
486
Total Arcs

0
0
180
884

A critical part of the current research is incorporating various types of operational
interdependencies simultaneously. The original dataset included only physical and
geographic interdependencies; however, with the addition of communication
infrastructure and the commodity of people, cyber and logical interdependency types
were established. The cyber interdependencies represent infrastructure systems that
depend on communication to provide the service from that infrastructure layer (e.g.,
emergency responders) or systems controlled by Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The logical interdependencies are based on certain assets
or facilities that require workers to be present to provide the infrastructure service from
those infrastructure assets (e.g., power plant, water treatment plant). Table 5.3
summarizes the number of operational interdependency subtype relationships across the
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associated infrastructure layers. Geographical interdependency relationships were
employed during the damage event due to a simulated flood event to specific portions of
the network.
Table 5.3. Multiple operational interdependency subtype relationships
across all infrastructure systems are incorporated into the BIIRM dataset
Interdependency
Subtype
Physical
Cyber
Logical
Geospatial

Relationships
59
51
13
41

Parent
Infrastructures
PWR, WTR, WWT
ICT
TER
All

Child
Infrastructures
All
PWR, TER, WTR, WWT
PWR, TER, WTR, WWT
All

The damage scenario represents a major flood event, which significantly
inundates the lower-lying areas of the network. This causes damage to all different types
of networks. The assets damaged include some that have operational and restoration
interdependencies and some that do not. Table 5.4 summarizes the damage simulated to
nodes and arcs across the five infrastructure layers within the BIIRM dataset.
Table 5.4. Nodes and arcs across all infrastructure
systems are damaged in a simulated flood event
Infrastructure
ICT
PWR
TER
WTR
WWT

Nodes
9
12
5
2
9

Arcs
2
6
18
5
5

Based on the damage scenario, several of the recovery tasks exhibit restoration
interdependencies or precedence recovery. These recovery tasks range from downed
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power lines due to trees that have fallen to pumping flooded streets and refueling
generators if necessary. Table 5.5 summarizes the various restoration interdependencies,
the coupling method employed in the BIIRM formulation, and a description of the
scenarios.
Table 5.5. All infrastructure systems are involved across all five of the restoration
interdependency subtypes over 36 restoration activities (approx. 50% of damaged assets)
Type
Traditional Precedence

Parent, Child
Infrastructures
PWR, TER

Coupling Method
arc-to-arc

TER, PWR
Effectiveness
Precedence
Options Precedence
Time-sensitive Options

PWR, TER

node-to-arc

TER, WTR
PWR, ICT
PWR, WWT

arc-to-node
node-to-node

Geospatial Repair

All

N/A

Scenario Description
Power line
inspection/de-energize
Tree removal along
power lines
Pumping flooded
streets
Access to worksite
Refueling generators
Cleanup due to loss of
power
N/A

Number
4
4
6
6
2
6
8

5.4.2. Recovery operations landscape
The damage scenario was first analyzed using all nine of the interdependent
relationships across varying weights among the two explicit objective functions to
provide an overview of the solution landscape. These solutions resulted in a Pareto
optimal front which highlighted the intuitive low expenditure yield of minimal
operability improvement. The Pareto front also showed the diminishing returns on
increased spending over a particular weighted operability. The Pareto front could be used
to determine a “sweet spot” for temporary or expedient recovery operations. For example,
the initial weighted operability value following disruption was 35,538 and after $2.6M
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the weighted operability value increased to 45,563 which correlates to a 10,025-value
increase. However, over the next $7M the highest increase is only 1,534 which explains
diminishing returns. This correlates to infrastructure assets and services that have high
cost, but minimal impact to the weighted operability. This understanding can help focus
resources to achieve the greatest amount of recovery using temporary and expendable
assets. Additionally, some non-essential functions might be able to wait until follow-on
efforts are made.
Figure 1 illustrates the balance between cost and operability. The model's input
parameters remained constant throughout the evaluated time periods for this scenario
(e.g., costs, node-, and arc-priority weights did not fluctuate over time). Although the
operability objective and the combined objective values did not increase and decrease
monotonically, respectively, when compared to the cost, the overall objective did
decrease consistently at every time period, thus illustrating the tradeoff between cost and
operability within the overall convex combination.
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Fig. 1. The convex combination shown as operability vs. cost and the combined objective
vs. cost with some 𝜇𝐴 values annotated highlight diminishing returns above a certain
operability threshold
5.4.3. Impact of interdependencies
The ability to analyze a recovery scenario with and without interdependencies
shows the necessity of acknowledging both operational and restoration interdependencies
to create the most accurate site picture. Most current modeling efforts incorporate
physical and geospatial operational interdependencies subtypes, if any are included.
Therefore, this was used as a base and compared against a simulation that added all the
operational interdependency subtypes. These results are tabulated in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6. Exclusion of cyber and logical interdependency subtypes can overestimate
operability projections
Operational
Interdependency
Subtype
Physical &
Geospatial
Physical, Geospatial,
Cyber, & Logical

Starting
Operability
(%)
66.1
65.9

Percent
Deviation
N/A

Ending
Operability
(%)
92.0

Percent
Deviation
N/A

-0.3

89.9

-2.3

The exclusion of cyber and logical operational interdependency subtypes in this
damage scenario meant overestimating the operability shortly after disruption by 0.3%.
Whereas by the end of 12 8-hr time periods, the operability was overestimated by 2.3%.
While these are the figures for this instance, other scenarios may show greater or lesser
disparities depending on the operational interdependency relationships. The ability to
include various, multiple, and sometimes compounding interdependent relationships
allows for a more accurate estimate of timelines and achievable operability.
A series of simulations were conducted to understand the effect of restoration
interdependencies on cost and operability. The simulation that included traditional
precedence (TP), effective precedence (EP), options precedence (OP), and time-sensitive
options (TS) was assumed to be the closest reflection to reality from the simulations.
Multiple simulations were done by removing one or more restoration interdependency
subtypes. In terms of cost, the simulation of TP, EP, and OP was the most closely
matched simulation of all the others, effectively showing that in this instance, TS did not
play a significant role when combined with the other restoration interdependency types.
All simulations except TP & EP overestimated the cost initially, which can be understood
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as assigning and repairing more work initially that might not be possible due to
precedence requirements. This means the model suggested fixing more than can be fixed
due to neglecting certain interdependencies. At time period 4, all the simulations except
for the one with no restoration interdependencies started to underestimate the cost for the
remainder of the recovery efforts, which can be interpreted as giving a low estimate of
the actual cost. Only the simulation of no restoration interdependencies consistently
overestimated the cost when considered against the assumed picture of reality. Figure 5.2
illustrates the overestimation and underestimation against the simulation with all the
restoration interdependency subtypes in terms of cost.

Fig. 5.2. Cost differences based on the restoration interdependencies involved where TP,
EP, OP, and TS along with TP, EP, and OP represent the assumed closest to reality
The damage resulted in all the recovery simulations starting with 65.9% of the
network operable. The networks were then restored, with every simulation experiencing a
significant increase in operability around time period 5 due to a restoration of a critical
node. The closest approximation to reality on percent operable is assumed to be the
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simulation, including all the restoration interdependency types. In terms of operability, all
of the simulations followed the same general trend. The TP & EP simulation improved
rapidly along with all others except the TP, EP, OP, & TS simulation and then had no
improvement to operability over the later time periods 5 to 12. The TP, EP, OP, & TS
simulation lagged behind every other simulation for time periods 1 to 4, but then
achieved a greater percent operable than TP-only and TP & EP simulations. The
performance of the TP, EP, OP, & TS simulation over the other two seems to indicate
that options precedence appreciably affects the system’s operability or recovery time in
this scenario by creating desirable recovery strategies leading to higher operability.
However, the inclusion of time-sensitive options restricted the TP, EP, OP, & TS
simulation so it wasn’t able to achieve as high operability. In the instance of the
simulation with TP, EP, and OP interdependency subtypes and no restoration
interdependencies, the percent operable remained consistently over the assumed reality
(i.e., TP, EP, OP, & TS simulation). Figure 5.3 illustrates the percent operability
throughout recovery operations for the various simulations, with enlarged windows for
time periods 1 to 4 and 5 to 12. The TP-only and no restoration interdependencies
simulations both experienced a decrease in the operability, which is a manifestation
overall objective function balancing cost and disruptive effect as well as Equation (14)’s
limitation of operability being based on demand being met. Therefore, in both of these
simulations the model restricted flow for one or two time periods causing some assets to
be classified as non-operable.
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Fig. 5.3. Percent operability of various simulations based on restoration
interdependencies included where the simulation with TP, EP, OP, and TS represents the
assumed reality; (a) overview of time periods 1 to 12; (b) enlarged analysis of time
periods 5 to 12; (c) enlarged analysis of time periods 1 to 4
In summary, the inclusion and exclusion of restoration interdependency subtypes
made the estimations of overall network operability either high or low. In terms of
operability, effectiveness precedence and options precedence provide alternate recovery
strategies while constraining the solution space resulting in net positive increases. The
addition of recovery pathways increases the solution space, while traditional precedence
and time-sensitive options restrict possibilities and shrink the solution space.
5.5. Conclusions
Interdependent infrastructure recovery modeling is critical in the complex
infrastructure systems used today. The current research seeks to add elements to
simultaneously incorporate four different operational interdependency subtypes and five
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different restoration interdependency subtypes, which has not been done previously. This
effort also adds a military installation-sized dataset, complete with cost data, to the pool
of available datasets for interdependent infrastructure restoration modeling and
simulation.
The analysis showed that both over and underestimating cost and operability are
possible when excluding certain interdependency types. The inclusion of all
interdependency types ensures the closest approximation to reality. While the simulated
damage event didn’t show drastic difference in magnitude for overall deviation based on
the inclusion or exclusion of interdependency subtypes, the damage was only 5% of the
network, and a larger damage event or an event with a higher rate of interdependencies
would likely make the magnitude of inaccurate recovery prediction significantly larger.
The primary concern with future efforts includes providing a way to
address non-binary operability among nodes and arcs. The use of binary operability is
common in infrastructure recovery modeling; however, binary operability is not always a
good representation of reality. The restriction to binary operability is a shortcoming of the
current model and other models similar in construction. Additionally, even though most
of the parameters are indexed on time, they are bound by linear relationships within a
given time period, thus they can only approximate complex, non-linear relationships such
as multi-input cost structures. Expansion of work done by others to integrate resource
competition is similarly warranted, since resource limitations are likely to cause problems
with recovery as damage events grow in size. Finally, the interdependencies examined
were illustrated only between infrastructure pairs, and an expansion of this to include
greater complexity in the number of infrastructure layers could be explored.
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VI. The Flexible Team Base Interdependent
Infrastructure Recovery Model (tmBIIRM)1
6.1. Introduction
Civil infrastructure systems are complex (Lewe et al. 2014), interdependent
(Rinaldi et al. 2001), and critical to national security (Department of Homeland Security
2013). The critical nature of infrastructure systems to national security is recognized by
nations around the world (Hall et al. 2016). In the United States, the link between security
and critical civil infrastructure had a prominent place embedded in the first pillar of the
2017 National Security Strategy. In part, this strategy stated, “We must build a culture of
preparedness and resilience among our government functions, critical infrastructure, and
economic and political systems” (United States 2017). This strategy detailed additional
priorities to ensure resilient infrastructure.
Resilient infrastructure is a necessity in today’s interconnected world. A recent
example is the Colonial Pipeline cyberattack, which resulted in gas distribution
shutdown, subsequent gas price increases, fuel shortages in certain areas in eastern
portions of the United States, and a $4M ransom to the attacker (Turton and Mehrotra
2021). Due to a cyberattack in the control system, multiple other systems were impacted
including oil and gas distribution systems, transportation infrastructure, commercial
infrastructure, and social infrastructures. A disruption in one system caused some level of
disruptions across multiple other systems, signifying the interdependent nature of

1

The contents of this chapter are anticipated to be submitted for publication by Moore, Schuldt, Grandhi,
and Jacques to the Military Operations Research Journal late 2021. The article is tentatively titled “Flexible
Recovery Team Management on Simulated Interdependent Civil Infrastructure Systems.”
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infrastructure systems. These systems did not respond as well as desired and therefore the
infrastructure system-of-systems lacked desirable resilient characteristics.
Resilient infrastructures are sometimes defined as 1) those infrastructure systems
capable of coping and bouncing back from unanticipated disruptions and 2) those
infrastructure systems which are able to maintain structure during external stresses
(Attoh-Okine 2016). In terms of defense-focused definitions, military installation
resilience is defined as the ability “to avoid, prepare for, minimize the effect of, adapt to,
and recover from” intentional or unintentional and anticipated or unanticipated effects of
disruptions in order to “maintain, improve, or rapidly reestablish …mission-essential
functions” (Legal Information Institute 2021). These definitions essentially capture both
the vulnerability and recoverability sides of resilience in critical infrastructure and are
essential to the present research (Almoghathawi et al. 2017).
This research seeks to address the resilience of critical infrastructure systems in a
socio-technical framework examining interdependent infrastructure recovery (IIR) of a
simulated disrupted military installation. Many IIR models assume certain characteristics
about recovery personnel and recovery teams. These assumptions can be vulnerabilities if
not properly addressed. This work seeks to analyze the effect of the education, training,
and skill of recovery personnel in the context of IIR efforts. A novel mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) model is presented as a way to evaluate the contribution
recovery personnel make to the resilience of military installations. The MINLP requires
network, personnel, and damage data inputs in order to establish optimal recovery team
composition, work schedules, and least-cost recovery strategies (i.e., identification and
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order of assets to recover). A series of discrete disruptive events are simulated to show
the importance of recovery personnel in recovery operations.
The remainder of this article establishes relevant IIR literature with an emphasis
on how recovery personnel or recovery teams are modeled. Then the MINLP is presented
followed by a description of the damage scenarios. Results of the model are discussed
and conclusions are drawn regarding the importance of considering personnel
contributions to the recoverability or resilience of interdependent infrastructure systems.
6.2. Literature Review
This research focused on network flow-based IIR modeling and examines the
assumptions surrounding modeling recovery personnel’s impact on system recovery. The
assumptions can be divided into four broad categories. These categories are team
composition, team management, resource management, and work conditions. These
assumptions were often made to reduce modeling complexity or were a subjective
assessment of the circumstances being modeled.
Team composition comprises the aspects of how the work crews are formed or
defined. IIR team composition modeling includes no team or ambiguous team structure,
parallel team structure, and parallel teams matched to given infrastructure systems.
Certian authors suggested that workers were necessary, but did not suggest any sort of
team composition structure (González et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2007). The lack of
consideration for team composition suggests that how repair crews were pre-defined or
that team organization was not relevant to that modeling effort.
Nurre et al. (2012), building from general Scheduling Theory, defined the work
crews as parallel teams similar to parallel machines in processing applications. The
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authors used two to three teams in total to evaluate the various network disruptions with
the associated datasets. Cavdaroglu et al. (2013), building off the work of Lee et al.
(2007) in terms of model formulation and notation, identified three parallel work crews
for the simulations they were conducting, whereas Lee et al. did not identify any specific
crews. These assumptions implicitly make teams of equal size and equally capable to
repair damaged assets.
Sharkey et al. (2015) added an element of skill matching to team composition,
ensuring work crews were associated with a given infrastructure system. An example of
this skill matching is ensuring electricians work on downed power lines and water utility
personnel work on a broken water main. This practice has been used by others as a way
to ensure that team composition and skill matching is considered at least in a rudimentary
fashion (Almoghathawi et al. 2019). This rudimentary skill matching makes the
assumption that work in one infrastructure will not require work skills from another
infrastructure system.
None of these team composition strategies (i.e., no stated structure/ambiguous
team structure, non-specific parallel teams, and infrastructure-specific teams) are
sufficient to deliver tailored recovery operations and address specific military
requirements. Current military practice aligns with current research in disaster recovery,
requiring multi-disciplinary teams for assessment and repair (Cavallo and Ireland 2014;
Lahiri et al. 2021). Additionally, the U.S. Air Force desires to improve training and
education to cultivate multi-skilled personnel (Roberson and Stafford 2017).
Improvements can be made to team composition in order to incorporate personnel
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knowledge, skill, and abilities and by allowing flexible teaming structures in varying
sizes to meet the recovery operations’ specific needs.
Team management comprises the assumptions about how repair crews can be
utilized to recover disrupted systems. Every set of authors reviewed in this research who
addressed this concept incorporated the concept of a single team assignment within a
non-preemptive environment (Almoghathawi et al. 2019; Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Nurre
et al. 2012; Sharkey et al. 2015). This largely meant only one work crew could work on a
recovery task at a time and that once a task was started the work crew would remain on
that task until it was complete. The requirement to remain on a task implies all damage is
known at the time of decision and nothing more important will come up. The requirement
for only one work crew per task precludes massing or teaming up on priority tasks.
An example of the single assignment within a non-preemptive environment
restriction is when Work Crew A finishes Priority 1 Task they cannot go and assist the
recovery of Priority 2 Task which is being worked by Work Crew B. If Work Crew A
were allowed to assist Work Crew B, then Priority 2 Task could be accomplished sooner.
Rather Work Crew A must be reassigned to a lower priority task due to this restriction.
While these scenarios might have potential application, experience and common sense
dictate that flexibility in team management and the ability to put more personnel on a
given task when determined effective should be possible.
Resource management addresses the assumption that each team has sufficient
resources to accomplish all repair tasks. One of the few authors to address this made a
general constraint suggesting that in order to repair a given asset some resources were
required (González et al. 2016). This generalization allowed the same constraint to
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encompass a high-value, low-quantity material used in recovery, a piece of equipment, or
even a work crew. It was a unique formulation but at least some mention of resource
management was incorporated.
One resource not appraised at all in the IIR models reviewed is experience,
though it is consistently ranked as one of the most important elements in construction
labor productivity (Ahmed et al. 2020; Alwasel et al. 2017; Johari and Jha 2020; Khanh
et al. 2021; Liberda et al. 2003; Pathirage et al. 2005; Rojas and Aramvareekul 2003). For
example, masonry workers’ experience level resulted in a range of 0.67 to 1.8 blocks per
minute, which is nearly a three-fold increase in productivity based on experience
(Alwasel et al. 2017). Another study on masonry productivity rates based on experience
level showed a range of 0.6 to 2.2 as a multiplier based on a number of circumstances
(Khanh et al. 2021). This somewhat intangible resource is underexplored as a factor in
IIR modeling.
Work conditions addresses the assumptions regarding the circumstances,
effectiveness, or success of the work. Assumptions surrounding work conditions tend to
stem from the previous assumptions highlighted and include no effect of productivity rate
due to workers’ knowledge, skills, and abilities and the unstated assumption that all
repairs will be on-time and effective. Sharkey et al. (2015) addressed the first issue in a
very specific way by identifying a restoration interdependency called effectiveness
precedence. This relationship meant that unless a given task was accomplished the other
task would require additional time. An example is trying to clear standing water from a
flooded street. If power is restored to a nearby lift station, then the work will proceed at a
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normal speed. If power is not restored to the lift station, then pump trucks will continue to
be used and the time to clear the flooded street will be prolonged.
The only author to address on-time and successful repairs from the reviewed
literature was González (2017) in his dissertation work on modeling interdependent
infrastructure networks. He employed stochastic optimization and conditional probability
in order to address uncertainty in repair success. While this specific challenge to work
conditions did not directly relate to work crews it was insightful as a way to incorporate
varying work conditions.
In summary, assumptions associated with team composition, team management,
resource management, and work conditions have the potential to impact the
recoverability of infrastructure systems. The recoverability of infrastructure systems then
impacts the resilience of systems. Specifically, relaxing the prevailing assumptions of
rigid parallel teams, the non-preemptive environment, not considering knowledge, skill,
and abilities of recovery personnel, and not allowing multiple crews to work on recovery
tasks will result in more realistic models for recovery operations within the military.
The remainder of this article presents a novel MINLP to address these
characteristics of recovery operations. The presentation of the model is followed by a
description of the damage scenario, followed by the results and discussion of the analysis.
6.3. Methodology
The purpose of this section is to present the MINLP that first seeks to balance
multi-commodity flow within a disrupted network while simultaneously scheduling
repairs. Second the model then integrates both operational and restoration
interdependencies identified and presented in Moore et al. (2021). The output of the
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model is 1) a least-cost recovery strategy, 2) work crew assignments for each time period,
and 3) recovery progress on all damaged assets for each time period.
The unique MINLP presented in this work is denoted as the flexible team base
interdependent infrastructure recovery model (tmBIIRM). Most of the previous models
reviewed were mixed-integer linear programs (MIP) and solved to optimality by using
solvers (i.e., CPLEX), which employs linear relaxation of the integer problem and dual
feasibility to prove optimality (IBM Corp. 2017). Some authors chose to employ
heuristics to improve computational time to include iterations in lieu of time indices
(González et al. 2016) and dispatching rules (Nurre et al. 2012). The non-linear nature of
the present work, precludes the use of the CPLEX solver but leverages a non-linear
solver BARON, which employs a branch and reduce algorithm to navigate the integer
program.
6.3.1. Combined network flow and scheduling repairs
Consistent with other models, the base model seeks to balance network flow and
scheduling repairs within the disrupted network (Nurre et al. 2012; Sharkey et al. 2015).
The infrastructure systems are modeled using a multilayered network consisting of nodes
and arcs which represent the built assets within the infrastructure layers. Multicommodity
flow is used to represent the infrastructure services that are necessary to support military
operations to be conducted within the network. An example of an infrastructure service
that is required to perform a military operation is fire and emergency services which are
necessary for crash rescue of aircraft experiencing an in-flight emergency. The ability to
meet the demand of the fire and emergency services at the node representing the airfield
implies the infrastructure is capable of supporting the military operations in this instance.
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If the delivery of fire and emergency services is prohibited as commodity flow based on
damaged intermittent nodes or arcs, then that infrastructure must be repaired before that
infrastructure service is available for the designated military operation.
Scheduling repairs is multifaceted. A brief description of scheduling repairs might
entail: identify infrastructure damage, assign repair crews, and repair the damage. This
simple description of scheduling repairs bypasses the formation and management of the
actual repair crew or assumes it is pre-defined and appropriate for the damage. The
current research includes team composition and skill-matching as part of the scheduling
process and therefore the brief description of scheduling repairs becomes: identify
infrastructure damage, assign and match personnel to repair crews, assign and match
repair crews to damaged infrastructure, and repair the damage. This intentionally adds in
the element of work crew composition and skill-matching for the completion of the
recovery tasks. These steps are often assumed away, but are part of the necessary process
to successfully repair damaged infrastructure systems.
Table 6.1 identifies sets, parameters, and variables associated with the network
flow and the infrastructure system’s operability. It is assumed that commodities flowing
within a given network share the overall arc capacity within that given network. An
example is recovery crews, essential personnel, fire trucks, police, and ambulance all
share the same capacity limitations of the damaged transportation infrastructure layer.
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Table 6.1. Sets, parameters, and variables associated with network flow and network
operations
Notation
𝒜
𝒜𝑘
𝒜′
𝒜′𝑘
ℒ
ℒ𝑘
𝒩
𝒩𝑘
𝒩′
𝒩 ′𝑘
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑘
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝜇𝑖𝑡

𝜇𝐴 or 𝜇𝐵
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘

Description
Set of arcs, indexed as (𝑖, 𝑗).
Subset of arcs within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
Set of damaged arcs.
Subset of damaged arcs within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
Set of commodities.
Subset of commodities able to flow within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
Set of nodes, indexed as 𝑖.
Subset of nodes within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. A further subset can be
designated using a subscript to denote demand (D), supply (S), and transshipment (T)
nodes.
Set of all damaged nodes.
Subset of damaged nodes within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
Supply or demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Cost of flowing commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 through arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Capacity parameter of arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 shared by all commodities flowing along that arc
at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Weighting parameter for arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 indicating the assigned value
for that asset to be operable at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Weighting parameter for cost objective and operability objective.
Variable representing flow of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 along arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 at time period 𝑡 ∈
𝒯.
Slack variable representing unmet demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 at time
period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Slack variable representing surplus of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 at time period
𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Binary variable indicating if arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is operable at time period
𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

Table 6.2 identifies sets, parameters, and variables associated with the scheduling
and repair of infrastructure systems. It is assumed that damaged nodes and arcs are
initially inoperable and that damaged assets only become operable after they are fully
repaired. In reality, some partial operability might be possible if the damage is minor
enough; however, this operability assumption is consistent with other modeling efforts
(Almoghathawi et al. 2019; González et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2007; Sharkey et al. 2015).
The repairs are assumed to be temporary fixes in order to restore infrastructure services.
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Temporary repairs are those repairs which restore the infrastructure services, but
sometimes do not completely achieve pre-disruption capabilities or performance. For
example, a blown transformer can be bypassed in order to restore power back to a critical
facility, and then the transformer can be repaired at a later time.
Table 6.2. Sets, parameters, and variables associated with scheduling workers and
repairing infrastructure systems
Notation
ℱ
𝒮
𝒲
Π

𝑎𝜋𝑡
𝐸𝜋𝑓
𝑔𝑠𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑓
or 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓
𝑘
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑞𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝜙𝑖𝑘 or 𝜙𝑖𝑗

Ω
𝑘
𝑘
𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑠
or 𝑔𝑖𝑠
𝑧𝑠𝑡

𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑘

Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 or Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 or Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡

Description
Set of knowledge, skills, and abilities that are required for restoration tasks, indexed as
𝑓 = {1, … , 𝐹}.
Set of locations.
Set of all work crews, indexed as 𝑤 = {1, … , 𝑊}, where 𝑊 ≤ 𝑃/2 since all work crews
must have at least two people in them
Set of workers or personnel that can be assigned to a work crew, indexed as 𝜋 =
{1, … , 𝑃}.
Hourly cost rate parameter of assigning personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π during time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Parameter indicating the experience level of personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π based on the skill set 𝑓 ∈
ℱ.
Cost parameter of geospatial site preparation of space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 started at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Parameter indicating normal processing time in manhours for repair of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or
arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 requiring skill set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ.
Cost parameter of repair for recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 at time
period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Number of skill sets associated with the restoration activity at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc
(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 .
Parameter designating the number of hours in a time period (e.g., 8-hour work shifts, 12hour half-day shifts, etc.)
Binary variable indicating if arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is in space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮.
Binary variable indicating if a recovery task in space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 is assigned during time
period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Binary variable that is equal to 1 if personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π is assigned to work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 in
time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Variable indicating the number of manhours work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 is assigned to a recovery
task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 during time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Binary variable equal to 1 if recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 has been completed by the
end of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 and 0 otherwise
Variable amount of work completed on restoration activity requiring skill set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ by
the end of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Variable indicating what percentage of time personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π is engaged in repair work
utilizing skill set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ within time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Variable amount representing the effective time at a restoration activity requiring skill
set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ by the end of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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The MINLP has two primary objectives associated with cost and operability. The
cost objective seeks to minimize multiple costs associated with different aspects of
recovery operations. There are four different costs to include site preparation, worker
assignment, repair, and flow costs. These are summed in the cost objective shown in
(6.1).
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯(∑𝑠∈𝒮 𝑔𝑠𝑡 𝑧𝑠𝑡 + ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝑎𝜋𝑡 Ω𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)).

(6.1)

The first term in (6.1) represents the site preparation costs. Site preparation costs
represent the costs associated with mobilization, detour planning and routing if necessary,
and excavation to reach buried utilities. There is one cost per area and is an average case
cost based on the type of terrain (i.e., urban, suburban, trees, open). The second term is
the assignment cost and is calculated based on the hourly labor rate for a given personnel
multiplied by the man-hours in the time period multiplied by a variable indicating
assignment to a work crew. The third and fourth terms are the repair costs based on
completed work on damaged arcs and nodes, respectively. The fifth cost is the cost to
flow commodities through the network. Each of these terms are indexed by time so as to
handle fluctuating costs which are often experienced during recovery operations as scarce
commodities drive costs (Sharkey et al. 2016).
The operability objective seeks to maximize the operability of nodes and arcs.
Operability is used instead of unmet demand in order to give critical linear assets, which
are represented by arcs, a chance to have equal weight as any given node. This choice
emphasizes critical linear assets to achieve military objectives to include airfield
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pavements, communication lines, and critical power lines. The operability objective is
shown in (6.2).
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
). (6.2)

The first term is the weighted nodal operability and the second term is arc-based
operability. The priority weighting terms are also indexed by time, which allows
stakeholders to assign time-dependent values which can be an important element in
examining infrastructure resilience (Poulin and Kane 2021).
These two objectives are combined in a weighted summation using the negative
of the operability function to result in an overall minimization problem. This is shown in
(6.3), following which, several network flow and scheduling constraints are presented
and then explained. A suffix “arc” is attached to some of the equation numbers in this
section to denote an arc-based version of the same constraint.
Minimize

𝜇𝐴 𝐴 − 𝜇𝐵 𝐵.

(6.3)

Subject to the following constraints
−,𝑘
+,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑗:(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
− ∑𝑗:(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
− 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈

𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.4)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.5)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.6)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.7)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.8)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(6.8.arc)

𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤

∑𝑓∈ℱ Δ𝑘
𝑖𝑓𝑡

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤

Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 =

𝜙𝑖𝑘

, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

∑𝑓∈ℱ Δ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝑘
𝜙𝑖𝑗

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑓𝑡

Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 =

𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑓

, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓

, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.9)

(6.9.arc)

(6.10)

(6.10.arc)
(6.11)

𝑘
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
, ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.11.arc)
∑𝑓∈ℱ 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.12)

∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 = 1, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.13)

∑𝜋∈Π 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 ≥ 2, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.14)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ Ω, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.15)

𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.16)

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.17)

+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.18)

𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.19)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.19.arc)

𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.20)

𝑘
0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ Ω, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.21)

𝑘
0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ Ω, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(6.21.arc)

𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.22)
(6.22.arc)

0 ≤ Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
0 ≤ Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.23)
(6.23.arc)

0 ≤ 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.24)

𝑘
0 ≤ Θ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑓
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.25)

𝑘
0 ≤ Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.25.arc)

The general flow balance equation is shown in (6.4), where outflow minus inflow
is equal to supply or demand plus any unmet demand and minus any surplus. The term
𝑘
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
is used for both supply and demand, such that when 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0 the node is a demand
𝑘
𝑘
node, when 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 0 the node is a transshipment node, and when 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
> 0 the node is a

supply node. Only demand nodes can have a non-zero positive slack variable indicating
−,𝑘
unmet demand, 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
. Only supply nodes can have a non-zero positive slack variable
+,𝑘
indicating surplus supply, 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
. The addition of slack variables is essential in a network

flow scenario where the nodes and arcs can be damaged and unable to be used in order to
flow commodities. Flow is restricted in (6.5) to (6.7) based on the arc capacity and
operability of the starting node, ending node, and arc, respectively. These general flow
equations follow the initial flow modeling of González et al. (2016).
The next constraints describe the restoration activities and the requirements to
restore a damaged asset. A damaged node and arc must be completely repaired in order
for it to become operable as seen in (6.8) and (6.8.arc), respectively. A node and arc are
completely restored when all the work requiring various skills are complete as shown in
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(6.9) and (6.9.arc), respectively. These last constraints incorporate skill matching. For
example, a node requiring electrical, HVAC, and structural work in order to be completed
has the variables Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 indicating the decimal percent of work accomplished at the given
node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 requiring skills 𝑓 ∈ {𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙, 𝐻𝑉𝐴𝐶, 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙} would need to sum to
3, representing that the work associated with each of the necessary skills is complete. The
number would then be divided by the number of skills required for that job in order to be
complete. The completion status of a given node or arc based on certain skill 𝑓 ∈ ℱ are
calculated in (6.10) and (6.10.arc), respectively.
The next set of constraints to be described are focused on the scheduling decisions
made during recovery operations. The effective man-hours applied toward completing a
task depends on the amount of time a person is using a certain skill, at a certain
proficiency, while working on a specific work crew for a given number of hours as seen
in (6.11) and (6.11.arc) for nodes and arcs, respectively. This is the only non-linear
constraint within the model and is what makes the overall model a MINLP instead of a
MIP. These constraints integrate the concepts of team composition and skill-matching
and are essential to this formulation.
A worker is capable of using only one skill at a time during a given time period as
seen in (6.12). A worker can be assigned to only one work crew within a given time
period, but they are able to be on different work crews across the several time periods
within the evaluation window as show in (6.13). An employee safety mandate was used
to ensure work crews consisted of at least two people, which can be eliminated as a
constraint if not applicable. Likewise an upper bound can be imposed on this same
constraint to restrict team sizes to manageable numbers, which was not done in this
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current effort. The minimum crew size restriction is seen in (6.14) and also sets a default
upper limit for the number of work crews as being half of the worker population, though
it can be restricted further. The final scheduling constraint ensures that work crews are
not assigned to work more than the number of man-hours available in a given time
period. For this formulation all the time periods were kept the same length, but, if
necessary, the Ω-term could be indexed by 𝑡, which would allow for varying lengths of
time periods. This might be appropriate if smaller time frames are deemed critical for the
first 24 to 48 hours, and then the recovery operations will be looked at in larger time
frames.
The last constraints, namely (6.16) to (6.25) are side constraints. These constraints
explain the nature of the variables and also express some upper and lower bounds when
appropriate. These objectives and constraints form the basis of the model and capture the
network flow and scheduling restrictions. The next subsection will detail how operational
and restoration interdependencies are integrated into the MINLP.
6.3.2. Integrating operational and restoration interdependencies
Interdependencies are largely in two forms, operational – affecting the operations
of the system, and restoration-based – affecting the order and precedence in which
recovery operations are conducted. Rinaldi et al. (2001) provided a set of four operational
interdependencies, which are used in the present work. Sharkey et al. (2015, 2016)
identified five restoration interdependencies, of which four precedence-focused
interdependencies are used in the present work. Finally, González et al. (2016) introduced
a final restoration interdependency and illustrated how operational interdependencies can
be coupled, which work was elaborated upon by others (Moore et al. 2021a).
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This subsection presents the constraints associated with various interdependency
subtypes followed by brief descriptions of the constraints. Table 6.3 identifies sets,
parameters, and variables associated with interdependencies.
Table 6.3. Sets, parameters, and variables associated with operational and restoration
interdependencies
Notation
𝐴𝑇𝑃 and 𝑁𝑇𝑃
𝐴𝐸𝑃 and 𝑁𝐸𝑃
𝐴𝑂𝑃 and 𝑁𝑂𝑃
𝐴𝑇𝑆 and 𝑁𝑇𝑆
̃

𝒩𝑖̃𝑘𝑘
𝜓𝜉
Ξ
Ψ
𝑘
𝑘
𝑒𝑖𝑓
or 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑓
̃

𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝑡
̃

̃

̃

𝑘𝑘
𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 , 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝑗̃ , 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
,
̃

𝑘𝑘
and 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
𝑗̃
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
or 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝑡
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

Θ𝑘𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑡 or Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑒𝑓𝑡

Description
Sets representing arc-based traditional precedence and node-based traditional
precedence.
Sets representing arc-based effectiveness precedence and node-based effectiveness
precedence.
Sets representing arc-based options precedence and node-based options precedence.
Sets representing arc-based time-sensitive options and node-based time-sensitive
options.
Set of nodes in infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 that have a parent-child interdependent
̃
relationship with child node 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 based on some operational interdependency
subtype 𝜓 ∈ Ψ and some coupling strategy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ.
Set of coupling strategies, indexed as 𝜉.
Set of operational interdependency subtypes, indexed as 𝜓.
Parameter representing the extended processing time in man-hours for repair of arc
(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 requiring skill 𝑓 ∈ ℱ.
̃
𝑘𝑘
Operational interdependency parameter based on parent-child node pairs 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 with
some operational interdependency type 𝜓 ∈ Ψ.
Parameters indicating the deadline for time-sensitive options to start if parent assets are
restored for node-to-node, node-to-arc, arc-to-node, and arc-to-arc, respectively.
Variable indicating the number of extended processing time manhours work crew 𝑤 ∈
𝒲 is assigned to a recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 with extended
processing time during time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Variable indicating the effective man-hours processed against the extended processing
time, which were accomplished at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 requiring skill
𝑓 ∈ ℱ at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

Operational interdependencies can be illustrated as node-to-node parent-child
relationships. The behavior of the relationship depends on the coupling 𝜉 ∈ Ξ, which for
this model are defined as one-to-one, one-to-any, and one-to-all. Not included in this
model is a one-to-many coupling strategy, since it is inconsistent with a binary
operability variable (Moore et al. 2021a). Table 6.4 establishes the various values the
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̃

operational interdependency parameter 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 takes based on the coupling. The presence
of the 𝜓 index within the interdependency parameter allows for layered operational
interdependencies of differing subtypes (i.e., physical, logical, cyber, geospatial). An
example is a wastewater treatment plant requiring the raw wastewater, power, water, and
personnel to run the plant. The raw wastewater is handled within the wastewater
infrastructure layer as a single commodity flow problem, where a disruption in the system
would result in a treatment plant not servicing the total system demand. The power and
water represent physical interdependencies between the power and water infrastructure
layers and the wastewater infrastructure layer. The dependence on workers to run the
treatment plant is a logical interdependency and if workers are unable to arrive at the
plant, eventually there will be some lapse in service or a degradation of service. Since the
interdependency parameter is also indexed on time, the interdependency may be
temporary or experience a lag in the effects on the system of interest.
Table 6.4. Effect of coupling strategy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ on operational interdependency parameter
̃

𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 given some sort of node-to-node parent-child relationship
̃

𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡

Coupling, 𝜉

Description

One-to-one

𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ is only functional when a specific
̃
𝑘𝑘
singular node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 .is functional.

1

One-to-any

𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ is functional when at least one node of a
subset is functional, namely some node 𝑖 ∈
̃
𝑘𝑘
𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉.

1

One-to-all

𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ is functional only if every node from a
̃
𝑘𝑘
subset 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 is functional.

1
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̃

𝑘𝑘
|𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉|

The following two constraints concisely summarize how operational
interdependencies are incorporated within this model. The first constraint shown in (6.26)
is modified from González et al. (2016) by adding interdependency subtype, coupling,
and time indices and controlling the summation over a specialized set of nodes that have
a pairing based on specific interdependent relationships and coupling strategies.
̃
∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘𝑘̃ 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑡 , ∀𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ , 𝑘̃ ∈ 𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝜉 ∈ Ξ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.26)

−,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.27)

𝑖̃ 𝜓𝜉

The operability of a child node within an operational interdependent relationship
depends on the operability of the parent node and numeric value assigned to the
interdependency parameter as shown in (6.26). A general constraint is also included to
repress operability if demand is not met as shown in (6.27). This last constraint makes the
assumption that operability is contingent upon infrastructure services.
The remainder of this subsection describes how the various restoration
interdependencies are incorporated into the model. All of the precedence constraints
exhibit distinct parent-child relationships with distinct asset-to-asset coupling which can
be described as node-to-node (n2n), node-to-arc (n2a), arc-to-node (a2n), or arc-to-arc
(a2a). For brevity of presentation only node-to-node relationships are shown with the
other relationships presented in Appendix E. Suffixes are added to designate the unique
coupling being described on appropriate constraints.
The first four restoration interdependency subtypes are built following the logic of
Sharkey et al. (2015) and are also called precedence constraints. The first restoration
interdependency subtype is called traditional precedence. Traditional precedence is when
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a recovery task in the parent infrastructure must be accomplished prior to starting any
work on a recovery task in the child infrastructure. An example is downed trees that need
to be cleared prior to repairing an overhead electrical distribution line.
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.28.n2n)
(6.29.n2n)

Equation (6.28) ensures that the parent asset is complete, prior to any work on a
child asset. There is an additional constraint which ensures that for node-based traditional
precedence the parent node is not only repaired but is also operable, to include meeting
demand throughout the repair of the child node as shown in (6.29).
The second restoration interdependency subtype is effective precedence. Effective
precedence uses the same traditional precedence relationship for normal completion time,
but also allows for extended processing time of a recovery task if repair of the parent
node is not completed first. An example of this is clearing a flooded street of excess
water, which either requires restoring power to a combined storm water and wastewater
pump for normal completion time or requires a pump truck at a longer or extended
processing time. This type of precedence adds variables associated with assigning work
crews to tasks at an extended processing time. This extended processing time is only an
option for assets with an effectiveness precedence relationship. The addition of new
variables requires the modification to previously presented constraints, which retain their
original purpose and are shown in (6.10*), (6.11*), and (6.15*). An asterisk is used with
the previous numbering in order to designate a change to a previously presented
constraint.
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Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 =

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑓

+

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑡
𝑘
𝑒𝑖𝑓

, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , (𝑖̃, 𝑖) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), 𝑖) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈

𝒯.

(6.10*)
Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 =

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓

+

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑓𝑡
𝑘
𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑓

, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , (𝑖̃, (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑘 ∈

𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.10*.arc)

Θ𝑘𝑖𝑒 𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 , ∀ (𝑖̃, 𝑖) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), 𝑖) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈
ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.11*)

𝑘
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑒𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑗
, ∀ (𝑖̃, (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.11*.arc)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+∑

∑
(

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
(𝑖̃,(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
𝑒 𝑤𝑡
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

(

𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝑡
(𝑖̃,𝑖)∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),𝑖)∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

+

≤ Ω, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇,Ω𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑓
]

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.15*)

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈

(6.30.n2n)
̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.31.n2n)

The main difference in the effectiveness precedence and traditional precedence is
seen in the option to start work at an extended processing time without the parent asset
being restored or allowing for proper normal processing time before the parent asset
would be complete as shown in (6.30). Similar to traditional precedence, if recovery of
the child asset is scheduled at normal recovery time, then the parent node must be
operable as shown in (6.31).
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The third restoration interdependency subtype is options precedence. This can be
thought of as a child recovery task requiring completion of at least one of the parent
recovery tasks. Options precedence can be considered as multiple parents to a singular
child in an asset-to-asset relationship. Traditional precedence is more than just a special
case of options precedence in that traditional precedence relationships are often built into
chains of events, where options precedence are single decision-point events. An example
of options precedence is restoring power to the hospital by repairing a downed power line
or by equipping the facility with a mobile generator for critical loads.
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑(𝑖,𝑖̃)∈𝑁𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.32.n2n)
(6.33.n2n)

One of two or more parent assets must be repaired prior to work starting on a
child recovery task as shown in (6.32). Parent nodes must be operable to include having
demand met, in order to work on the child recovery task as seen in (6.33).
The fourth restoration interdependency subtype is time-sensitive options. Timesensitive options describe those instances when a recovery task must be accomplished by
a certain deadline or another recovery task will be generated. An example is power needs
to be restored to a cell tower before the fuel in the generator hits a critical level at a
specific time. If power is not restored by the deadline, then a crew needs to be dispatched
to refuel the generator.
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 + ∑𝑡

̃

̃

𝜏=𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘

̃

̃

(∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝜏 + 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝜏 ) ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.

∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘̃ − 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.
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(6.34.n2n)
(6.35.n2n)

At the time of the deadline, the parent asset must be operational or the newly
generated recovery task must be started. Beyond the initial deadline the parent asset must
be operable or the child recovery task must be actively being worked on or be completed
as seen in (6.34). In order to simulate the recovery task being generated at the deadline,
the child recovery task is not allowed to be worked on until just before the deadline as
shown in (6.35).
The fifth and final restoration interdependency subtype is geospatial repair.
Geospatial repair includes work to prepare a site (e.g., mobilization, site safety, detours,
notification, utility excavation) and represents the average work necessary for a given
location based on terrain type. An example demonstrating potential cost savings is
scheduling road repair and a water main repair which share one geospatial location to be
performed at the same specific time period, thereby only incurring the site preparation
fees once as shown in (6.36). The node- and arc-based constraints (6.36) are based on the
logic used by González et al. (2016). The side constraint governing the work location
variable is shown in (6.37).
1
Ω
1
Ω

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑔𝑖𝑠
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ) ≤ 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.36)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑠
(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) ≤ 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. (6.36.arc)
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

𝑧𝑠𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(6.37)

Additionally, side constraints are added to define the extended processing time
𝑘
variables of 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖𝑗
, Θ𝑘𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑡 , and Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑓𝑡 similarly as they were defined for normal
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

processing time. These side constraints are implemented in the model but not shown.
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This concludes the formulation of the tmBIIRM and the following section discusses the
damage scenarios and results.
6.4. Computational Results
This section discusses 1) the simulated military network and damage scenarios, 2)
the integration of personnel data, and 3) the results of analysis. Each of these points are
discussed in the following subsections.
6.4.1. The simulated interdependent infrastructure military network
This subsection discusses the simulated military network and damage scenarios.
The simulated interdependent civil infrastructure networks were built based on a model
constructed by Valencia (2013) for risk analysis. The infrastructure networks were
constructed in a multiplex format which means there is a one-for-one mapping of nodes
across layers. Nodes are reflected when it operates as a demand node, supply node, or
transshipment node within the reflected network. An example of this is a water
distribution pump residing in the water infrastructure layer that also has an electrical
power demand. Therefore, the water pump is reflected in the power infrastructure layer.
A total of five infrastructure layers were used comprising telecommunications, power,
transportation, water, and wastewater.
Within the network two different scenarios were simulated using a minimum and
maximum extent of damage. A flattened representation of the network is shown in Figure
6.1 where the simulated damage is also identified. The military context is based on a
critical mission being conducted out of Admin Facility 1, which is the primary target of a
kinetic attack using an improvised explosive device causing an explosion. The explosion
is combined with simultaneous cyber-attacks to key industrial control systems. The
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overall initial targeted attacks disrupt the infrastructure services and creates a state in
which repair crews must repair the network to continue to conduct military operations.

Fig. 6.1. Flattened representation of the simulated military network and targeted
disruptions with both kinetic and cyber-attacks
In the damage scenarios, the most extensive damage is to the critical facilities and
support infrastructure in close proximity of the kinetic attacks. Table 6.5 summarizes the
network and damage scenario characteristics.
Table 6.5. Network and damage scenario characteristics within simulated network
Assets
Percent
Asset
Quantity Damaged Damaged
Node
67*
7
10.4%
105
10
9.5%
Arc
* 21 Nodes and 46 nodal reflections
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An important element of interdependent infrastructure recovery are the
interdependencies. The simulated military network exhibits multiple operational and
restoration interdependencies, which are not dominated by one system only, but rather
follows network-to-network interdependencies used in other public access datasets such
as the CLARC dataset (Little et al. 2020; Loggins and Wallace 2015; Sharkey et al.
2018). Table 6.6 summarizes the number and type of interdependencies within the
system.
Table 6.6. Number and type of interdependency relationships within the network

Operational

Qty.

Physical

7

Parent-Child
Infra.*

Restoration

Qty.

Parent-Child
Infra.*

PWR-ICT
PWR-WTR
PWR-WWT
WTR-TER
WTR-WWT

Traditional
precedence

1

PWR-WTR

Effectiveness
precedence

2

WTR-WTR
WTR-WWT

Cyber

5

ICT-PWR
ICT-TER

Options
precedence

6

TER-PWR

Logical

5

TER-TER
TER-WWT
WTR-TER

Time-sensitive
options

2

PWR-PWR

WWT-WTR

Geospatial
repair

3

Any-Any

Geospatial

1

* ICT – telecommunications, PWR – power, TER – transportation, WTR – water,
WWT - wastewater

The combination of the networks with interdependencies and a military-focused
context creates a small simulated set of civil infrastructure networks for use to show the
veracity of challenging the prevailing teaming assumptions. Personnel information such
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as skill and experience had to be included into the dataset and is discussed in the
following subsection.
6.4.2. Integration of skilled labor data
A representative U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer personnel dataset used in other
simulation and planning scenarios was obtained and used. No personal identifiable
information accompanied the dataset. Each individual represented some type of
craftsman with associated skill sets. Table 6.7 lists the craftsmen and then lists the
primary skills associated with that craft. Some craftsmen have secondary or tertiary skills,
and all laborers have an unlisted skill called “general” – meaning general labor.
Table 6.7. Worker crafts and associated primary, secondary, and tertiary skills
Worker Craft

Primary

Cable & Antenna Systems

Communications Structures

Electrical Systems

Electrical

Engineering & Surveyors

Surveying

Heating, Ventilation, Air
Conditioning, & Refrigeration

HVAC

Plumbing

Electrical

Pavement & Construction Equipment

Pavements

Structures

Surveying

Power Production

Generator

Electrical

Structural

Structures

Pavements Surveying

Water and Fuel Systems Maintenance Plumbing

Secondary

Tertiary

Generator

Structures

A skill level is also associated with each individual for any skill listed in Table
6.7. It was assumed that secondary and tertiary skill proficiency were less than the level
attained within the primary skill. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer
community uses a tiered skill level system of apprentice, journeyman, craftsman, and
superintendent. The first three skill levels are the most important in this research and
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roughly equate to the efficiency which is expected from an individual worker. This means
that an apprentice will take a little longer to accomplish the same task that a journeyman
could accomplish, while the craftsman will finish the same task faster than the
journeyman. These ideas contributed to the information embodied in 𝐸𝜋𝑓 – the
experience parameter.
6.4.3. The effect of flexible team management on infrastructure recovery
This subsection details the results of analyzing the effect of teams throughout the
damage events. The tmBIIRM was programmed using GAMS v31.1.1 on a desktop
computer with an Intel Xeon CPU-E5-1620 processor operating at 3.60 GHz with 16 GB
of RAM. The solver used was BARON v20.4.14. All tests were conducted using ten 8hour time periods with 25 work crew personnel. The average run time was 48 minutes.
Due to the nature of military operations, the operability objective was more heavily
weighted, i.e., 𝜇𝐵 = 0.8, in most of the analysis. Additionally, in order to achieve a
balance of computational time and accuracy, a relative optimality gap of lower than 5%
was allowed as a solver stopping criterion.
A comparative analysis was conducted using the flexible team MINLP denoted as
tmBIIRM and a parallel team MIP based on the authors’ previous work (Moore et al.
2021b) denoted as BIIRM. The same damage scenarios were used with both models. For
comparison’s sake six work crews were simulated, effectively adding an upper bound to
Equation (6.14). The tmBIIRM allowed varying team compositions from time period to
time period while the BIIRM simulated team assignment in a infrastructure-specific
parallel assignment fashion. This allowed for better evaluation of including flexible team
composition and skill matching.to levels of damage caused to nodes and arcs.
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The max extent of the damage in these scenarios yielded repair times
approximately three times greater than the min damage scenarios. Figure 6.2 shows a
comparison of the system operability based on the use of the flexible teaming model
(tmBIIRM) or the parallel team model (BIIRM) and damage level.
The tmBIIRM showed extremely quick recovery capability with the min damage,
while the max damage showed both greater and lesser overall system operability levels.
In total, both the min and max tmBIIRM scenarios did not recover as many of the
network assets, leaving some network assets in a disrupted state. Both models chose not
to repair some of the wastewater infrastructure. This is due to the model’s tradeoff of cost
to gain in weighted system operability. To change this outcome a modeler or
infrastructure stakeholder could adjust the nodal weight for a given system, which in
these scenarios weighted electrical systems the most important and wastewater some of
the least important. Of the 175 assets, the tmBIIRM did not repair 6 and 9 assets for the
min and max damage events, respectively. The BIIRM did not repair 5 assets for both
min and max damage events.
A general trend in the comparison of the flexible teaming and parallel teaming
models is the more abrupt nature of the parallel teaming model output. The flexible
teaming model output is more gradual, though it also has large increases at time periods 2
and 5 for the max damage event.
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Fig. 6.2. Comparison of flexible teaming and parallel teaming infrastructure recovery
based on a min and max level of damage evaluated within the same damage scenario
Figure 6.3 shows the worker skill usage by craft. Based on the given damage
scenario the electrical, plumbing, and structures craft were most heavily used in their
primary skill, with HVAC not significantly less. Communications and generator laborers
were largely used for their secondary skills. Pavements showed the highest idle time,
meaning they were employed at a work site for a portion of the time, but then had nothing
more to contribute before the work day was complete. General labor was mixed in among
all the crafts with two notable exceptions: one electrician and one surveyor were used
only as general laborers. This is a complete deviation from the parallel teams assumption,
since it was just assumed that either the crews had all necessary skills or the skill set was
only associated with a given infrastructure layer. Therefore, in contrast to the variety of
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skills used for optimal recovery incorporating flexible teams as seen in Figure 6.3. each
employee would be used only in the primary skill.

Fig. 6.3. Percent usage of skill per employee as they are grouped by craft
There was a slight preference for the journeyman skill level, which might indicate
a balance between cost and competence. Figure 6.4 shows this slight preferential
treatment based on usage of that skill level over others. The summation of usage does not
add up to 100%, because not all the workers were needed during all the time periods
under evaluation.
While overall least cost recovery strategies between flexible teaming models and
parallel models are largely the same, the level of detail in organizing recovery crews is
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superior in the flexible teaming models. This allows visibility into how it is best to utilize
employees’ skills and match them with requirements.

Fig. 6.4. Optimal assignment showed slight preference for intermediate skill level
6.5. Conclusions
Current modeling of interdependent civil infrastructure recovery uses parallel
teams and does not consider the use of multiskilled personnel and flexible teaming
structures. The presented MINLP or tmBIIRM incorporates team composition decisionmaking and skill-matching to improve visibility for optimal human capital management
over the parallel teams. Recovery strategies are comparable between flexible teaming and
parallel teaming models. Some improvements noticed in system operability can be due to
several reasons to include teams can grow in size to more quickly handle large outages
and problems. Improvement is also seen in work crews being able to divide time among
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work tasks based on their skill sets, which can also cause some lag behind the nonpreemptive environment assumed in the parallel teaming models.
Computational performance is slower in the tmBIIRM with an average time of 48
CPU minutes. The same damage scenarios using the BIIRM was less than 1 CPU minute.
The increased team structure management would need to be weighed with the urgency of
the recovery task. Due to the current computational time, this type modeling effort would
best be utilized in planning and preventive analysis rather than in actual recovery
operations. Future considerations include reduction of the computational time in order to
make it a more viable option for recovery operations use as well as planning.
The assumptions and nuances of team management within recovery operations are
largely overlooked in modeling and simulation. The incorporation of team composition
and skill matching is an exciting development toward a closer approximation of realworld recovery operations and the necessary decisions that accompany these events.
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VII. Model Behavior, Performance, and Limitations
7.1. Introduction
This chapter summarizes various efforts to fully understand the BIIRM’s
behavior, performance, and limitations. An emphasis is on the BIIRM model, since it
serves as the base model for the LiteBIIRM and tmBIIRM models. This chapter is
divided into three sections covering the behavior, performance, and limitations of the
BIIRM.
7.2. Model Behavior
This section addresses the development of the objective functions and the integerbehavior of the BIIRM. The objective functions’ development starts as a single-objective
problem and becomes a multi-objective problem, and includes a discussion on the scaling
of the objective functions. The integer-behavior of the BIIRM creates a disparity between
the MIP and the linear relaxation or relaxed mixed-integer program (RMIP) of the
BIIRM.
7.2.1. Single versus multiple objectives
The BIIRM was originally constructed using a single cost-centric objective with
one other objective considered as a constraint using an 𝜖-constraint method (Haimes et al.
1971). This idea mimicked the work of Almoghathawi et al. (2019) who used a similar
approach in their resilience-focused MIP. It was thought that a modification to the 𝜖constrained resilience objective could be modified to provide a defense- and missionfocused objective. This constraint sought to give decision authority to a mission owner on
the desired level of mission assurance represented by 𝜖. This term mirrors a quantity
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representing a network’s resilience, where resilience is defined as 𝑅(𝑡) =
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦(𝑡)/𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑡) (Almoghathawi et al. 2019).
Leveraging the notation from previous chapters, let the following additional
notation be defined as follows:
•

𝑘
𝜇𝑖𝑡
: Weight of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯, which emphasizes repair to

critical mission assets. This parameter takes a value from 1 to 100.
•

𝛿𝑡𝑘𝑑 : The total weighted demand met in a given infrastructure 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at the time
𝑘
𝑘
when all damage is known, 𝑡𝑑 . This means that 𝛿𝑡𝑘𝑑 = ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
(−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
−
𝐷

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
) , at 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑑 , ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

•

𝛿𝑡𝑘0 : The total weighted demand met in a given infrastructure 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at a time that
𝑘
𝑘
is prior to the disruptive event, 𝑡0 . This means that 𝛿𝑡𝑘0 = ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
(−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
),
𝐷

at 𝑡 = 𝑡0 , ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. This assumes all demand is met prior to the disruptive event.
•

𝑘
𝛿𝑖𝑙𝑡
: The weighted demand met of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at a demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘

in infrastructure 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. This parameter is used strictly for a
−,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
more concise notation and reflects 𝛿𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 𝜇𝑖𝑡
(−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
− 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
).

With this notation defined, the following is the mission assurance 𝜖-constrained
objective described in Equation 7.1.
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝛿𝑖𝑙𝜏 −𝛿𝑡𝑑 ]−(𝜏−1)[∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝛿𝑖𝑙(𝜏−1) −𝛿𝑡𝑑 ]]
𝑖∈𝒩𝐷
𝐷

∑𝑇
𝜏=1[𝜏[∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑

∑𝑘∈𝒦 [

𝑇(𝛿𝑡𝑘0 −𝛿𝑡𝑘 )

] ≤ 𝜀,

(7.1)

𝑑

This represents the weighted recovery of all nodes over total loss. The numerator
defines the change in demand met from time period (𝑡 − 1) to 𝑡 across all demand nodes
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in a given network 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦. The first set of terms define the weighted demand met at a
given time against the demand met after all damage has occurred. The second set of terms
represents the same relationship at time period (𝑡 − 1). The denominator is the total
demand loss over all time periods. This expression was supposed to take a value between
0 and 1, with 1 being a fully capable mission (i.e., all critical demand met) and 0 being no
mission (i.e., no critical demand met). Thus, the mission assurance objective becomes
constrained by 𝜖, which was able to be controlled by decision makers to achieve the
desired target level of mission assurance.
This mission assurance objective became problematic during the actual runs of
the model. Due to the nature of the variables and summing over different periods of time,
the terms 𝛿𝑡𝑘𝑑 and 𝛿𝑡𝑘0 had to be pre-determined and set in order for the constraint to work.
This eliminated the dynamic nature that was intended during the formulation of the
model to determine the level of mission assurance. This likely could have been overcome
by setting up an initial run of the model over the necessary time periods with the
necessary conditions (i.e., no damage then initial damage) in order to obtain the right
values for the parameters. These initial runs could have been followed by a run of the full
model. This could have been coded in GAMS to become automatic using iterative solve
statements with submodel regimes including only the necessary equations. This possible
solution was conceived after a different approach was adopted and was never fully tested.
The inability to leverage the mission assurance objective as a constraint left the
BIIRM with only the cost-centric objective. Therefore, it is relevant to address the use of
penalty costs in the cost-centric objective function. Following the pattern of González et
+,𝑘
−,𝑘
al. (2016) penalty costs were used to incentivize flow. The penalty costs, 𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡
and 𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡
,
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+,𝑘
were associated with the slack variables representing the surplus, 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, and unmet
−,𝑘
demand, 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
. These are seen in an early version of the cost objective function in

Equation 7.2, where the first and second terms are the repair and assignment costs for
arcs, the third and fourth terms are the repair and assignment costs for nodes, the fifth and
sixth terms are the surplus and unmet demand penalty costs, and the seventh term is the
flow cost.
Minimize
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 (∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′ 𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
)+
𝛼, 𝑥
+,𝑘 +,𝑘
−,𝑘 −,𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
)) + ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦 ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 (∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘(𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡 ) +
𝑘
𝑘
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)).

(7.2)

In a recovery-based cost minimization problem based on network flow, penalty
costs were essential to incentivize flow. In a least-cost optimization with no penalty costs,
the cheapest option is to do nothing (e.g., no repair, no flow). The complete reliance upon
penalty costs is a departure from traditional network flow, where constraints of meeting
demand ensure flow through the system, which are based on an underlying assumption of
a completely functional network. Due to the nature of damaged nodes and arcs in
recovery operations, some demand will not be met, thus the underlying nature of network
flow changes in recovery scenarios.
An initial estimate of representative penalty costs were 10 times the cost of repair
for a given node. However, the resultant objective value was extremely large (e.g.,
+,𝑘
−,𝑘
1 × 109 magnitude) mainly due to the slack variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
and 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, being non-binary

and ranging from 0 to 500. These variables were multiplied by 10 times the largest cost
parameter (i.e., repair cost), which could result in penalty costs as high as 5,000 times the
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cost to repair a given node. The concerns over the penalty costs expressed by a mentor, a
committee member, and other literature (González 2017) emphasized the benefits of a
multi-objective construct balancing cost, time, and mission over the use of a single
objective highly dependent on penalty costs.
A set of three objective functions oriented around cost, time, and mission –
represented by unmet demand – was developed. These objectives are presented below in
Equations 7.3 to 7.5. These equations represent a combined desire to minimize cost,
minimize recovery time, and minimize the disruptive effect which is represented by
unmet demand. They were combined in an overall weighted sum objective function as
shown in Equation 7.6.
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 (∑𝑠∈𝒮 𝑔𝑠𝑡 𝑧𝑠𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑘∈𝒦 (∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 (∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′ 𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑤𝑡 )) +
𝑒 𝑤𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ))) + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)).

(7.3)
1

𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = 𝑇 ∑𝑡∈𝒯(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝓉𝑖 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝓉𝑖𝑗𝑘 ).

𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐶 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦 ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘
𝐷

𝑍 = 𝜇𝐴 𝐴 + 𝜇𝐵 𝐵 + 𝜇𝐶 𝐶.

𝑘 −,𝑘
𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

.

(7.4)
(7.5)
(7.6)

Equation 7.3 is similar to the cost function described as Equation 7.2 except that
Equation 7.3 includes the assignment costs for node and arc repair at extended processing
times as well as normal processing times. Equation 7.3 also removed the penalty costs
due to the introduction of what should be competing objectives. Equation 7.4 seeks to
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repair critical nodes and arcs as early as possible to minimize the time objective function
value. The time objective function introduces new variables 𝓉𝑖𝑘 and 𝓉𝑖𝑗𝑘 which are defined
𝑘
as 𝓉𝑖𝑘 = 𝑇 − ∑𝑡∈𝒯 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 and 𝓉𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑇 − ∑𝑡∈𝒯 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦

for nodes and arcs, respectively. Equation 7.5 seeks to meet demand at critical nodes, by
minimizing unmet demand at those same nodes. Table 7.1 identifies the controlling
variables for each objective function. The time objective function (Equation 7.4) has an
explicit dependence on the 𝓉 variable, but also an implicit association with the 𝑦 variable
based on the above-mentioned relationships. Also, due to another constraint relating
operability to having all of its demand met, the time function implicitly is associated with
the 𝑥 − variable. The disruption objective function (Equation 7.5) has an explicit
dependence on the 𝑥 − variable, but that slack variable is influenced on the repair of
damaged nodes (𝛼) and the flow of commodities through the system (𝑥).
Table 7.1. Goals and variables for the cost, time, and disruption objective functions
Objective
Cost (A)
Time (B)
Disruption (C)

Goal
Minimizing
Minimizing
Minimizing

Variables
𝛼 and 𝑥
𝓉 (𝑦 and 𝑥 − implicitly)
𝑥 − (𝛼 and 𝑥 implicitly)

These three objective functions eventually were reduced to two after evaluating
the effect or lack of effect between the various objectives. The next subsection illustrates
this change and presents the finalized objective functions used in the BIIRM and other
models.
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7.2.2. Scaling and balancing the objective functions
In order to understand the nature of the multi-objective solution space a series of
comparisons were run. The idea was to use one of the three objectives as the minimizing
function, constrain a second, and let the third be free. Table 7.2 tabulates these runs and
provides a description of the results which correlate with Figures 7.1 to 7.6. Each figure
is explained individually below. The indicators A, B, and C refer back to Equations 7.3 to
7.5.
Table 7.2. Objective function analysis by minimizing one function, constraining another,
and allowing the third to be free
Minimize

Constrained

Free

Descriptive Results

Cost (A)

Time (B)

Disruption (C)

Reflected curves (Fig. 7.1)

Cost (A)

Disruption (C)

Time (B)

Parallel flat lines (Fig. 7.2)

Time (B)

Cost (A)

Disruption (C)

Parallel curves (Fig 7.3)

Time (B)

Disruption (C)

Cost (A)

Parallel flat lines (Fig 7.4)

Disruption (C)

Cost (A)

Time (B)

Pseudo parallel lines* (Fig
7.5)

Disruption (C)

Time (B)

Cost (A)

Converging curves* (Fig 7.6)

* Solution was integer infeasible when run as a MIP, results are for runs as RMIP

Figure 7.1 shows the results of minimizing the cost objective while constraining
time objective values from 20,000 to 2,000 in increments of 2,000. Only seven of the ten
increments showed any results, with three being infeasible based on the constraints on
time objective value. Figure 7.1 shows that cost decreased as the time lengthened and that
disruption, in the form of unmet demand, increased over time. These were interesting
results and seemed to indicate that if less was expended (in terms of repair, assignment,
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and flow) then there would be more unmet demand (more disruption). While instinctively
true, this is not what the model was intended to do and was the first indication that these
objective functions were not properly configured.

Fig. 7.1. Objective function analysis minimizing Cost (A) and constraining Time (B)
Figure 7.2 illustrates the results as the cost objective was minimized and
disruption (unmet demand) was constrained from 10,000 to 1,000 in increments of 1,000.
These results indicated that constraining the disruption objective function had no effect
on either the cost objective or the time objective.
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Fig. 7.2. Objective function analysis minimizing Cost (A) and constraining
Disruption (C)
Figure 7.3 shows the results from minimizing the time objective while
constraining the cost objective from an objective value of 10,000 to 1,000 in increments
of 1,000. The model only produced results when the cost objective was between 9,000
and 6,000 and at all other times was infeasible due to the cost constraints. These results
were closer to what was expected. With an increase in cost, the time to repair could be
decreased and the unmet demand would decrease. The slight non-linear behavior was
likely due to non-uniform repair costs, repair time, and demand.
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Fig. 7.3. Objective function analysis minimizing Time (B) and constraining Cost (A)
Figure 7.4 illustrates the results as the time objective was minimized and the
disruption (unmet demand) objective was constrained from an objective value of 20,000
to 2,000 in increments of 2,000. Similar to Figure 7.2 constraining the disruption
objective had no effect on the cost and time objectives.
All combinations trying to minimize the disruption objective function and
constraining either the cost or time functions were infeasible using the standard MIP. It
was unclear why this was happening, but trying to minimize unmet demand with a
damaged network would set all 𝑥 − variables to zero causing several equations to become
infeasible. However, when the program was run as a relaxed mixed-integer program
(RMIP) there were some results which are shown in Figures 7.5 and 7.6.
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Fig. 7.4. Objective function analysis minimizing Time (B) and constraining
Disruption (C)
Figure 7.5 shows the results of minimizing the disruption objective function as an
RMIP while constraining the cost objective function from 10,000 to 1,000 in increments
of 1,000. These results show minimal change in both the time objective function value
and disruption function value when constraining the cost objective.
Figure 7.6 illustrates the results of minimizing the disruption objective function as
an RMIP while constraining the time objective from 20,000 to 2,000 in increments of
2,000. These results are similar to those seen in Figure 7.1 with a general decrease in cost
and a general increase in disruption as time increases. However, there are some
inconsistencies within the general trend, notably the sharp dip in cost at the constrained
time objective value of 12,000.
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Fig. 7.5. Objective function analysis as RMIP minimizing Disruption (C) and
constraining Cost (A)

Fig. 7.6. Objective function analysis as RMIP minimizing Disruption (C) and
constraining Time (B)
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Based on the analysis, it was determined that the tri-objective configuration was
inappropriate and not performing as desired. The behavior of the objective functions on
one another are thought to be due to implicit associations between the variables. While
each objective on the surface seemed to be independent of one another, several
constraints created complex relationships that affected the behavior. It was determined
that the two independent variables were 𝑥 and 𝛼 which explain how commodities flow
through the system and what is scheduled for repair. All the other variables are dependent
upon these two and combinations of other variables.
The objectives were reconfigured to include a cost objective and an operability
objective. The latter objective effectively combined the time and disruption objectives
into one objective seeking to maximize the overall system operability. These equations as
they are used in the BIIRM are again listed here as Equations 7.7 and 7.8. These two
explicit objective functions constitute the multi-objective functions used in the
LiteBIIRM, BIIRM, and tmBIIRM (see Chapters 4 to 6) and are combined in a weighted
summation shown in Equation 7.9. Table 7.3 compiles the objectives, goals, and
associated variable when applicable. The cost objective is maintained in much the same
form with the goal of minimizing costs. The second objective is operability, which seeks
to maximize the overall operability of the system. Although there are only two explicit
objective functions, the use of a time index on variables and parameters allows for a
semblance of maintaining a third objective.
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 (∑𝑠∈𝒮 𝑔𝑠𝑡 𝑧𝑠𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑘∈𝒦 (∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 (∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′ 𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑤𝑡 )) +
𝑒 𝑤𝑡
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𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ))) + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)).

(7.7)
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
). (7.8)

𝑍 = 𝜇𝐴 𝐴 − 𝜇𝐵 𝐵.

(7.9)

Table 7.3. Goals and variables for the cost, operability, and time objective functions used
in the LiteBIIRM, BIIRM, and tmBIIRM
Objective
Cost (A)
Operability (B)
Time

Goal
Minimizing
Maximizing
N/A

Variables
𝛼 and 𝑥
𝑦
None, but uses time index

The relationship between the cost objective (Equation 7.7) and the operability
objective (Equation 7.8) was found by minimizing the overall objective 𝑍, while varying
𝜇𝐴 and 𝜇𝐵 , which sum to one to create a convex combination of the two objective
functions. Figure 7.7 shows this convex combination of the two explicit objective
functions. This relationship establishes the intuitive connection that little investment in
repair will yield poor operability within the damaged system. Of interest is what can be
seen as diminishing returns as significant resources are added to the repair without
significant changes in the operability.
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Fig. 7.7. Convex combination of the cost objective function and the operability objective
function with 𝜇𝐴 values annotated by each data point
The relationship between cost and operability as seen in Figure 7.7 and explained
in Equations 7.7 to 7.9 establish the competing nature of the multi-objective space. In
order to understand the nature of the MIP, a linear relaxation was completed and is
discussed in the following subsection.
7.2.3. Disparity between integer program and linear relaxation of the integer
program
A relaxed mixed-integer program (RMIP) is a method used in order to relax the
integer constraints within a given upper and lower limit bounded by the original integer
boundaries. This relaxation helps determine the super-optimal objective value where the
integer solution can only be as good as the relaxed linear solution and not to exceed it
(Bazaraa et al. 2009). The BIIRM MIP was converted to a RMIP easily by virtue of
redefining the model type in GAMS. The CPLEX solver was still used to ensure
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continuity between solving methodologies. All other parameters and the damage scenario
remained the same between the two different runs.
Figure 7.8 illustrates the MIP versus RMIP convex combination results and show
a large disparity in terms of the operability objective value especially in the terminal
operability value for each run, respectively. This means the RMIP is able to achieve
significantly better operability results. The two runs also exhibited an increasing disparity
in cost when evaluating the difference of costs at the initial and terminal points of the
runs, respectively. The initial gap was close to $6M and the end gap was close to $8M.

Fig. 7.8. Disparity between the RMIP and MIP existed in the terminal operability as well
as an increasing disparity in the cost
An investigation into this disparity showed that the allowance of partial
assignments compounded the disparity in terms of both cost and operability. The
assignment variable, 𝛼, was allowed to take on any value from 0 to 1 across multiple
nodes not to exceed summing to 1 in any given time period. This changed the underlying
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assumption that a crew is assigned to a given node from the start of repair until complete.
Effectively, this meant that a work crew could be assigned for a portion of the time
period on one recovery task, then another, and so on until they had been assigned for an
entire work period. This alone is not a large problem, but this partial assignment
combined with the constraints shown in Equations 7.10 and 7.11 led to disparity in the
operability objective values. A partial assignment could sum over a number of time
periods to become a completed node, thus increasing the operability at a minimal cost
based on a one-time partial assignment.
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑗
]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(7.10)
(7.11)

A quick example is demonstrative and provides a tangible example of what
happens during the relaxation. At time period 1, work crew “wTERa” was assigned to a
𝑇𝐸𝑅
recovery task at Node 22 with 𝛼22,𝑤𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑎,1
= 0.125. At time periods 2 to 9, the repaired
𝑇𝐸𝑅
value was repeatedly 𝛽22,𝑤𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑎,2
𝑡𝑜 9 = 0.125, which over eight time periods summed to

be equal to 1, representing a completely repaired asset. This relaxation essentially created
unrealistic assignments, which compounded the level of disparity for operability and cost
at each successive time period. Figure 7.9 shows some model output highlighting the
assignment and the recurring repair values over multiple time periods as described above.
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Fig. 7.9. An example of a partial assignment, 𝛼, at time period 1, and summing over eight
time periods as the repaired variable, 𝛽
Having identified likely the main issue, an additional constraint was added to
lessen the effect of the relaxation. Equations 7.12 and 7.13 are a modified versions of
Equations 7.10 and 7.11 which sum over 𝑡 and 𝑤. This effectively means that amount of
repair must be less than or equal to the sum of assignments.
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(7.12)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(7.13)

The addition of the two RMIP constraints produced similar cost growth among
the two runs and nearly eliminated the initial operability disparity. Figure 7.10 shows the
addition of the modified RMIP into the original RMIP and MIP. The modified RMIP and
MIP have similar cost growth of close to $4.5M, but still maintain a disparity between the
two sets of values. The initial operability disparity was nearly eliminated, but the terminal
operability disparity persisted. In general, the shape of the modified RMIP and MIP are
more similar than the MIP and the original RMIP.
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Fig. 7.10. The addition of RMIP constraints corrects the initial operability disparity and
maintains the cost disparity rather than increasing it
This concludes the notes regarding the underlying behavior of the BIIRM and the
development of the objective functions used in this research. The next section discusses
the BIIRM performance in terms of precision and computational time.
7.3. Model Performance
The model’s performance can best be described by precision and computational
time. Precision is used as a model performance measure since there is no established
“correct” answer to assess accuracy. One way to evaluate precision is the model’s
tendency toward the true optimal as the relative optimality gap decreases, where the
relative optimality gap is described in a later subsection. Computational time is a
commonly used model performance metric and is important when basing decisions off
IIR model output (Cavdaroglu et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2007).
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7.3.1. Performance based on the number of time periods
A series of 25 runs were performed with an increasing number of time periods.
Run number 1 evaluated 1 time period, run 2 evaluated 2 time periods, and so on to run
25 with 25 time periods in the evaluation window. These runs used a damage scenario
identical to the one described in Chapter 5. The objective functions were balanced
between cost and operability (i.e., 𝜇𝐴 = 𝜇𝐵 = 0.5). The resulting increase in
computational time appeared to be polynomial in nature with some anomalies at time
periods 19, 21, and 22. The total computational time increased from less than one second
to 879 seconds (14.6 minutes) as shown in Figure 7.11.
The first runs with one, two, and three time periods, respectively, did not
experience any repair or flow costs. The lack of expenditure is due to too short an
evaluation window. The small number of time periods was too short to effectively make
expending resources worth it to see an increase in the operability and thus decrease the
overall objective function. While no recovery effort is not an acceptable option typically
in disaster scenarios, it should be noted that a sufficient quantity of time periods is
required in order to ensure the model functions properly. The number of time periods that
are deemed sufficient will be unique to the damage scenario, the repair times, and how
time periods are defined.
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Fig. 7.11. Computational time experienced polynomial growth with some anomalies as
the number of time periods being evaluated increased
This shows that although the computational time increases with the number of
time periods being evaluated, every run was less than 15 minutes. The following
subsection discusses the performance with respect to relative optimality.
7.3.2. Performance based on the relative optimality gap
GAMS and the global solver CPLEX use a relative termination tolerance for
optimality. This relationship is described by a ratio between 1) the difference between the
primal and dual bounds and 2) the maximum of the absolute value of the primal and dual
bounds (GAMS Development Corp. 2021). This is mathematically shown in Equation
7.14 where PB stands for primal bound and DB stands for dual bound. Therefore, PB in
this case is the objective function value of the best feasible solution and DB is the lower
bound of the problem since it is a minimization problem.
|𝑃𝐵 − 𝐷𝐵|/ max( |𝑃𝐵|, |𝐷𝐵| ).

(7.14)
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This termination criterion is used within the GAMS model as a way to ensure the
returned solution is within a certain percentage of the true objective value. The solver
will stop as soon as a feasible solution is proven to be within the tolerance of the
optimality gap. For instance an optimality gap of 0.01 means that the objective value will
be within 1% of the true objective value (GAMS Development Corp. 2021).
Table 7.4 combines the results of the computational time associated with the
various relative optimality gaps. The table provides the range of computational time for
generating the convex combination based on a specified optimality gap as well as the
average time in seconds. The series of runs used the same damage scenario as explained
in Chapter 5 for consistency. Only two instances when the optimality gap was set to
0.01% timed out after a 24hr computational time, having only achieved up to that point a
relative optimal gap of 0.06% and 0.02%, respectively. These high computational times
were both associated with a low weighting on the cost function (i.e., 𝜇𝐴 = 0.1 and 0.2)
and a high weighting on the operability function (i.e., 𝜇𝐵 = 0.9 and 0.8). All other
computational times for 0.01% optimality gap averaged at 543 seconds. The two longest
computational times for optimality gap equal to 0.1% were the same weighting scenarios,
which made the average for that time so much higher than the previous ones. Excluding
the two highest computational times from the 0.1% optimality gap reduces the average
time to 195 seconds.
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Table 7.4. Range of computational time and average time for solving the same problem
with different specified optimality gaps
Optimality
Gap
Range of Time (sec)
Average Time (seconds)
10%
7 to 36
20
5%
14 to 37
21
1%
15 to 36
23
0.1%
21 to 3080
698
a
0.01%
21 to 86400
19616
a
Upper threshold for runtime was set at 86,400 seconds (24 hrs),
which was reached twice (𝜇𝐴 = 0.1, 𝜇𝐵 = 0.9 & 𝜇𝐴 = 0.2, 𝜇𝐵 =
0.8)

The convex combinations were plotted based on the associated relative optimality
gap (Figure 7.12). This analysis showed close clustering except for a couple of the
extreme cases. Namely, when 𝜇𝐴 = 0.1 and 𝜇𝐵 = 0.9 the spread between the costs were
the greatest, though the operability objective value were nearly the same. In general, the
10%, 5%, and 1% optimality gap objective values tended to cluster together, while the
0.1% and the 0.01% optimality gap objective values did as well. Another exception was
when 𝜇𝐴 = 0.8 and 𝜇𝐵 = 0.2, where the 10% optimality gap cost and operability
objective values were closer aligned to when cost was fully weighted. All other values in
this instance clustered tightly. This shows that the computational time burden is minimal
in most instances a 1% or 0.1% optimality gap is sufficient for this scenario.
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Fig. 7.12. A series of convex combinations with varying relative optimality gaps
These simple analyses showed that the model is able to perform efficiently with
the damage scenario and instance size presented thus far. The following section discusses
model limitations.
7.4. Model Limitations
This section discusses the known limitations of this model as presently
formulated. First it discusses the scalability from smaller to larger datasets and then it
discusses the possible solution and use of heuristics.
7.4.1. Scalability to larger datasets
A choice was made early on to employ a multilayered network approach.
Typically there are three styles of multilayered networks: multi-plex, multi-slice, and
network-of-networks (Bianconi 2018). The difference is in the mapping and temporal
nature of the layers. In multi-plex cases the nodes map one-to-one in each layer and are
reflected into layers as necessary. The multi-slice structure uses changes over time with a
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one-to-one mapping of nodes. The network-of-network structure discards the one-to-one
mapping.
Based on interpretation of academic literature it seemed infrastructure networks
were most often modeled as either multi-plex or network-of-network structures.
Literature seemed to promote multiplex as typical for infrastructure and this method was
selected (Bianconi 2018; Buldyrev et al. 2010; González et al. 2016). Multi-plex network
structure was useful in order to evaluate operational interdependencies. However,
recovery operations involve a temporal nature of change in the system and required a
multi-slice approach. The multi-slice approach was required to examine the restoration
interdependencies. These choices created a complex structure of a multi-plex structure
within a mutli-slice structure to exploit the analysis of both operational and restoration
interdependencies (Figure 7.13).
This structural decision of the model has consequences on instance size. The
CLARC database comprises 1,305 nodes and 4,764 arcs (Sharkey et al. 2018). However,
when restructured for use in the BIIRM the nodes increased to 3,020 and the arcs
increased to 4,780. This caused problems within the execution of the BIIRM using
GAMS which started with an extremely large file and quickly would run into heap limits,
which is a way to describe memory management within the program.
Challenges with the full CLARC dataset and the desire to develop a military
installation-sized dataset were both influential in reducing the CLARC dataset into what
was used in this research. Additional information is provided in Appendix A on the
evaluation of the CLARC Database and the construction of the BIIRM Multi-plex
dataset.
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Fig. 7.13. The BIIRM represents a complex multilayered construct using a multi-plex
structure to evaluate operational interdependencies and a multi-slice structure to evaluate
restoration interdependencies
In summary of this subsection, structural changes to evaluate the operational and
restoration interdependencies have caused undue burden on computational time and
memory capacities. While this research is studying more relationships than others like
Sharkey et al. (2015), the network size is approximately 10% of the original CLARC
dataset. Therefore, the BIIRM model currently does not scale to very large instances to
include the region-sized CLARC dataset.
7.4.2. Using heuristics and modifications
Possible solutions to the scalability limitations may be achieved by using
heuristics or modifications to the BIIRM. Several heuristics were employed in similar IIR
research to include heuristics to decrease the computational burden due to indexing time
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periods (González et al. 2016), create better repair assignments (Nurre et al. 2012), and
simulate different stakeholder information sharing (Sharkey et al. 2015). Additional
solution strategies have also been used in network evaluation to include L-decomposition
(González 2017) and Bender’s cuts (Kennedy 2003).
Additional solution methods and heuristics have not been extensively explored to
determine the feasibility of their use with the BIIRM. In particular, a stochastic solver
might be able to overcome the limitations currently experienced with increased instance
sizes. This is an area of significant future work.
Modifications to the BIIRM are also possible. One particular assumption seems to
largely drive the necessity of using a multi-plex structure, which doesn’t seem to exist for
other models. That assumption is that arcs can operate only within a given network and
flow commodities within a given network. An example of this besides the current
research is the work of González et al. (2016). A counter example is in the work of
Sharkey et al. (2015), where arcs go from one network layer to another and establish the
interdependencies. This latter example may, in particular, be why Sharkey et al. (2015)
were able to run analysis on the CLARC Database outside of not examining additional
interdependencies and coupling strategies.
7.5. Conclusions
This chapter examined the underlying model behavior, performance, and
limitations. The behavior of the model is largely based on the objective functions used
and the nature of the MIP. In particular the behavior of the BIIRM is driven by the binary
nature of the assignment variable 𝛼. The performance of the BIIRM is such that precise
solutions are achievable in relatively short time spans based on the damage scenario and
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instance size evaluated. The limitations of the model are the current challenges with
scalability to larger instance sizes. These challenges might be able to be overcome by
employing heuristics or by the use of stochastic solvers.
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VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1. Introduction
This chapter compiles the key contributions and main conclusions of this
research. This chapter also identifies recommendations for future work. There are three
main sections in this chapter. First, a section restates the research objectives and
discusses how they have been answered. Second, there is a section for the research
conclusions and contributions to the body of knowledge regarding interdependent
infrastructure recovery (IIR). Third, there is a place for recommendations for future work.
8.2. Review of Research Objectives
The primary objective of this research was to develop a defense-focused
interdependent infrastructure recovery (IIR) model balancing cost, repair time, and
operability. This was achieved with the creation of a mixed-integer program using
multiple objectives addressing cost and operability explicitly, and including repair time
implicitly with the use of a time-based index. The primary model was denoted as the base
interdependent infrastructure recovery model (BIIRM).
There were three additional research questions which influenced the direction and
scope of the present research. These are listed below, followed by a brief answer to the
questions.
•

Q: How can multiple and various interdependency subtypes and coupling
strategies be simultaneously be incorporated into an IIR model?
A: The operational interdependency subtypes and coupling strategies were
̃

integrated using a modified interdependency parameter, 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 , where this term
took on different values based on the interdependency subtype and coupling
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strategy. The restoration interdependency subtypes and asset-to-asset coupling
strategies were incorporated through a series of constraints, mainly precedence
related.
•

Q: How do multiple and various interdependency subtypes and coupling
strategies affect the cost, repair time, and operability of disrupted infrastructure
networks?
A: The exclusion of operational interdependencies tends to give false impressions
about infrastructure systems, overestimating operability in times of disruption.
Overestimating operability also includes analyses with only one operational
interdependency subtype. The inclusion or exclusion of restoration
interdependencies causes both over and under estimating on cost, repair time, and
operability, but the effects are situation-specific. It is most accurate to include all
the various interdependency subtypes when available.

•

Q: How does work crew management including flexible team composition,
training, and education of recovery personnel affect the recovery of
interdependent infrastructure networks?
A: The ability to divide teams into multi-skilled composites, rather than rigid
parallel teams with all assumed skills, was powerful in determining optimal
strategies. This showed tailored response to the needs of the repair tasks and not
trying to make do with one-size-fits-all.
These research questions formed a basic framework to approach the research.

This research addressed these questions and also touched on tangentially related topics.
The following section discusses the research conclusions and contributions.
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8.3. Research Conclusions and Contributions
This section summarizes the conclusions and contributions to the body of
knowledge this research has accomplished. This is done by categorizing conclusions and
contributions based on literature review, coupling, interdependencies, modeling, and data.
8.3.1. Conclusions from literature review
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the literature review examining
network-based IIR models. First, most IIR models pursued at least one of three primary
objectives focused on cost, repair time, and system operability or performance. While the
approaches and techniques differed on how to examine and quantify each of these
objectives, it became apparent that these three objectives constitute the basis of the
recovery operations trilemma. The recovery operations trilemma defines the tradespace
balancing cost, repair time, and system operability. The identification of this trilemma is
beneficial for stakeholders, modelers, and emergency managers as they seek to use this
frame of reference for future efforts in IIR.
Second, the identification of characterizing assumptions is beneficial to current
and future efforts to improve modeling and simulation of IIR. Eight different assumptions
were prevalent and only superficially addressed across the IIR models examined. The
eight characterizing assumptions are: teaming structures, sufficient resources, negligible
transit time, work efficiency, no degraded conditions, no external support, compressed
phases of recovery, and success of recovery. Assumptions are often made about these
elements of recovery operations and may not be valid in all instances, thus making
models less representative of actual conditions. Identification of these characterizing
assumptions allows future work to challenge these assumptions when appropriate.
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Challenging prevailing assumptions, to include building upon the limited work already
accomplished, will improve IIR modeling.
8.3.2. Conclusions about coupling
Four contributions regarding coupling are appropriate to highlight. First, this
research presented the first model to simultaneously integrate all four of the tight or linear
coupling strategies identified by González et al. (2016). These coupling strategies were
identified as one2one, one2any, one2all, and one2many. Second, nuances associated with
integration of all four coupling strategies were detailed for models treating operability as
binary and non-binary. The differences are particular to each case and require slight
modifications to previously presented or explained relationships. Third, in models using a
non-binary operability variable, the addition of a pseudo-node in connection with the
one2many coupling can allow system modeling nodes that maintain some level of
operability despite disturbances or some degradation. This is particularly useful, since
this mimics many known systems that still function with manual overrides, but at a
reduced capacity or responsiveness when control systems are in need of system
maintenance. Fourth, coupling strategies can be used to overcome some data accessibility
issues in lieu of obtaining full data. The combination of partial data plus additional
interdependencies to compensate for the missing infrastructure data yielded results within
3% of the dataset representing complete data. These contributions exemplify the power of
incorporating coupling into IIR models.
8.3.3. Conclusions about interdependencies
This research made three contributions to the modeling and understanding of
interdependencies. First, this research is the first to simultaneously integrate nine
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different interdependency subtypes within a single IIR model. This enables a modeler to
identify multiple interdependencies between systems and evaluate the effect of these
relationships on the entire system in terms of cost, repair time, and operability. Second,
the combination of multiple interdependency subtypes and coupling strategies allows a
system modeler to articulate complex, multiple, and compounding interdependent
relationships. This is a unique modeling capability due to the inherent ability in the model
formulation rather than establishing unique sets and constraints in other work (González
et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2007). Third, a method for identifying node pairs that might
experience interdependent relationships was developed through the process of nodal
examination in a multi-plex structure. Details regarding this nodal analysis are found in
Appendix A.
8.3.4. Conclusions about modeling
Several improvements to existing models have been highlighted already and this
subsection suggests improvements based on this research to benefit all network-based IIR
modeling. Models are often unique and specific and, therefore, are difficult to compare
output or results from one model to another. To aid in overcoming this challenge three
concluding thoughts are proposed to help model evaluation and selection.
1. Incorporate the recovery operations trilemma framework to establish and discuss
model focus and objectives. This may help articulate how a given model
addresses or does not address these three critical elements of interdependent
infrastructure recovery operations.
2. Establish and clearly articulate which interdependency subtypes and coupling
strategies are able to be used within a given model. Incorporating more
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interdependencies is not necessarily the goal, but rather calculated and intentional
inclusion of the appropriate interdependencies for the scenario is the goal for
modeler and stakeholders alike.
3. Identify characterizing assumptions within a given model. This should influence
model transparency and provide stakeholders with better information to make
decisions on appropriate models for the scenarios of interest.
These three conclusions are supported and informed by the present research but
are not fully accomplished by this present work. Some sort of model repository could be
beneficial to such ends. Such a repository could be expanded to be more inclusive by
using the six dimensional interdependency framework of Rinaldi et al. (2001) or using a
modified version of Griot’s (2010) model assessment framework.
8.3.5. Conclusions about data
Two significant contributions were made in terms of data. First, 322 errors were
identified in the CLARC Database which were corrected. Additionally, improvements to
the CLARC Database were suggested and implemented in the creation of four separate
databases. The BIIRM Multiplex dataset represents the CLARC Database restructured in
a multi-plex fashion. The BIIRM Multiplex+ dataset incorporates the improvements
suggested and adds additional telecommunication demand as well as an additional
transportation commodity. The BIIRM Multiplex Reduced dataset is 10% of the BIIRM
Multiplex dataset, while still maintaining the nodal and arc diversity. Finally, the BIIRM
Multiplex Reduced+ dataset adds telecommunication and transportation demand
proportionally based on the reduced instance size similar to the BIIRM Multiplex
Reduced dataset. These latter two datasets are approximately the same size and scope of
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military installations and represent a first attempt at creating military specific IIR datasets
for academic research.
8.4. Recommendations for Future Research
The recommendations for future research are categorized in a similar fashion as
the conclusions and contributions with the exclusion of literature review. Therefore, the
following listed items are categorized as coupling, interdependencies, modeling, and data.
•

Coupling
o Explore more scenarios of overcoming inaccessible data. A critique in the
review of one of the papers suggested it was limited by examining only
one scenario.
o Explore non-linear or complex coupling. These types of coupling
comprise an under-explored area, since most assumptions assume tight
and linear coupling characteristics and are normally node-to-node or arcto-arc based.
o Examine the time-delayed effects on system disruption based on loose
coupling. Time-delayed effects are common in real systems due to on-site
storage or some temporary capability to overcome outages. Common
examples include uninterrupted power supply systems for critical
electronic equipment. The inherent nature of the BIIRM can handle those
peculiar relations, but they have not been explored.

•

Interdependencies
o Incorporate restoration interdependency resource competition in order to
address common assumption of sufficient resources. This can be done in
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part by adapting the general resource constraint presented by González et
al. (2016).
o Incorporate degraded conditions such as chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) protocol to recovery operations. This may include the
identification of additional restoration interdependencies due to
decontamination and post-attack reconnaissance.
o Address each characterizing assumption and combinations of assumptions.
Efforts can build on others’ work to share ideas about how to better model
IIR nuances (e.g., increasing costs, shifting priorities).
•

Modeling
o Establish a model validation method by integration with Energy
Resilience Readiness Exercises or “pull-the-plug” exercises performed
across the Department of Defense. Additional integration can be achieved
in general exercise planning and estimation of repair times and responses
to scenarios based on simulation.
o Integrate the BIIRM damage scenario simulation with HAZUS. This is
coupled with additional GIS data improvements, but would provide a way
to analyze likely damage scenarios and the impact of multi-plex structure
for damage scenario creation.
o Explore inherent model flexibility in additional ways to include non-static
costs throughout recovery operations and shifting priorities. Explore
additional scenarios such as a second wave of damage and incremental
information flow.
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o Examine time-based interdependencies, that materialize at moments of
peak value. Moments of peak value is a novel approach to resilience-based
analysis (Poulin and Kane 2021, under review).
o Develop heuristics and consider reformulation to improve BIIRM
execution with larger instances. Current issues may be in the complex
multilayer structure of multi-plex infrastructure layers within a multi-slice
construct. This might be addressed by reevaluating a network flow and
network design assumption which would allow arcs and commodities to
cross infrastructure layers.
•

Data
o Correct the GIS interface based on the CLARC Database corrections.
o Create a GIS interface for the BIIRM Multiplex datasets.
o Create a GIS context and interface for the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced
datasets and include military-specific nomenclature to asset types to better
align with military base analysis.
These conclusions, contributions, and recommendations express the culmination

of years of study in interdependent infrastructure recovery. The hope is this will profit the
future development of efforts to improve the recoverability and thereby the resilience of
civil infrastructures.
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Appendix A. Network Database Preparation for BIIRM1
This appendix details three main contributions to the preparation of the network
database used for the BIIRM. The first section details the CLARC Database and slight
corrections made based on the version available for download (Sharkey et al. 2018). The
second section explains the modifications needed to convert that data into a multiplex
layered system. The third section addresses the source and assumptions used to add cost
data in lieu of real-world data from an actual damage event.
A.1. CLARC Database
The data used for the BIIRM was constructed largely from a database called the
CustomizabLe ARtificial Community (CLARC) County Data (Little et al. 2020; Loggins
et al. 2013). This database represents a mixture of real geospatial and infrastructure
information of assets while removing proprietary or sensitive information. It was built
over the course of a couple of years by the information from the data stewards and
infrastructure managers. This database has significant advantages over other datasets
primarily due to the multi-directional operational interdependencies rather than strictly
defining dependencies on one infrastructure system (Sharkey et al. 2015). It also is
representative of actual infrastructure data for a region (on the scale of a U.S. county).
These data represent 1,305 nodes across 10 infrastructures including: power,
telecommunications, water, wastewater, transportation and emergency response (TER),
travel, education, healthcare, industry, and residential. These nodes represent 47 different

1

Some contents of this appendix were submitted independently as technical notes by Moore and Jacques to
ASCE’s Journal of Infrastructure Systems on 10 June, 2021. The submission was titled “Technical Notes
on Using and Improving the CLARC Database for Interdependent Infrastructure Modeling and
Simulation.”
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types of assets ranging from junctions in a power or water distribution system to power
plants, schools, and other commercial entities. There are 4,764 arcs across 5
infrastructures including: power, telecommunications, water, wastewater, and TER.
These arcs represent 21 different types of assets from bridges, interstates, and water
mains to cell tower signals. It is noteworthy that the nodes are distributed across 10 layers
and the arcs were categorized into 5 layers, but connected all the nodes using data fields
of “To_Infra” and “From_Infra” representing the infrastructure layers in which the toand from-nodes resided. Full descriptions are available with the original dataset (Sharkey
et al. 2018). Table A1 summarizes the network attributes that are relevant.
Table A1. CLARC Database represents a large interdependent network consisting of
nodes and arcs across five principal infrastructure systems (i.e., power,
telecommunications, water, wastewater, and TER) and five additional layers

Infrastructure Type
Power
Telecommunications
Water
Wastewater
TER
Travel
Education
Healthcare
Industry
Residential
Total

Nodes .
Asset Types
Number
5
63
2
29
3
183
3
373
11
391
4
52
5
41
4
78
9
18
1
77
47
1305

Arcs .
Assets Types Number
4
919
5
414
3
749
3
1169
6
1513

21

4764

As mentioned previously, the CLARC Database exemplifies network-to-network
interdependencies. This is evident with 2,631 interdependent relationships between
various networks. The CLARC Database, for analysis of operational interdependencies,
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grouped the node-based infrastructure networks of travel, education, healthcare, and
industry as one aggregate layer called “Social” infrastructure. This resulted in a
recategorization of node layers into seven layers consisting of the five principal
infrastructure systems (i.e., power, telecommunications, water, wastewater, and TER),
social, and residential layers to describe the interdependencies. Table A2 summarizes
these operational interdependent relationships using these recategorized seven nodebased infrastructure layers.
Table A2. CLARC Database exemplifies infrastructure interdependencies
between all the network layers

Parent Infrastructure
Power
Water
Wastewater
Telecommunications
TER
Total

Number of Child
Infrastructures
6
5
5
3
3

Number of
Relationships
845
423
425
143
795
2,631

This summarizes the CLARC data, which served as the initial starting point for
the databases used in the BIIRM. After the CLARC Database was downloaded some
errors or inconsistencies in the data were noted and are addressed in the following
subsection.
A.1.1. Correction of issues and irregularities
Data cleansing included identification of issues and irregularities and then
correction of those errors consistent with the other data. The inconsistencies included
missing demand, erroneous demand, mislabeling, missing location information, and arc
inconsistencies.
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A.1.1.1. Missing demand
One of eight wastewater treatment plants was missing a water demand. All others
had a demand of 75, but Wastewater_Treatment_Plant_7 had a demand of 0. Five of 221
wastewater Pump_Stations were missing power demand, whereas all others had a power
demand of 30. The pump stations were Pump_Station_61 and Pump_Station_208 to 211.
A.1.1.2. Erroneous demand
All 34 Banking ATM machines had both water and wastewater demands equal to
10. It is not clear why an ATM required a water or wastewater service connection and
why they needed that demand met in order to fulfill their service as a monetary
dispensary. Therefore, these demands at these nodes were set to zero and associated
water and wastewater arcs were deleted.
A.1.1.3. Mislabeling
There were 107 lighted intersections out of 237 total intersections that each
required power; however, there were only 77 arcs listed as a Power_Traffic_Line,
indicating that 30 arcs were either missing or mislabeled. They were mislabeled under the
“Definition” field as CF_Dist_Line, but properly labeled in the “Name” field. This
change also resulted in a need to correct the capacity of the arc to size it consistent with
the other Power_Traffic_Line arcs. The ArcIDs for these mislabeled arcs were: 1149,
1151, 1154, 1156, 1157, 1160, 1171, 1173, 1174, 1180, 1183, 1185, 1188, 1190, 1192,
1194, 1211, 1213, 1214, 1220, 1226, 1228, 1233, 1235, 1236, 1238, 4900, 4901, 4902,
and 5478.
Three Water_to_CF lines were mislabeled as Waste_to_CF lines, confusing the
definition and name. This was sorted out by observing which infrastructure they had a
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listed capacity for. In all three instances they were water lines. These arcs had ArcID
values of 3463 to 3465. Additionally, 10 Trans_CF_Conn arcs were mislabeled with the
definition of “Local”, but should have had definition of “Trans_CF_Conn”. These were
Trans_CF_Conn_272 to 281.
11 Waste_Main_Pipe arcs were inconsistently numbered, since all other arcs were
paired in bi-directional groupings. This means arcs (𝑖, 𝑗): (9579,9580) and
(𝑖, 𝑗): (9580,9579) would both be labeled as Waste_Main_Pipe_197. This nomenclature
fell apart at Waste_Main_Pipe_366 and beyond, specifically involving
Waste_Main_Pipe_366 to 377. There is also another Waste_Main_Pipe_380, which is
discussed in the subsection addressing arc inconsistencies.
A.1.1.4. Missing locations
Many arcs were missing location information, which was under the field
“Census_Tract”. There were 77 census tracts or locations. 100% of all the nodes and 96%
of all the arcs had a specified location. It was chosen that the location of the point of
destination would be the location of the arc. It is important to note that arcs can be in or
transit more than one geographical location, which were considered as synonymous with
the census tracts. Listing all transited locations of arcs would be an improvement upon
the dataset and may support a more in-depth evaluation on the consequences of the
restoration interdependency subtype of geospatial repair. In total there were 192 arcs
without a listed census tract (location), with the following breakdown: 4
Power_Traffic_Line, 4 Main_Pipe, 1 Waste_Main_Pipe, 55 Trans_CF_Conn, 64
Waste_to_CF, and 64 Water_to_CF.
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A.1.1.5. Arc inconsistencies
Each Census_Point had a duplicate connection with a Cell_Tower defined by the
Signal arcs except for two Census_Points. Signal_83 and Signal_152 were the only
connection from Cell_Towers to Census_Points_42 and 76 respectively.
Two duplicate bi-directional Trans_CF_Conn arcs existed, which connected node
149 to 5807. These arcs were Trans_CF_Conn_403 and 415 for arc (𝑖, 𝑗): (5807,149)
and Trans_CF_Conn_405 and 416 for arc (𝑖, 𝑗): (149,5807). Due to the numbering
Trans_CF_Conn_415 and 416 were deleted, since they represented the second instance of
the same arc.
Waste_Main_Pipe_223 had an arc (𝑖, 𝑗) = (𝑗, 𝑖): (9580,9580), making it a bidirectional loop. However, in the GIS database the identified arc looked as if it should
have been connected to node 9319, but both terminal points listed node 9580. In the
database all Waste_Main_Pipe arcs were bi-directional, except Waste_Main_Pipe_380
which had an (𝑖, 𝑗): (9580,9319) and no reciprocal arc. Therefore, it was determined that
Waste_Main_Pipe_223 was intended to be the bi-directional set of arcs connecting nodes
9319 and 9580. This eliminated the need for Waste_Main_Pipe_380.
In summary, these errors were mostly minor, but serve as an improvement upon
the original data set. In addition to these errors, some underlying concerns arose and are
explained in the following subsection.
A.1.2. Concerns about the database
Two major concerns arose in reviewing the data and network structure as it
pertained to the telecommunications infrastructure and the TER infrastructure. The
telecommunications infrastructure is also called the information and communication
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technology (ICT) infrastructure in some academic circles and is abbreviated as ICT in the
present work (Oughton et al. 2016). The concerns were unique to each system and are
expressed below.
A.1.2.1. Concerns with ICT infrastructure.
The largest concern was the apparent lack of connectivity to assets, which in dayto-day operations and in emergency situations rely heavily upon telecommunications. In
fact, only four of the 47 different nodal asset types had a communication demand in the
ICT network, namely: ATM, gas station, emergency communication center, and census
points. After removing the two asset types that are within the ICT infrastructure and the
four that originally had connectivity, there were 41 different nodal asset types that had no
communication links. Of those 41 nodal asset types with no original ICT requirement,
Table A3 lists 34 of them with examples of ICT services. Table A3 therefore represents
the connectivity gap within the original CLARC Database.
Of particular interest to the present research is the presence of Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are able to improve efficiency,
but also create interdependencies and are sometimes vulnerable to system degradation
(Bobbio et al. 2010). These relationships are primary sources of cyber interdependencies
where dependence or control is based on the transfer of information through the ICT
infrastructure (Rinaldi et al. 2001). One of the primary purposes of the BIIRM is to
capture cyber as well as other operational interdependency subtypes simultaneously.
Therefore, the absence of significant information in the ICT infrastructure is a concern.
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Table A3. 34 nodal assets have day-to-day and emergency telecommunication
requirements not captured in the original dataset
Node Asset Types
Information & Telecommunication Requirements
Airport
Air Traffic Control, radar, telephone, internet
Banking_Central_Office
ATMs, bank transactions, telephone, internet
Bus_Terminal
WIFI, telephone, internet
Central_Office
Telephone, internet
Child_Residential_Facility
Telephone, internet
College
WIFI, telephone, internet
EMS_Station
911 calls, dispatch, telephone, internet
Ferry
Telephone
Fire_Station
911 calls, dispatch, telephone, internet
Fuel_Terminal
SCADAa, telephone
Group_Home
Telephone, internet
Hospital
WIFI, dispatch, telephone, internet
Hotel
WIFI, telephone, internet
b
Industry
SCADA, telephone, internet
Jail
Telephone, internet
Nursing_Home
Telephone, internet
Police_Station
911 calls, dispatch, telephone, internet
Pump_Station
SCADA
c
School
Telephone, internet
Shelter
Telephone
d
Substation
SCADA
Wastewater_Treatment_Plant
SCADA, telephone
Water_Treatment_Plant
SCADA, telephone
Well_Site
SCADA
a
SCADA – supervisory control and data acquisition; b Represents 8 different industries;
c
Represents 3 different school types; d Represents distribution and transmission types

Additionally, the layout and structure of the ICT network does not seem accurate
or straight forward. There are two nodal asset types within the ICT network to include a
central telephone office or hub and a cellular tower. Both types of nodes originally had a
transshipment type function, which is an accurate representation of how they these types
of nodes function in reality; however, it is not the only way to view these nodes. There is
also an issue with the imbalance of the supply and demand nodes. The only supply nodes
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are the census points (population nodes), which discounts any other asset type as an
origin of a communication link (i.e., business-to-business, business-to-private
transactions). It was intended to be modeled as a multicommodity flow of origindestination (O-D) pairs also commonly done for telecommunication networks (Ahuja et
al. 1993). In the CLARC Database there are 77 census points being the only supply of
communication at a value of 1 each, and the network has a cumulative demand of 143.
Due to the imbalance, it is impossible that all O-D pairs would have been successful in
meeting the demand. Therefore, the structure and design of the ICT network was a
concern both because of the lack of other O-D pair possibilities and the imbalance of
supply and demand.
A.1.2.2. Concerns with the TER infrastructure.
While slightly less obvious, the TER infrastructure has an inherent disparity based
on the multiple commodities flowing within that network. The TER infrastructure has
three commodities which flow across the network and are the emergency services of
“EMS”, “Police”, and “Fire”. While these are very important commodities in a response
to and recovery from a disruptive event, there is a missing commodity of “People” that
compete for the same transportation resources. In effect, by not modeling people or how
the population moves from place to place in competition with the Emergency Response
the TER network analysis is limited and only partially reflects recovery. People that need
to be modeled include infrastructure work crews, workers for all the social and
commercial entities modeled, and if necessary, based on the scenario (e.g., hurricane
event), the excess population as it evacuates the area. The omission of “People” as a
commodity in the TER network was also a concern.
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The combination of these concerns prompted additions and modifications to the
original CLARC Database in order to address these items of interest in the BIIRM. The
details of these additions are explained in the following subsection.
A.1.3. Additions to the database
Additions or modifications were made to both the ICT and TER infrastructures in
order to address the concerns mentioned above. Modifications to the ICT network
included the identification of additional demand nodes, substitution of binary
telecommunication demand with a range of demand, and a restructuring of the network to
emphasize connectivity.
The 34 additional nodal asset types identified in Table A3 that have a day-to-day
and emergency telecommunications demand were given a non-zero demand for a single
type “Communications” commodity. Additionally, the original nodes that had a
telecommunication demand equal to one were all given a non-zero demand scaled to
represent either the number of working personnel at a given location or the demand for
information exchange or some combination of the two.
In order to address the network structure concern, the ICT network was
reconfigured to emphasize connectivity and ability to meet demand. Therefore, it was
restructured as a supply and demand network flow versus the original O-D pairing. This
was accomplished by turning the telephone central offices and cell towers into source
nodes and then making all others demand nodes. This essentially allowed for an analysis
of whether or not the demand nodes were connected via operable links to an ICT node,
which then would connect to any other node via operable links. This allowed for
identification of inoperable or damaged links or nodes that required repair and satisfied
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the intent of ICT infrastructure analysis. Figure A1 illustrates the reconfiguration of the
ICT network as a supply-demand network model to emphasize connectivity.
To address the concerns in the TER infrastructure every node was evaluated to
determine if there was a need for a constant workforce. A constant workforce was
defined as active laborers to perform the work or provide the service from that location.
An example is a hospital requires doctors, nurses, and staff in order to provide the
healthcare and life saving services they offer. In contrast to these types of nodes there are
nodes like a distribution level substation, which houses electrical equipment, but is not
manned constantly in order to provide the electrical service. Rather, if an issue arises,
then a crew would be dispatched to that location. Such nodes were not considered as
having a constant workforce and are therefore not demand nodes in terms of the
commodity “People”. All nodes that have a constant workforce requirement were given a
representative demand of commodity “People”. This then meant that during recovery of
infrastructure and social services, the essential personnel or workforce were also included
in the network analysis. Table A4 records the original and new “Communication” and
“People” demands.
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Fig. A1. Reconfiguring the ICT network in standard supply-demand construct
emphasizes the connectivity and meeting demand of all demand nodes rather than
focusing on the origin-destination path
Not captured in Table A4 is the supply data due to the changes in the ICT and
TER infrastructure layers. The amount of supply of “People” at the population centers
represent 65.4% of the total population at those locations, which is a national average
percentage for those in the working age in the United States (OECD 2021). The supply
quantity of “Communication” was scaled to meet the cumulative demand divided among
the ICT nodes that were represented as supply nodes.
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Table A4. Additional ICT & TER demand data required for BIIRM analysis
Infrastr.
PWR

"Communication"
Orig.
New
1
10
1

Asset
Dist_Substation
Steam_Plant
Trans_Substation

"People"
New
10

WTR

Water_Treatment_Plant
Well_Site

5
1

WWT

Pump_Station
Wastewater_Treatment_Plant

1
5

EMS_Station
Fire_Station
Police_Station
Banking_ATM
Banking_Central_Office
Fuel_Gas_Stations
Fuel_Fuel_Terminals
Hospital

10
24
24
1
10
5
5
95

10
5
5
100

TER

1
1

5

5
10
25
25

Travel

Airport
Bus_Terminal
Ferry
Hotel

475
5
5
10

500
5
5
10

Education

Jail
School_High_School
School_Middle_School
School_Elementary_School
College

24
48
48
24
475

25
50
50
25
500

Healthcare

Child_Residential_Facility
Group_Home
Shelter
Nursing_Home

24
24
5
48

25
25
5
50

Industry

Emergency_Communication_Center
Industry_Chemical_Plant
Industry_Solar_Plant
Industry_Battery_Plant
Industry_Xray_Plant
Industry_Distribution_Center
Industry_Software_Company
Industry_Steel_Company
Industry_Lumber_Yard

1

24
475
475
238
238
95
48
95
24

25
500
500
250
250
100
50
100
25

Residential

Census_Point

1

500
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Another interesting complexity arose when within the TER infrastructure layer
there were five nodal asset types that had both supply and demand type functions based
on different commodities. While uncommon in network flow problems in general this is
closer to reality, where within the transportation network a certain commodity must
arrive before a different commodity may be sent out (e.g., replacement firefighting crews
or replacement police officers must come on shift to take over for the others). These
additions and modifications to the CLARC Database provide an overview of the changes
to the data. In the next section the structure of the data is addressed.
A.2. Modifications of the Database for the BIIRM
This section outlines the modifications made in the structure of the CLARC
Database in order to accommodate a multiplex structure where a node is mapped one-forone in each network layer in which it is present (Bianconi 2018). This process entailed
reconfiguring the data in the database to accommodate the multiplex structure. The
restructuring of the data provided insights into operational interdependencies. Finally,
this section will discuss the creation of a reduced dataset, the damage scenario data used
for initial analysis with the BIIRM, and geospatial considerations.
A.2.1. Conversion of the database to a multiplex structure
The organization of the original CLARC Database made it difficult to use in a
true multiplex sense and therefore it was restructured. One of the primary differences in
the structure of the database can be understood by considering the nodes. A node in the
CLARC Database was listed once, and then regardless of the various uses across
infrastructures (i.e., supply, demand, capacity) all the node’s data was on one row. In a
multiplex database, each node has some parent infrastructure (i.e., power plant is in the
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power infrastructure). This node may or may not be reflected into another infrastructure
(i.e., power plant has a water and wastewater demand and therefore is reflected in those
networks) and each instance of the node is a separate entry. This significantly increases
the number of nodes, since the node may be represented in the case of the BIIRM on up
to five different infrastructure layers. The number of arcs stays relatively the same under
the assumption that a commodity flows only within its given infrastructure layer. An
oversimplification of the process involves taking a fat and short data table and converting
it into a skinny and tall data table.
Additionally, the original CLARC Database consists of nodes across 10
infrastructures and arcs across five infrastructures, which if used directly suggests that
five infrastructure layers are disconnected or that arcs cross infrastructure boundaries.
The latter was true for the original CLARC Database. Therefore, it was determined all
nodes, including reflected nodes, and all arcs could be captured in just five infrastructure
layers including: power (PWR), telecommunications or information and communication
technology (ICT), water (WTR), wastewater (WWT), and transportation and emergency
response (TER).
When reflecting nodes into the various infrastructures it was seen that only five
infrastructure layers were needed. Table A5 maps the same five infrastructure layers used
in the CLARC and BIIRM models. Table A6 maps the unique CLARC infrastructure
layers to the BIIRM layers. These tables represent 47 different asset types and the nodes
or reflected nodes across the infrastructure layers used in the BIIRM. In Tables A5 and
A6, the indicator “H” represents the host infrastructure layer and the indicator “R”
represents a reflected infrastructure layer.
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A.2.2. Operational interdependency insights from multiplex construct
Organizing nodes in a multiplex manner provides an easy or visual way to
determine whether or not some type of operational interdependency might exist between
a node in a given infrastructure layer and that same node’s reflection in another layer.
This is possible by realizing that a node may have or will likely have a meaningful
operational interdependency of the physical, cyber, and logical type when a given node
performs more than one function across the various infrastructure layers it is reflected in.
In order to illustrate this, three scenarios are given. First, analyze the functions of
a Fire Station across the various layers and one understands the Fire Station has a demand
for power, communication, water, wastewater, and people. But that same Fire Station
also supplies the emergency service of firefighting. Therefore, one can quickly see that
due to the different functions across the various infrastructure layers there is the potential
that one of the demand layers could impact that same node being able to respond to a fire
or act as a supply node for the “Fire” service commodity. By employing engineering
judgment or historical knowledge one can decide if there will be an interdependency
between these sets of systems. For instance, no communication might inhibit the Fire
Station from responding. Lack of personnel at the time of shift change might likewise
impede or degrade responsiveness. While some of these things will not render a node
inoperable or completely incapable of performing the other function, it is a starting point
for assessment of how the various infrastructure services affect operations. This same
pattern of evaluation is followed in the other two examples.
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Table A5. CLARC node mapping to BIIRM infrastructure layers and commodities; H – host layer, R – reflected layer

CLARC Infra.
Power (PWR)

Telecommunications
(ICT)
Water (WTR)
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Wastewater (WWT)

Transportation,
Emergency Response
(TER)

Node Asset Type
Dist_/Trans_Substation
External_Demand
Power_Node
Steam_Plant
Cell_Tower
Central_Office
Water_Node
Water_Treatment_Plant
Well_Site
Pump_Station
Waste_Node
Wastewater_Treatment_Plant
Banking_ATM
Banking_Central_Office
EMS_Station
Fire_Station
Fuel_Fuel_Terminals
Fuel_Gas_Stations
Hospital
Intersection
Intersection_Lighted
Police_Rally_Point
Police_Station

PWR
Power
H
H
H
H
R
R

ICT
Comm
R

WTR
Water

WWT
Waste

R
H
H

R

R

R

H
H
H

R

R

R

H
H
H

R

R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R
R

R
R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R

R

1

R

R

EMS

TER
.
Police
Fire
People

H
H
H

H

H
H
H

H
H
H
H
H

H
H

H
H

H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H

Table A6. CLARC non-primary node mapping to BIIRM infrastructure layers; H – host layer, R – reflected layer

CLARC Infra.
Travel

Education
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Healthcare

Industry

Residential

Node Asset Type
Airport
Bus_Terminal
Ferry
Hotel
College
Jail
School_Elementary/_Middle/_High
Child_Residential_Facility
Group_Home
Nursing_Home
Shelter
Emergency_Communication_Center
Industry_Battery_Plant
Industry_Chemical_Plant
Industry_Distribution_Center
Industry_Lumber_Yard
Industry_Software_Company
Industry_Solar_Plant
Industry_Steel_Company
Industry_Xray_Plant
Census_Point

PWR
Power
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

ICT
Comm
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

2

WTR
Water
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

WWT
Waste
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

EMS
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H

TER
.
Police
Fire
People
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H

Second, a pump station functions as a transshipment node in the wastewater
infrastructure layer, but has a power demand and is controlled by a SCADA system in the
ICT infrastructure layer. Therefore, it is possible that the power or the SCADA system
could impact the operability of the pump station within the wastewater network thereby
creating an operational interdependency of the physical or cyber type.
Third, an airport has demand across all five of the infrastructure networks
examined. Therefore, if demand is not met by one or more infrastructure service there is
no service with an associated alternate nodal function that is being evaluated that would
be impacted by unmet demand. In reality, an airport provides travel by air, but if that is
not being modeled then that won’t be considered as some operational interdependency.
These scenarios are visually seen in Figure A2 where red indicates a demand, yellow a
transshipment, and green a supply function.

Fig. A2. Use of color coding for demand (red), transshipment (yellow), or supply (green)
function provides visual method for understanding whether or not operational
interdependencies are likely
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While this is not a primary reason for structuring the database in this fashion, it
does help answer infrastructure managers’ and researchers’ consternation of having
elusive operational interdependencies (Ouyang 2014). The restructuring of the CLARC
Database also provided a multiplex structure of the original data intended for analysis in
the BIIRM. This newly structured database without the additions of new communications
connections and people mentioned is called the BIIRM Multiplex dataset. The dataset
with the ICT and TER additions is called the BIIRM Multiplex Plus dataset. Additional
modifications are explained in the following subsection.
A.2.3. Reduced dataset for base-level scope
One of the primary objectives of the BIIRM was to analyze interdependent
infrastructure recovery as it relates to a military base. While the diversity of support
operations on a military installation are similar to the CLARC Database, the size is
substantially smaller than a regional size database. Therefore, a 10% sampling of all asset
types within the CLARC Database provides an approximation of the diversity and
quantity of infrastructure on a medium- to large-sized military installation. Such a
sampling produced a reduced dataset called the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced dataset. This
reduced dataset has a companion which includes proportional ICT and TER additions and
is called the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced Plus dataset.
In the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced dataset there were at least one of all the 47
different types of nodal assets and all 21 arc assets included. Table A7 provides a brief
summary and comparison between the CLARC Database, the BIIRM Multiplex dataset
(MP), the BIIRM Multiplex Plus dataset (MP+), the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced dataset
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(MPR), and the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced Plus dataset (MPR+) with key network
elements.
Table A7. Multiplex structure adds significant node count as seen in comparison of
CLARC, BIIRM Multiplex (MP), Multiplex Plus (MP+), Multiplex Reduced (MPR), and
Multiplex Reduced Plus (MPR+) datasets

Nodes
Reflected Nodes
Arcs
Additional Arcs

CLARC
1305
0
4764

MP
1305
1715
4761
19

MP+
1305
2366
4761
1302

MPR
153
227
648
2

MPR+
153
312
648
176

The additional arcs in the BIIRM Multiplex dataset are due to 19 electrical
generator lines for 19 cell towers, which were incorporated into the analysis done by
Sharkey et al. (2015). Similarly, the 2 additional arcs in the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced
dataset are 2 electrical generator lines. The other additional arcs in the BIIRM Multiplex
Plus and BIIRM Multiplex Reduced Plus datasets are the necessary arcs to satisfy the
increased demands in the ICT and TER infrastructure layers. The compilation of the
damage scenario data is expressed in the next subsection.
A.2.4. Damage scenario data
The damage scenario was created to mirror the magnitude of damage scenarios
found in literature, specifically the damage scenarios of Sharkey et al. (2015). The
damage scenarios simulated by Sharkey et al. (2015) were chosen due to the use of the
CLARC Database as a starting point and the authors’ inclusion of restoration
interdependencies. The original intent was to use the results of Sharkey et al. (2015) as a
benchmark and calibration point against the BIIRM. However, details regarding the exact
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damage scenario and all data associated with the network were not available. Therefore,
it served as a target magnitude of a damage scenario. Across the three damage scenarios
performed by Sharkey et al. (2015), 3% of nodes and 6% of arcs were damaged on
average. That became the target values for the created damage scenario used for the
BIIRM. While these values were the target values, damage is scenario specific and
shouldn’t preclude analysis with varying levels of damage.
The main reason the damage scenario was created was there hasn’t been a
simulated damage event which allowed for the evaluation of all nine interdependency
types simultaneously. However, real-world scenarios often include these types of
interdependencies affecting operations or restoration (Ouyang 2014). Therefore, to ensure
realistic scenarios, the damage scenario was created to showcase the cause and effect of
including operational and restoration interdependencies.
It should be noted, in an actual damage scenario information will come in
sporadically and will be unique to the disruptive event. Some operational
interdependencies will be known prior to a disruptive event and as mentioned above,
some analysis may identify additional operational interdependencies. History has shown
that time and again we will also be surprised by some unknown operational
interdependencies (Matthews 2005; National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)
2018). Restoration interdependencies are inherently situation-specific; however, there
may be historical instances which drive local protocol that can be construed as predetermined restoration interdependencies, especially if these protocols affect the
precedence of recovery. Such protocol-driven scenarios can be pre-programmed into the
restoration interdependencies of given infrastructure systems within the model. These
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pre-programmed interdependencies can be given conditional coding that will generate
precedence constraints only if both assets within the interdependent infrastructure
systems are damaged. This was tested during model debugging of the base model;
however, it is not likely that most of the restoration interdependencies would come from
this type of protocol-driven origin. Therefore, in this scenario each component of the
restoration interdependency was damaged and precedence was relayed through the
command structure to develop the restoration interdependencies.
An anecdote helps illustrate how restoration interdependencies might be
established during a damage assessment following some disruptive event. For instance, a
city crew is dispatched after a major storm and notes that trees had been knocked down
and are lying on some power lines. This is called in to a disaster management center and
is a task for the city crew to clean up, but requires an electrical crew to ensure everything
is de-energized prior to tree removal. Following tree removal, the electrical crew will
need to repair the power line and re-energize the system. This type of damage report
should establish precedence relationships (restoration interdependencies) which will
inform calculations of system recovery times.
The completeness of the damage scenario in terms of restoration interdependency
subtypes is illustrated by comparison. Table A8 compares the damage inclusion of
restoration interdependency subtypes by Sharkey et al.’s (2015) work and the BIIRM
MP+ dataset. Additionally, the BIIRM MPR and MPR+ datasets also had damage
scenarios that leveraged all restoration interdependency subtypes. In the case of the
traditional precedence relationships the BIIRM MP+ is double the number of
relationships used by Sharkey et al. due to counting both directions of bi-directional arcs.
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Table A8. Damage scenario created for the BIIRM Multiplex Plus dataset is the
only one incorporating all restoration interdependency subtypes of interest
Sharkey et al., 2015a
Interdependency Type
Traditional Precedence
Effectiveness Precedence
Options Precedence
Time-sensitive Options
Geospatial Repair

Infrastructures
PWR & TER
TER & PWR
PWR & TER
TER & WTR
PWR & ICT
PWR & WWT
All

Med.-Scale
1
1
0
0
19
52
0

Lrg.-Scale
10
10
0
0
19
52
0

BIIRM
MP+
20
20
80
56
57
52
77

This tailored damage scenario also highlights the variety of coupling possibilities
within restoration interdependencies. There are four coupling strategies for these types of
relationships, namely: node-to-node, node-to-arc, arc-to-node, and arc-to-arc. Table A9
shows that the damage scenario utilizes all four coupling strategies possible for the
restoration interdependencies.
Table A9. BIIRM damage scenario showcases all four coupling strategies
possible in restoration interdependencies
Interdependency Type
Traditional Precedence
Effectiveness Precedence
Options Precedence
Time-sensitive Options
Geospatial Repair

Coupling Strategy
arc-to-arc
node-to-arc
arc-to-node
node-to-node
n/a

An alternate damage scenario creation mechanism was explored, but not fully
exercised. If a fully developed GIS representation of the BIIRM Multiplex dataset had
been available or created (see next subsection), then damage could be simulated using an
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ArcGIS plugin like HAZUS, developed by Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Unfortunately, this was not accomplished in the present work and is an area of
improvement for future work. In combination with the HAZUS damage simulation, the
use of stochastics for associating a probability of damage to certain asset types across the
various infrastructure layers might be able to generate more robust damage scenario
profiles to test overall system response.
A.2.5. Geospatial considerations
The original CLARC Database consisted of some geospatial information, which
allowed for the nodes, arcs, and census tract polygons to be loaded into ArcMAP. All the
nodes and arcs were included in one shape file and needed to be parsed into each
individual infrastructure layer to support either the original CLARC “layers” or the
BIIRM multiplex structure. This effort was started; however, missing data, mislabeled
data, as well as disconnected components of the network slowed the data transformation.
This problem was exacerbated by trying to turn the original CLARC GIS data into a GIS
representation of the BIIRM Multiplex. The final issue became the missing portion of the
ICT network which was deemed as critical information. Therefore, attempts to correct
and add missing GIS information was abandoned for the present work and the effort was
shifted to only the node and arc information in the databases.
The BIIRM Multiplex Reduced network represents an approximate 10% sampling
of the CLARC Database constructed in a multiplex fashion. This reduced dataset was
given a geospatial context in order to inform the damage scenario creation and also the
associated interdependencies. This geospatial context allowed for a simulated damage
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event to consider geospatial operational interdependencies by having some reference of
proximity.
Future work can address GIS compatibility with the changes mentioned above.
This is an area where significant improvements can be made in terms of data
visualization and synchronization with other GIS tools and analysis. While not the focus
of the present research, some efforts were made to incorporate aspects of geospatial
context in order to fully evaluate the operational interdependency geospatial subtype.
The following section explains the largest contribution to the primary data, by
adding cost figures to the data.
A.3. Addition of Cost Data
The CLARC Database had no cost data associated with it, which presented a
concern, since the most common objective functions in interdependent infrastructure
recovery analysis were cost-centric. Therefore, generic cost data was constructed for all
the various asset types and all other associated costs used in the cost objective of the
BIIRM. These costs include site preparation, repair, assignment, and flow costs. These
are each given an individual subsection below. Additionally, penalty costs are discussed
since they were used intermittently throughout the model for various reasons.
As a general note, actual cost data associated with an actual network would be
superior to any cost data created. While the creation or fabrication of the cost data is not
flawless, extensive efforts were employed to render a representative cost structure. The
resulting cost data are flexible and responsive to varying types of analyses of interest to
the research based on tailorable assumptions on the amount of damage, unit costs, etc. It
is important to remember much of the cost data related to infrastructure may be
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proprietary or protected and therefore representative costs may be all that is publicly
accessible for research.
The purpose in creating cost data for the CLARC Database and associated BIIRM
datasets is to more fully understand the multi-objective behavior of infrastructure
recovery and to provide a proof of concept. At best these costs should be considered as
project comparison cost estimates with no greater accuracy than −20% to +40% (DoD
2010). The following subsections explain how each of the different types of cost were
created.
A.3.1. Site preparation costs
The CLARC Database had four different terrain types including: open, heavy
trees, city, and suburbs. Each of these areas were used in order to establish the cost of site
preparation. While each repair project in reality might have unique site preparation costs
and unique requirements, these four terrain types were assumed to be unique enough to
apply a single cost for work within a geospatial area. The CLARC Database had 77
geospatial sites called Census Tracts, which were the same for the BIIRM Multiplex
datasets, and which were reduced to 8 Census Tracts for the BIIRM Multiplex Reduced
datasets. Three different websites were consulted to determine price ranges for site
preparation within the various terrain types (homeadvisor.com 2021a; howmuch.net
2020; kompareit.com 2021). Table A10 shows the costs for site prep for work within the
four various terrain types.
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Table A10. The four terrain types used in CLARC Database have site preparation costs
ranging from $1,000 per job to $3,500 per job
Terrain Type
Open
City
Heavy Trees
Suburbs

Site Prep Cost
$1,000
$2,750
$3,500
$1,750

A.3.2. Repair costs
Each of the 68 different asset types found in the CLARC Database were given a
unique cost using Table 3 of Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) 3-701-01, DoD Facilities
Pricing Guide, with change 6. Each asset type was compared with the Facility Analysis
Category (FAC) within the DoD Real Property Classification System and the respective
FAC title. A Plant Replacement Value (PRV) is given for each FAC, where PRV is
defined as the “cost to design and rebuild a notional facility to current standards [in
order] to replace an existing facility on the same site” ( DoD 2020). This was considered
as what was required in the case of catastrophic failure or total damage of the assets.
Using the chosen FAC for each asset, Table 3 of the above-mentioned UFC
provides a PRV Unit Cost (PUC). The PUC in combination with a reference size or asset
quantity (completely tailorable) were used to obtain the total cost of an asset (see
Equation A.1).
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝑃𝑈𝐶 × 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦.

(A.1)

The total cost of an asset was then split into an appropriate number of portions
based on the number of infrastructure systems affecting that asset plus one. For example,
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a lighted traffic intersection has a transportation (TER) and electric (PWR) aspect to this
asset. Therefore, the total cost of repair for that intersection was divided into 2+1 equal
portions. The “lead” or “host” infrastructure system received a double portion of the cost
and the reflected aspects of that node received only one. Another example takes an
airport, which has a demand in all five infrastructure layers, and divides the total cost into
six equal portions. In this instance the double portion is also associated with the TER
infrastructure layer since that is the “host” layer for that node. Equations A.2 and A.3
represent the cost per asset system and the cost for the lead asset system respectively.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠+1)

(A.2)

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 2 × 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚

(A.3)

The costs of the asset systems were then used to determine the cost of the damage
to that asset system, based on an assumed percentage of damage. The percentage of
damage is completely tailorable, to include variations within different systems, based on
the damage scenario. The percentages used in the BIIRM Multiplex and BIIRM
Multiplex Reduced datasets ranged from < 1% to 100% based on the expendability of
the asset systems. Only the Census_Point assets had damage less than 1%. This was
determined because it was assumed that the cost to a community would be far less than
the cost to private owners and their insurance companies for reparation. Equation A.4
shows how the cost of a damaged asset system was calculated. Equation A.4 also applies
to the lead system.
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 × 𝐷𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒. (A.4)
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All UFC cost data reflected FY2020 dollars and was not adjusted any further,
being considered present value. Again, it is reiterated that actual cost data would be of
greater and of a more valuable quality to a user of the BIIRM, but in the absence of that
data this offers a realistic tailorable cost based on the assumptions a user imposes to
develop the cost of repair for damaged assets.
A.3.3. Assignment costs
It is assumed in the BIIRM that each infrastructure layer has fully trained and
equipped craftsmen associated with that network to fix any of the problems associated
with damaged assets within that layer. This means that parallel work crews can be
developed for each layer similar to other work in this research field (Cavdaroglu et al.
2013; Nurre et al. 2012; Sharkey et al. 2015).
Assignment costs were developed for work crews that would repair various
infrastructure assets within a given infrastructure system. While these costs are
representative, actual shop rates or employee wages for given recovery crews can be
substituted if available. Hourly rates were found on a variety of sites ranging from $15 to
$200 per hour (homeadvisor.com 2021b; c; payscale.com 2021a; b). Table A11 lists all
the assignment costs based on an assumption of three-person crews for 8 hours using
average hourly rates.
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Table A11. Assignment costs for the five infrastructure systems used
in the BIIRM range from $600 to $2,520 per work crew assignment
Infrastructure
Hourly Rate
Daily Ratea
PWR
$75
$1,800
WWT
$105
$2,520
WTR
$105
$2,520
ICT
$25
$600
TER
$25
$600
a
Based on 3-person crew for an 8-hour work day
A.3.4. Flow costs
The first challenge in assigning flow costs was having to deal with unitless
demand values in the CLARC Database. Various nodal asset types within the CLARC
Database had a relative scale in terms of supply or demand of a given commodity. For
example, the commodity of “Power” varied across the demand nodes from 5 for a lighted
traffic light to 500 for a census point housing tens of thousands of residents. Each
commodity within a network was unitless with some relative scale.
These relative scales within the CLARC Database did not perfectly match values
for similar types of facilities from national databases. However, in most instances each
commodity’s relative scale roughly followed actual data in terms of magnitude. For
example, the power usage over a month for residential dwellings was approximately 914
kWh, where commercial entities used on average 6,189 kWh, and industry used 99,221
kWh on average (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2020). This approaches
a near tenfold increase across these different sectors and when converted to kWh per day
the values nearly matched those assigned in the CLARC Database. Therefore, the units
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assigned to the supply and demand for the power infrastructure was kWh/day. A similar
analysis was completed for all the infrastructure networks. Table A12 shows the results
including the range of values from the BIIRM Multiplex Plus dataset for demand and the
assigned unit of measure.
Table A12. Relative nodal demand scales and units of measure based on commodity
Infrastructure
PWR
ICT
WTR
WWT
TER

Relative Demand Scale
5 to 500
1 to 500
10 to 120
10 to 120
2 to 20 (EMS)
2 to 30 (Police)
2 to 15 (Fire)
5 to 500 (People)

Units Assigned
kWh/day
peak connections
kGal/day
kGal/day
calls/day
calls/day
calls/day
commutes/day

Establishing units of measure allowed for investigation into the average cost of
providing utility services. It was assumed that utility companies owned and operated by a
municipal are compensated for expenditures to include operations and maintenance, but
are not necessarily for-profit enterprises. While some public services are for-profit and
are structured more like businesses, it was assumed that the costs associated with utility
payment represents the cost to flow materials to customers. The identification of unit cost
of the commodity did not fix correlating the CLARC or BIIRM relative demand scale to
actual demands.
Correlation of the CLARC or BIIRM relative scale and real values from national
databases presented a further challenge. The main way the relative scale was applied to
the national database figures was by using a percent deviation of the mid-range. This
permits the use of the relative scale inherent in the CLARC Database and BIIRM
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datasets, while still being able to associate it with the real cost data. This strategy will be
shown in certain instances and contrasted against other methods used for certain
commodities. In general, some infrastructure systems shared commonalities, while each
infrastructure network displayed some uniqueness.
Power, water, and wastewater. The U.S. Energy Information Administration
(2020) publishes an annual report with cumulative energy sales, customers, and prices.
While this report encompasses various forms of energy generation, the averages were
used to establish the cost for three different sectors including: residential, commercial,
and industrial. The cost for each sector was found by taking the 2019 “Sales to Ultimate
Customers” (Table 2.2 in reference) and dividing it by the 2019 “Number of Ultimate
Customers” (Table 2.1 in reference). This was then converted to kWh/day and multiplied
by the 2019 “Average Price” (Table 2.4 in reference) to achieve a cost for each of the
three sectors in $/kWh.
The Department of Energy produced a report in 2017 with quantities, prices, and
trends of water and wastewater data from 2008 to 2016 (U.S. Department of Energy
2017). The water consumption data (Table 1 in reference) were used to develop sector
averages for water consumption and wastewater production across the three sectors of
residential, commercial, industrial. Additionally, the data from the water rates (Figure 3
in reference) and wastewater rates (Figure 4 in reference) over time were used to find the
price for water delivery and wastewater treatment in FY2020 dollars. This was
accomplished by using the trends identified in the report.
Table A13 shows the relative demand range for the CLARC and BIIRM datasets
within a given sector, excluding the census points from the residential ranges. The census
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points used in the CLARC Database and BIIRM datasets are unique in that they are a
single node which represents a cluster of similar type facilities (called cluster nodes). Due
to their unique nature, they are treated separately in calculating the flow cost to those
particular nodes. Table A13 also displays the average demand based on national
databases and the associated unit cost per sector.
Table A13. Model demand ranges, average national demand [units/time], and average
unit cost [$/units] vary across infrastructures and asset sector grouping
Sector
Residential

PWR
50 to 75a
30 kWh/d
0.1301 $/kWh

WTR
10 to 15b
0.37 kGal/d
3.89 $/kGal

WWT
10 to 15b
0.49 kGal/d
5.07 $/kGal

Commercial

20 to 500
202 kWh/d
0.1068 $/kWh

50 to 50
6.61 kGal/d
3.89 $/kGal

5 to 50
8.61 kGal/d
5.07 $/kGal

Industrial

0 to 500
0 to 75
0 to 50
2,918 kWh/d
211.93 kGal/d
276.22 kGal/d
0.0681 $/kWh
3.89 $/kGal
5.07 $/kGal
a
Census tracts have a power relative demand of 500.
b
Census tracts have a water and wastewater relative demand of 120.

These average costs were then converted into a representative unit flow cost for
the model using one of two general equations. Equation A.5 represents the general
conversion equation for the census tracts (cluster nodes). The unit prices are converted
𝑘
into a unit flow cost, 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
, based on the number of units or dwellings represented by node

𝑗 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘 in the CLARC or BIIRM datasets. The conversion is achieved by taking the
average usage for a given sector, multiplied by the number of facilities represented by a
𝑘
node, multiplied by the average cost, all divided by the “To_Node” usage or 𝑏𝑗𝑙𝑡
, where
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𝑗 ∈ (𝑖, 𝑗). Equation A.6 represents the second general equation for non-cluster nodes. The
only difference between Equations A.5 and A.6 is the substitution of “number of
facilities” with a percent deviation from the mid-range, which is an expression of central
tendency that can be utilized to leverage the relative demand scale in the CLARC and
BIIRM datasets.
$
𝑘
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
[𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠∙𝑑𝑎𝑦]

=

𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒[

𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
$
]×𝑄𝑡𝑦[
]×𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡[
]
𝑑𝑎𝑦∙𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒[
]
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒

.

𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒[
$

𝑘
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
[𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠∙𝑑𝑎𝑦] =

𝑘
(𝑏𝑘
𝑗𝑙𝑡 −𝑏𝑙𝑡 )
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
$
)×𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡[
]×(1+
]
𝑑𝑎𝑦∙𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
max 𝑏𝑘
− min 𝑏𝑘
𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝑗∈𝒩𝐷
𝑗∈𝒩𝐷
𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒[
]
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒

(A.5)

,

(A.6)

𝑘

where, 𝑏𝑙𝑡 represents the mid-range value of the model demand scale for a given
commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 within an infrastructure 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 at a time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. The mid-range
value is calculated using Equation A.7.

𝑘
𝑏𝑙𝑡

𝑘
𝑘
( max 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
)
+ min 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

=

𝑘
𝑖∈𝒩𝐷

𝑘
𝑖∈𝒩𝐷

2

, ∀𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(A.7)

An example calculation for a residential arc between nodes 2501 and 5001 is
shown in Equation A.8. Where node 2501 represents a transmission substation and node
5001 represents a census point (concentration of individual residential dwellings), with
the commodity being “Power” and the time period being 𝑡1. The high price of delivering
electricity to this one node is due to the fact that the census points represent a collection
of residential facilities, and in this particular case supporting over 19,000 people. In
essence, the census points tend to reduce the quantity of similar, co-located facilities
together into one node in order to reduce the overall number of nodes.
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𝑃𝑊𝑅
𝑐2501,5001,𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟,𝑡1

=

30[

𝑘𝑊ℎ
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
$
]×5619[
]×0.1301[
]
𝑑∙𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒5001
𝑘𝑊ℎ
𝑘𝑊ℎ
500[
]
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒5001

$

= 43.25 [𝑘𝑊ℎ∙𝑑]. (A.8)

Additionally, an example calculation for an industrial arc between nodes 6001 and
5761 is shown in Equation A.9. Where node 6001 represents a power node and node
5761 represents a solar panel plant. In this instance the demand value is 500 in a scale 0
to 500 with a mid-range value of 250 for node 5761. Therefore, the overall cost to flow
power is less to the single industrial node versus the aggregate residential node.
𝑃𝑊𝑅
𝑐6001,5761,𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟,𝑡1

=

2918[

(500−250)
𝑘𝑊ℎ
$
]×(1+
)×0.0681[
]
𝑑∙𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒5761
500
𝑘𝑊ℎ
𝑘𝑊ℎ
500[
]
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒5761

$

= 0.60 [𝑘𝑊ℎ∙𝑑]. (A.9)

Theses general equations and examples provide an illustration of how unit cost
flows were developed for power, water, and wastewater infrastructures.
Telecommunications. The BIIRM seeks to increase the focus of the
telecommunication connections and requirements across multiple assets throughout the
dataset. This is achieved by providing updated values to the communications demand,
which roughly equates to 95% of the working population at a given node based on the
average percentage connectedness across the U.S. (Pew Research Center 2019). While it
is unlikely that a single entity will be making 500 telephone calls in any one given point
in time, 500 was chosen as the upper range of the demand used in the BIIRM
commensurate with other commodities. This demand value can be considered as a
combination of the following types of connections: telephone, cellular, internet, and
industrial control systems. Only one generic commodity called “Communication” is used,
when in reality there could be multiple for each of the above-mentioned ICT connection
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types. This means that in developing the flow cost both internet/data and
telephone/cellular prices were considered.
For census points cellular prices were used based on costs ranging from $70 to
$114/customer/month (Akhtar 2021; Webber 2019), which had an average of
$92/customer/month. These prices seem to reflect both customers with and without
multiple lines, but are used to reflect a household (Webber 2019). Residential internet
average price is $60/household/month (Dilley 2021). These two costs sum to be
$3.65/household/d. By using Equation A.5 above, a unit cost can be calculated for census
tracts.
For commercial, industrial, and the remaining residential facilities corporate
telephone prices were used based on an average cost of $25/user/month (Dinardi 2019).
Corporate internet prices depended on what level of data was needed ranging from
$70/facility/month to $500/facility/month, with an average over the top four internet
packages being $375/facility/month (Frost 2020). This translates to a
commercial/industrial base cost of $12.50/facility/day plus a variable cost of
$0.83/person/day. This is a straight forward unit cost, which is expressed in Equation
A.10, where 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 is “Communications” and 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦 is the ICT infrastructure.
𝐼𝐶𝑇
𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚)𝑡
=

𝐼𝐶𝑇
12.50+(0.83𝑏𝑗(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚)𝑡
)
𝐼𝐶𝑇
𝑏𝑗(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚)𝑡

, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝐼𝐶𝑇 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(A.10)

Transportation and emergency response. There are various methods used to
determine cost of vehicular traffic in terms of wear and tear on the road surfaces. Most
experts claim that weight is one of the largest factors determining damage to road
surfaces; however, there are lots of hidden costs and lots of complications. An
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organization out of Canada published an article that seeks to define the cost to society of
a 5 km commute (McLaren et al. 2015). While not perfect, this serves as the basis of the
cost, which is then multiplied by how heavy the vehicle is that is driving on the road as
compared to the standard automobile. The cost was converted from 2.78 2015 Canadian
dollars per 5 km to 0.014¢ per linear foot of road traveled per vehicle. This unit price is
then multiplied by the distance of each road to develop unique costs per vehicle for each
TER arc for all the commodities. Table A14 shows the summary of the unit costs for each
of the commodities within the TER network.
Table A14. Unit costs for TER commodities based on weight

Commodity
People
Police
EMS
Fire

Vehicle
Weight (lbs)
4000
4500
12000
50000

Weight Multiplier
1
1.125
3
12.5

Unit Cost
($/LF/vehicle)
0.00014
0.00016
0.00043
0.00181

A.3.4. Penalty costs
Penalty costs were used in some of the initial model formulations, but were
eventually removed. The primary reason penalty costs were included was to incentivize
flow in a minimum cost of recovery scenario. With a damaged network, traditional
network flow may be disrupted leaving some nodes with unmet demand or a surplus
supply due to an inability to deliver the commodities to the demand nodes. This changes
the steady state network minimum cost flow problem to an inherently different problem.
With a minimizing objective function on cost and the allowance of unmet demand and
surplus supply the easiest way to minimize cost in terms of flow is to not flow any
commodities throughout the network. Penalty costs were used to incentivize flow and
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penalize unmet demand that could be met due to an operating network as seen in other
work (Gonzalez 2017; González et al. 2016).
Penalty costs were removed for two primary reasons, namely the addition of
competing objectives and the inherent challenges with proper scaling. When the BIIRM
was originally built it was seeking least cost recovery strategies. In this scenario with no
other competing objective and due to a damaged network, penalty costs were essential to
incentivize flow. However, the addition of other competing objectives eliminated the
need of penalty costs. This was a welcome thing since penalty costs must be
appropriately calibrated to not overly skew a model because they are too large or be
overlooked by the model because they are negligible (González et al. 2016). While
penalty costs have some utility, they were abandoned in light of competing objectives.
A.4. Summary of Changes
This appendix has detailed the issues that were found in the CLARC Database. It
also listed the concerns with missing data and network structure issues within the ICT
infrastructure network. The appendix also detailed how the CLARC Database was
reconfigured into a multiplex construct. This resulted in a significant increase in the
number of nodes used in the BIIRM datasets. Finally, this appendix detailed the addition
of cost data and explained which aspects of the data are tailorable.
These changes are included to summarize notes, assumptions, and decisions
regarding the preparation of the BIIRM datasets used in the foregoing research.
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Appendix B. Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Model Reviews
This appendix details the interdependent infrastructure recovery (IIR) models that
were reviewed in connection with Chapter 2. This appendix provides a location to explain
the categories and subcategories used in the modified evaluation of models in the
literature based on Griot (2010). Each model reviewed is provided with a one-page
summary of notes in chronological order based on publication date.
This appendix first addresses the inclusion criteria, then the main categories of the
interdependent infrastructure model evaluation framework, and then followed by
subcategory explanations. Finally, this appendix then presents the notes on the models
that met the inclusion criteria.
B.1. Inclusion Criteria, Category Definitions, and Subcategory Definitions
Table B1 explains the inclusion criteria used in the evaluation of the IIR models.
The inclusion criteria consist of modeled as network flow, inclusion of assignment or
scheduling elements, ability to simultaneously look at multiple infrastructure systems,
and incorporation of operational or restorations interdependencies.
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Table B1. Definitions of model evaluation inclusion criteria
Inclusion Criteria

Description

I

Network flow based modeling
and simulation

Model or problem formulation must exhibit
network flow, or flow of one or more
commodities across a network of nodes and
arcs (vertices and edges).

II

Assigning/Scheduling repair
of damaged assets

Model or problem formulation must include
element of scheduling or repair to damaged
components of the network(s).

III

Simultaneous modeling and
simulation of multiple
systems

Model or problem formulation must include
multiple infrastructure systems or layers.

IV

Operational or restoration
interdependencies

Model or problem formulation must address
interdependencies (i.e., operational,
restoration, other) between the multiple layers
within the overall system of systems.

Table B2 describes all the main categories used in IIR model evaluation which
was adopted from Griot’s (2010) framework. The categories include everything from
modeling focus to characterization of interdependencies to software programs used for
the employment of a model and references to publications using this model. There are 13
categories used with two of them distinctly unique to this research.
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Table B2. Description of categories used as adapted from Griot (2010)
Category

Description

1 Modeling focus and main
objectives

Purpose of model and stated objectives using
descriptive language.

2 Domain and scale of application

Infrastructure sectors, cause of disruption, and
scale.

3 Methodological design strategy

Bottom-up or top-down approach.

4 Conceptual paradigms

Describes how critical infrastructures,
interdependencies, and cascading failures are
handled. This includes how these are viewed
as well.

5 Mathematical features

Describes the type of program or mathematical
approach underlying the model. Also may
address specific features such as
deterministic/stochastic, dynamic/static,
geospatial/non-geospatial, etc.

6 Requirements and resources

Inputs, how model is validated, and how output
is verified.

7 Types of outputs

Describes results in words.

8 Advantages and limits

Self-explanatory.

9 Tools

Software, computer, solver, etc.

10 Interoperability

Connection to larger modeling and simulation
frameworks or efforts.

11 Recovery Operations*

Key areas of interest in how recovery operations
is modeled mainly dealing with explicit or
implicit assumptions.

12 References

Self-explanatory.

13 Miscellaneous*

Self-explanatory.

* Added or modified categories or fields from Griot (2010) for clarity of comparison in
present work.
Tables B3 to B6 describe the subcategories used in the evaluation of IIR models.
Table B3 describes the general model attributes such as model focus, model scenario, and
methodology. Table B4 describes the interdependency and coupling characterization and
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handling. Table B5 describes the mathematical approach, data requirements, advantages,
and limitations. Table B6 describes the recovery operations, prevalent assumptions
associated with those operations, and then additional categories.
Table B3. IIR model evaluation subcategories describing general model attributes
Subcategory

Description

1A

Model name*

Self-explanatory and only when applicable.

1B

Modelling focus

Stated or inferred use or application of the model. May also
include generalized category defined by Gonzalez (2017):
analytical models, performance evaluation models, design
methodologies, mitigation models, and recovery
methodologies. May include focus as defined by Eusgeld
et al. (2018): interdependency analysis or system analysis.
Recovery or restoration methodologies is the implied
category for this study.

1C

List and description
of the objectives
of the approach

Includes description of the objective function(s).

2A

Sectors being
considered

Enumeration of infrastructure systems. Note that this may be
dependent on the problem or the associated data used in
modeling.

2B

Types of threats

Cause of the (simulated) damage or network disruption. May
also include Eusgeld et al.'s (2008) categorization of
accidents, attacks, or failures.

2C

Granularity

Scale of model or infrastructure: Global, Regional/National,
Local.

3A

Bottom-up or topdown

Bottom-up: Specific information on network/model
components leads to general information.
Top-down: General information leads to specific results
or outputs at network/model components.

* Added or modified categories or fields from Griot (2010) for clarity of comparison in
present work.
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Table B4. IIR model evaluation subcategories describing interdependencies and coupling
Subcategory

Description

4A

Critical infrastructure
handling

Description of how critical infrastructures are
modeled. Network flow is the default for this study.

4B

Critical infrastructure
characterization

Description of what critical infrastucture needs and
how they are identified (e.g., weighting factor).

4C

Interdependency
handling*

Description of how two interdependent infrastructures
are related (e.g., binary parameter or constraint
based on an interdependent subset).

4D

Operational
interdependency type
and characterization*

Enumeration of operational interdependency types and
how the different types are identified.

4E

Restoration
interdependency type
and characterization*

Enumeration of restoration interdependency types and
how the different types are identified.

4F

Coupling handling and
characterization*

Description of coupling between interdependent
infrastructure systems (e.g., one-to-one, node-tonode, etc.).

4G

Cascading effect handling

Description of how failure propagates through the
network. May include Eusgeld et al.'s (2008)
categorization of cascading, escalating, common
cause, and confined.

* Added or modified categories or fields from Griot (2010) for clarity of comparison in
present work.
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Table B5. IIR model evaluation subcategories describing mathematical approach, data
requirements, advantages, and limitations
Subcategory

Description

5A

Mathematical
techniques

Description of mathematical technique or type of model, e.g.,
linear program, mixed-integer program, quadratic
program, min cost flow, max covering, origin-destination
pairs, etc.

5B

Model &
simulation
approach
properties

Model properties such as deterministic/stochastic,
dynamic/static, geospatial/non-geospatial, etc. Key
assumptions may be listed here as well.

5C

Solution approach*

Description of how solution is found. Identification of
heuristics if used.

6A

Data required by
the model(s)

Enumeration of data required by the model, i.e., input sets
and parameters.

6B

Validation and
verification

Description of how the model was validated that it worked as
planned/programmed and how the results were verified.

6C

Expertise

Skills or training required to use the model.

7A

Result description

List and description of what results show.

8A

Advantages

Self-explanatory.

8B

Limits

Self-explanatory.

9A

Available tools

Can include software, computer, solver descriptions.

10A Type of framework

Description of whether or not model is part of larger
framework.

10B Models of interest

Description of other models of interest that the present model
relates to or is built from/informed by.

* Added or modified categories or fields from Griot (2010) for clarity of comparison in
present work.
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Table B6. IIR model evaluation subcategories describing recovery operations
Subcategory

Description

11A Teaming structure*

Description of how repair teams are determined, assigned,
and utilized if stated.

11B Resource
requirements*

Description of assumptions surrounding resources, i.e.,
material, equipment, vehicles, scarce or long-lead items
are handled if stated.

11C Recovery time*

Description of how recovery/repair time is calculated and
whether any conditions affect the time of recovery or
repair if applicable.

11D Recovery costs*

Description of which costs are used, how they are used, and
sources of cost data if applicable.

11E

Type of repair*

Description of the type of repair work that is being
accomplished if stated.

11F

Transit time*

Description of how transit time is accounted for to include
between jobs if applicable.

11G Work efficiency*

Description of how work efficiency impacts repair schedule
if applicable.

11H Degraded
conditions*

Description of circumstances which effect ability to or
effectiveness of repair work if applicable.

11I

External support*

Description of use of other resources beyond those inherent
in the system if applicable.

11J

Phases of recovery* Description of the phases of recovery, e.g., damage
assessment, response, recovery, etc. if applicable.

11K Success of
recovery*

Description of how repaired assets are determined to be
successfully repaired if applicable.

12A Bibliography

Self-explanatory.

12B Expertise resources

Organization producing model if applicable.

12C Websites

Self-explanatory.

12D Maturity

Number of times article or report is cited. For consistency
use one site. Google Scholar is used for the present
report. Low (<25), Medium (<50), High (<100), Very
high (>100).

13A Notes*

Self-explanatory.

* Added or modified categories or fields from Griot (2010) for clarity of comparison in
present work.
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B.2. Model Evaluations
This section uses the modified IIR evaluation framework described above and
displays one-page summaries of notes taken during model evaluation. The following
notes are only for those IIR models which were included based on all the abovementioned inclusion criteria. The models are listed in chronological order by publication
date. These notes are not referenced as tables or figures, but are just listed as part of the
appendix content, even though they are structured similar to tables. The following
shorthand references lay out which models are included to include model name when
available.
1. Lee et al. (2007) – Interdependent Layered Network (ILN)
2. Cavdaroglu et al. (2013)
3. Sharkey et al. (2015) – Interdependent Integrated Network Design and Scheduling
(IINDS) Problem
4. González et al. (2016) – Iterative Interdependent Network Design Problem
(iINDP)
5. González (2017) – Time-dependent Interdependent Network Design Problem (tdINDP)
6. González (2017) – Stochastic Interdependent Network Design Problem (sINDP)
7. Almoghathawi et al. (2019)
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Appendix C. The Lite Base Interdependent
Infrastructure Recovery Model (LiteBIIRM)
This appendix details the goals, assumptions, notation, and formulation for the
complete LiteBIIRM model as seen in Chapter 4.
C.1. LiteBIIRM Goals
The goal of this model is comprised of two parts to allow for all four coupling
strategies and partial operability.
C.2. LiteBIIRM Assumptions
The assumptions for the LiteBIIRM are nearly identical to the assumptions of the
BIIRM except for the following assumptions:
•

A node or arc that is directly damaged is not operational until it is restored. A
node that has some operational interdependency with a damaged node may be
inoperable or partially operable based on the coupling strategy. Direct damage is
assumed to create total inoperability, which can be repaired.

•

Operational interdependencies subtypes (i.e., physical, cyber, logical, or
geospatial) are assumed to exist between node pairs and can be described based
on the interdependency subtype and a coupling strategy. Operational
interdependency coupling of node pairs can be achieved at least four ways,
including one-to-one, one-to-any, one-to-all, and one-to-many (González et al.
2016).

234

•

Operational interdependencies may affect a node’s level of operability and the use
of a pseudo node within an infrastructure layer can be used to ensure some level
of operability remains in a one-to-many relationship.

•

No restoration interdependencies are included, due to the focused concentration
on the coupling of interdependent systems.

C.3. LiteBIIRM Notation
This section lists the sets, parameters, and variables used in the LiteBIIRM. The
listing is alphabetical with symbols from the Latin alphabet first followed by the Greek
alphabet. Unless otherwise explicitly stated the index 𝑡 denotes “during time period 𝑡 ∈
𝒯” where 𝒯 is the set of all time periods.
𝒜 = overall set of arcs, indexed as (𝑖, 𝑗);
𝒜𝑘 = subset of arcs within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒜′ = overall set of damaged arcs;
𝒜′𝑘 = subset of damaged arcs within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑘
𝑎𝑤𝑡
= cost of assigning work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
= supply or demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
= cost of flowing commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 through arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 ;

ℒ = overall set of commodities;
ℒ 𝑘 = subset of commodities able to flow within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒩 = overall set of nodes, indexed as 𝑖;
𝒩 𝑘 = subset of nodes within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒩 ′ = set of all damaged nodes;
235

𝒩 ′𝑘 = subset of damaged nodes within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑘 or 𝑝𝑖𝑗
= normal processing time for repair of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑘
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑞𝑖𝑡
= cost of repair for recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
= capacity of arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 shared by all commodities flowing along that arc;

𝒲 = set of all work crews;
𝒲 𝑘 = subset of work crews able to perform tasks in infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
= variable representing flow of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 along arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜 𝑘 ;
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
= slack variable representing unmet demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
= slack variable representing surplus of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 = variable taking a value between 0 and 1, indicating if arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 or

node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is operable;
𝑘
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
= binary variable indicating if work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 is assigned to a

recovery task during time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝑘
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
= binary variable indicating if work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 has completed the

recovery task by the beginning of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
̃

𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 = operational interdependency parameter based on parent-child node pairs 𝑖 ∈
̃

𝑘𝑘
𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 with some operational interdependency type 𝜓 ∈ Ψ;

𝜇𝐴 and 𝜇𝐵 = weighting parameter for cost objective and disruptive effect objective;
𝑘
𝑘
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝜇𝑖𝑡
= weighting parameter for arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 at time period 𝑡 ∈

𝒯;
Ξ = set of coupling strategies, indexed as 𝜉;
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Ψ = set of operational interdependency subtypes, indexed as 𝜓;
C.4. LiteBIIRM Formulation
The following is the full formulation of the LiteBIIRM. Equations may have a
suffix ascribed denoting a variation based on being arc-based instead of node-based (no
suffix). The formulation of the LiteBIIRM was builds upon the work of González et al.
(2016) and Cavdaroglu et al. (2013).
C.4.1. Objective functions
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦 (∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘[∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 (𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑤𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡 ) +
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡 + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
)] + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
).

(C.1)

𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
). (C.2)

These two explicit objective functions also include a time index, thus
incorporating repair time into the combined objective functions implicitly as follows.
Minimize

𝜇𝐴 𝐴 − 𝜇𝐵 𝐵.

(C.3)

Subject to the following constraints
C.4.2. Network flow and scheduling constraints
−,𝑘
+,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑗:(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
− ∑𝑗:(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
− 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈

𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.4)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.5)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.6)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.7)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.8)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(C.8.arc)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(C.9)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(C.9.arc)
(C.10)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡

≤ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑗
]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

(C.10.arc)
(C.11)

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.11.arc)
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑗
−1]

𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≤1+

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘+1 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘 +1 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑖

(C.12)

𝑖𝑗

C.4.3. Operational interdependencies
̃
∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘𝑘̃ 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑡 , 𝜉 = 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑜𝑛𝑒, 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑎𝑛𝑦, 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦, ∀𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ , 𝑘̃ ∈
𝑖̃ 𝜓𝜉

𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
̃

(C.13)
̃

̃

̃ ̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑖̃𝑘𝑡 , 𝜉 = 𝑜𝑛𝑒2𝑎𝑙𝑙, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 , 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.14)

−,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.15)

C.4.4. Side constraints
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.16)

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.17)

+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.18)

0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.19)

𝑘
0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(C.19.arc)

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.20)
(C.20.arc)

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(C.21)
(C.21.arc)

C.4.5. Equation descriptions
Table C1 summarizes and categorizes the equations. The equations are
categorized as either objective functions, flow constraints, recovery constraints,
scheduling constraints, interdependency constraints, or side constraints. Table C1 seeks
to strike a balance between completeness and brevity by combining like equations.
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Table C1. Summary of objective function and constraints for LiteBIIRM
Ref

Category

Description

C.1

Objective func.

Least cost recovery strategies. The first and second terms
are the arc repair costs and arc assignment costs, the third
and fourth terms are node repair costs and node assignment
costs, and the fifth term is the flow cost.

C.2

Objective func.

Weighted operability of nodes and arcs, which represents a
surrogate for mission impact or disruptive effect.

C.3

Objective func.

Weighted and combined multi-objective function using C.1
and C.2.

C.4

Flow constraints Standard flow balance. Where slack variables representing
unmet demand and surplus supply help balance the
equation.

C.5 to
C.7

Flow constraints Restricts flow if starting node (C.5), ending node (C.6), and
arc (C.7) is inoperable.

C.8,
C.9,
C.11

Recovery
constraints

Ensures that a restored asset becomes operable (C.8), assets
are only repaired once (C.9), and assets are repaired after
sufficient processing time (C.11).

C.10
C.12

Scheduling
constraints

Ensures that only one work crew is assigned per repair task
(C.10) and that crews work on only one job at a time (C.12).

C.13 to
C.15

Interdependency Child node operability depends on parent node’s operability
constraints
and coupling (C.13) and (C.14), and nodes are operable if
demand is met (C.15).

C.16 to
C.21

Side constraints

Flow variables are positive continuous, operability is
continuous between 0 and 1, and assignment and repair
variables are binary.
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Appendix D. The Base Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Model (BIIRM)
This appendix details the goals, assumptions, notation, and formulation for the
complete BIIRM model as seen in part in Chapter 5.
D.1. BIIRM Goals
The goal of this model is to find optimal recovery strategies of disrupted
interdependent infrastructure networks while balancing cost, disruption, and repair time.
In order to accomplish this goal the model has three sub goals enumerated below.
1. Integrate network design and scheduling problems in order to model infrastructure
recovery.
2. Incorporate 9 interdependency subtypes including 4 operational (i.e., physical,
cyber, logical, and geospatial) and 5 restoration interdependency subtypes (i.e.,
traditional precedence, effectiveness precedence, options precedence, timesensitive options, and geospatial repair).
3. Allow for and evaluate multiple complex interdependency relationships between
node pairs simultaneously.
D.2. BIIRM Assumptions
The assumptions for the BIIRM may be categorized into network flow,
scheduling, interdependency, and cost assumptions.
D.2.1. Network Flow Assumptions
•

Each infrastructure network layer is composed of arcs and nodes, both of which
are subject to failure and can be repaired or reconstructed.
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•

Each infrastructure network may flow one or more commodities. An example of a
single commodity network is the drinking water network, which supplies potable
water for consumption. An example of multicommodity flow is the transportation
and emergency response layer which flows EMS, Police, Fire, and People as
commodities.

•

Each commodity flows through only one infrastructure network.

•

Networks have a known supply and demand structure for all commodities
associated with that given network.

•

There is a known flow capacity for each arc in every infrastructure network,
which is shared by all commodities flowing through a given network.

•

A damaged node or arc is not operational until it is restored. Damage creates total
inoperability, which is a simplification of reality.
D.2.2. Scheduling Assumptions

•

When a recovery task is started it will be completed, before a work crew will be
assigned to a different one. This means it is a non-preemptive environment.

•

Recovery of nodes and arcs are assumed to be expedient and possible (i.e., no
total losses). This also neglects the real processes of insurance claims,
estimations, project bidding, material acquisition, project execution, and project
closing which should follow any temporary repairs done during recovery
operations.
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•

Additional tasks on or near nodes or arcs that are not directly related to repairing a
damaged node are designated by a pseudo-node or pseudo-arc. An example is a
power line inspection and deenergizing, which must be accomplished prior to
downed tree removal and before the actual repairing of the power line.

•

Work crews are skilled and proficient to handle any necessary repair in the
assigned network layer.

•

Sufficient materials are available for repair of assets.
D.2.3. Interdependency Assumptions

•

Interdependencies, which are by definition bi-directional, are captured by
capturing all uni-directional dependent relationships between infrastructure pairs
(Sharkey et al. 2016).

•

Operational interdependencies (i.e., physical, cyber, logical, and geographical) are
known. This is a simplification of reality, since some interdependencies manifest
themselves only in unique situations and are not generally known (National
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) 2018).

•

Operational interdependencies subtypes (i.e., physical, cyber, logical, or
geospatial) are assumed to exist between node pairs and can be described based
on a coupling strategy. Operational interdependency coupling of node pairs can be
achieved at least four ways, including one-to-one, one-to-any, one-to-all, and oneto-many (González et al. 2016). Due to the binary nature of the operability
variable only one-to-one, one-to-any, and one-to-all coupling strategies are
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compatible with the BIIRM. Additional modifications are required to enable all
coupling strategies. Coupling was removed in Chapter 3’s reduced presentation of
the BIIRM due to brevity.
•

The operational interdependency geospatial subtype may be and is incorporated
during damage scenario generation.

•

Four of the five restoration interdependency subtypes identified by Sharkey et al.
(2015) (i.e., traditional precedence, effectiveness precedence, options precedence,
and time-sensitive options) are assumed to exist between nodes and arcs. This
creates coupling strategies for restoration interdependencies of node-to-node
(n2n), node-to-arc (n2a), arc-to-node (a2n), and arc-to-arc (a2a).

•

The geospatial repair restoration interdependency subtype assumes the site
preparation cost burden during a specific period of time is shared. This can be
thought of as the cost of site preparation for co-located network components being
shared between the networks. This is achieved by a cost being associated with
each geographical region as a worst-case scenario (González et al. 2016).

•

Interdependencies affect node operability. Multiple interdependency subtype
connections between node pairs in different infrastructure networks can all
influence node operability.

244

D.2.4. Cost Assumptions
•

There is a known fixed cost of flowing a given commodity in a network during a
certain time period. This is a simplification since costs in reality could depend on
the amount of commodity flow during a time period.

•

The reconstruction costs for each node and arc are known fixed costs for a given
time period. This is a simplification of reality. Typically, repair costs are
dependent on the severity of the damage and on the type of repair selected. They
are also initially given as estimates, which may be high or low depending on the
unforeseen site conditions and the experience of the estimator.

•

Cost for recovery crew assignment and associated materials happens when work
is assigned, not completed.

D.3. BIIRM Notation
This section lists the sets, parameters, and variables used in the BIIRM. The
listing is alphabetical with symbols from the Latin alphabet first followed by the Greek
alphabet. Unless otherwise explicitly stated the index 𝑡 denotes “during time period 𝑡 ∈
𝒯” where 𝒯 is the set of all time periods.
𝒜 = overall set of arcs, indexed as (𝑖, 𝑗);
𝒜𝑘 = subset of arcs within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒜′ = overall set of damaged arcs;
𝒜′𝑘 = subset of damaged arcs within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑘
𝑎𝑤𝑡
= cost of assigning work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
= supply or demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
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𝑘
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
= cost of flowing commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 through arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑒𝑖𝑘 or 𝑒𝑖𝑗
= extended processing time for repair of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑘
𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑠
or 𝑔𝑖𝑠
= binary variable indicating if arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is in space 𝑠 ∈

𝒮;
𝑔𝑠𝑡 = cost of geospatial site preparation of space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮;
ℒ = overall set of commodities;
ℒ 𝑘 = subset of commodities able to flow within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒩 = overall set of nodes, indexed as 𝑖;
𝒩 𝑘 = subset of nodes within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒩 ′ = set of all damaged nodes;
𝒩 ′𝑘 = subset of damaged nodes within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑘 or 𝑝𝑖𝑗
= normal processing time for repair of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑘
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑞𝑖𝑡
= cost of repair for recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 ;

𝒮 = set of spaces;
𝑘
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
= capacity of arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 shared by all commodities flowing along that arc;

𝒲 = set of all work crews;
𝒲 𝑘 = subset of work crews able to perform tasks in infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
= variable representing flow of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 along arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜 𝑘 ;
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
= slack variable representing unmet demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
= slack variable representing surplus of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 = binary variable indicating if arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is operable;
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𝑧𝑠𝑡 = binary variable indicating if a recovery task in space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 is assigned during time
period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝑘
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
= binary variable indicating if work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 is assigned to a

recovery task during time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
or 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 = binary variable indicating if work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 is assigned to a
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

recovery task with extended processing time during time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝑘
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
= binary variable indicating if work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 has completed the

recovery task by the beginning of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
̃

̃

𝑘𝑘
𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝑡 = operational interdependency parameter based on parent-child node pairs 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉

with some operational interdependency type 𝜓 ∈ Ψ;
̃

𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 = node-to-node time-sensitive option deadline (other variations exist);
𝜇𝐴 and 𝜇𝐵 = weighting parameter for cost objective and disruptive effect objective;
𝑘
𝑘
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝜇𝑖𝑡
= weighting parameter for arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 at time period 𝑡 ∈

𝒯;
Ξ = set of coupling strategies, indexed as 𝜉;
Ψ = set of operational interdependency subtypes, indexed as 𝜓;
D.4. BIIRM Formulation
The following is the full formulation of the BIIRM. Equations may have a suffix
ascribed denoting a variation based on being arc-based instead of node-based (no suffix).
A suffix is also used on all restoration interdependency constraints based on coupling of
node-to-node (n2n), node-to-arc (n2a), arc-to-node (a2n), or arc-to-arc (a2a).
Additionally, an asterisk is used to denote modifications to previously listed equations if
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including the applicable relationships. The formulation of the BIIRM was builds upon the
work of González et al. (2016) and Sharkey et al. (2015).
D.4.1. Objective functions
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 (∑𝑠∈𝒮 𝑔𝑠𝑡 𝑧𝑠𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑘∈𝒦 (∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 (∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′ 𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑤𝑡 )) +
𝑒 𝑤𝑡
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘(𝑞𝑖𝑡
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ) + 𝑎𝑤𝑡
(𝑝𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ))) + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)).

(D.1)
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
). (D.2)

These two explicit objective functions also include a time index, thus
incorporating repair time into the combined objective functions implicitly as follows.
Minimize

𝜇𝐴 𝐴 − 𝜇𝐵 𝐵.

(D.3)

Subject to the following constraints
D.4.2. Network flow and scheduling constraints
−,𝑘
+,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑗:(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
− ∑𝑗:(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
− 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈

𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.4)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.5)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.6)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.7)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.8)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
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(D.8.arc)
(D.9)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(D.10)

𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑗
]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

(D.9.arc)

(D.10.arc)
(D.11)

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.11.arc)
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑗
−1]

𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≤1+

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘+1 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘 +1 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑖

𝑖𝑗

(D.12)

D.4.3. Operational interdependencies
̃
∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘𝑘̃ 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑡 , ∀𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ , 𝑘̃ ∈ 𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝜉 ∈ Ξ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.13)

−,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.14)

𝑖̃ 𝜓𝜉

D.4.4. Restoration interdependencies
D.4.4.1. Traditional precedence
̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.15.n2n)

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.15.n2a)

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.15.a2n)

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.15.a2a)

1−
1−

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

̃

𝑘
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

̃

𝑘
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(D.16.n2n)

(D.16.n2a)

1

𝑡
̃∑
𝑘

̃
𝜏=𝑡−𝑝𝑖̃𝑘 +1

𝑝𝑖̃

(1 −

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

̃

̃

𝑘
) ≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , 𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘 , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
<

0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 .

(D.17.n2n)

1

𝑡
̃ ∑
𝑘

𝑝𝑖̃ 𝑗̃

̃
𝜏=𝑡−𝑝𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃ +1

(1 −

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

̃

̃

𝑘
) ≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , 𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃ , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
<

0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 .

(D.17.n2a)

D.4.4.2. Effectiveness precedence
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝑡 ) ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(D.10*)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) ≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
𝑒 𝑤𝜏
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑒𝑖𝑘 ]

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝜏=1

𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , (𝑖̃, 𝑖) ∈

𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), 𝑖) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑗
]

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑒𝑖𝑗
]

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝜏=1

(D.11*)
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , (𝑖̃, (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈
𝑒 𝑤𝜏

𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑘 −1]

∑𝜏=1

∑

𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏

(𝑖̃,𝑖)∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
(
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),𝑖)∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

(D.11*.arc)

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑝𝑖𝑗
−1]

+ ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
+

𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡+𝑒𝑖𝑗
−1]

𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

∑

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
(𝑖̃,(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
𝑒 𝑤𝜏
(
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘+1 ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
+ ∑𝑡𝜏=𝑝𝑘 +1 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑖

(D.10*.arc)

𝑖𝑗

𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

≤1+

(D.12*)

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈

𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.18.n2n)
𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑘 ]

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
,

(D.18.n2a)
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𝑘
𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑗
]

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
,

∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.18.a2n)

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑒 𝑤𝜏 +
𝑘
min[𝑇,𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑗
]

∑𝜏=1

1−
1−

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

̃

𝑘
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

̃

𝑘
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.18.a2a)
(D.19.n2n)

(D.19.n2a)

D.4.4.3. Options precedence
̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑖̃)∈𝑁𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.20.n2n)

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,(𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ))∈𝑁𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.20.n2a)
̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑((𝑖,𝑗),𝑖̃)∈𝐴𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.20.a2n)
̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 ∑((𝑖,𝑗),(𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ))∈𝐴𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.20.a2a)
1−
1−

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

̃

𝑘
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

1

𝑡
̃∑
𝑘

𝑝𝑖̃

̃

𝑘
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
< 0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

̃
𝜏=𝑡−𝑝𝑖̃𝑘 +1

(1 −

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

̃

(D.21.n2n)

(D.21.n2a)

̃

𝑘
) ≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , 𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘 , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
<

0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 .

(D.22.n2n)
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1

𝑡
̃ ∑
𝑘

𝑝𝑖̃ 𝑗̃

̃
𝜏=𝑡−𝑝𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃ +1

(1 −

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
𝑘
−𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡

̃

̃

𝑘
) ≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , 𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃ , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃|𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
<

0, 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 .

(D.22.n2a)

D.4.4.4. Time sensitive options
̃

𝜃𝑘𝑘

̃

̃

𝑖𝑖̃
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝜏 ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 + ∑𝜏=1
̃

𝜃𝑘𝑘̃

̃

̃

𝑖𝑖̃ 𝑗
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝜏 ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝑗̃ , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 + ∑𝜏=1
̃

𝑘𝑘
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
∑𝜏=1
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑤𝜏

̃

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

+

𝑘𝑘
≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
, … , 𝑇, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡

̃
𝑖𝑗𝑖̃ 𝑗̃
𝑘𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘̃ 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑗̃𝑤𝜏 ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
+ ∑𝜏=1
𝑗̃ , … , 𝑇, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

(D.23.n2n)
(D.23.n2a)
(D.23.a2n)

̃

𝜃𝑘𝑘

(D.23.a2a)
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘̃ − 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘̃ − 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.

(D.24.n2n)

∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝑗̃̃ − 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑗̃ − 1, ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.

(D.24.n2a)

̃
̃
𝑘𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
− 𝑝𝑖̃𝑘 − 1, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

(D.24.a2n)

̃
̃
𝑘𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
𝑗̃ − 𝑝𝑖̃𝑗̃ − 1, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

(D.24.a2a)

D.4.4.5. Geospatial repair
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝑔𝑖𝑠
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝑡 ) ≤ 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.25)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑠
(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) ≤ 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. (D.25.arc)
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

D.4.5. Side constraints
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.26)

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.27)

+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.28)
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𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.29)
(D.29.arc)

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.30)
(D.30.arc)

𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃), (𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.31)

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
∈ {0,1}, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃), ((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

(D.31.arc)
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.32)
(D.32.arc)

𝑧𝑠𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(D.33)

D.4.6. Equation descriptions
Table D1 summarizes and categorizes the equations. The equations are
categorized as either objective functions, flow constraints, recovery constraints,
scheduling constraints, interdependency constraints, or side constraints. Table D1 seeks
to strike a balance between completeness and brevity by combining like equations.
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Table D1. Summary of objective function and constraints for BIIRM
Ref

Category

Description

D.1

Objective func.

Least cost recovery strategies. The first term is the site
preparation cost, the second and third terms are arc repair
costs, the fourth and fifth terms are arc assignment costs, the
sixth and seventh terms are node repair costs, the eighth and
ninth terms are node assignment costs, and the tenth term is
the flow cost.

D.2

Objective func.

Weighted operability of nodes and arcs, which represents a
surrogate for mission impact or disruptive effect.

D.3

Objective func.

Weighted and combined multiobjective function using C.1
and C.2.

D.4

Flow constraints Standard flow balance. Where slack variables representing
unmet demand and surplus supply help balance the
equation.

D.5 to
D.7

Flow constraints Restricts flow if starting node (C.5), ending node (C.6), and
arc (C.7) is inoperable.

D.8,
D.9,
D.11

Recovery
constraints

Ensures that a restored asset becomes operable (C.8), assets
are only repaired once (C.9), and assets are repaired after
sufficient processing time (C.11).

D.10
D.12

Scheduling
constraints

Ensures that only one work crew is assigned per repair task
(C.10) and that crews work on only one job at a time (C.12).

D.13,
D.14

Interdependency Child node operability depends on parent node’s operability
constraints
(C.13) and nodes are operable if demand is met (C.14).

D.15 to
D.17

Interdependency Traditional precedence completion order (C.15), assignment
constraints
requires met demand (C.16), and sustainment (C.17).

D.18,
D.19

Interdependency Effectiveness precedence completion order (C.18) and
constraints
traditional assignment demand (C.19).

D.20 to
D.22

Interdependency Options precedence completion order (C.20), assignment
constraints
requires met demand (C.21), and sustainment (C.22).

D.23,
D.24

Interdependency Time-sensitive options completion requirement (C.23) and
constraints
restriction of assignment until deadline (C.24).

D.25

Interdependency Geospatial repair of nodes and arcs, which can enable cost
constraints
savings for co-located work.

D.26 to
D.33

Side constraints

Flow variables are positive continuous while assignment,
repair, operability, and location variables are binary.

254

Appendix E. The Flexible Team Base
Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Model (tmBIIRM)
This appendix details the additions and modifications to the goals, assumptions,
notation, formulation, and computer code of the BIIRM which are associated with the
complete tmBIIRM model as seen in part in Chapter 6.
E.1. tmBIIRM Goals
The goal of tmBIIRM maintains the primary goal and subgoals of the BIIRM to
find optimal recovery strategies of disrupted interdependent infrastructure networks while
balancing cost, disruption, and repair time. However, the tmBIIRM adds three additional
subgoals in order to incorporate the elements of flexible teaming structures.
1. Integrate varying knowledge, skill, and abilities among work crew members,
which could impact team composition and restoration effectiveness.
2. Ability for a work crew manager to assign more than one work crew to a task to
realize efficiency benefits.
3. Allow for starting and stopping of restoration activities, thus creating a
preemptive environment.
Three observations from academic literature and USAF initiatives motivates this
exploration. First, Ouyang (2014) identified that no network-flow based models evaluated
were able to “[inform] organizational and administrative structure to increase response
and coordination of restoration activities.” An output of the tmBIIRM is a coordinated
schedule of restoration activities and a schedule of work crew teaming. Second, the
United States Air Force is seeking to improve the way they educate and train personnel to
achieve multi-skilled Airmen (Roberson and Stafford 2017). An input of the tmBIIRM is
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a skill matrix, which can be altered to evaluate the impact of varying and multiple skill
sets to system recovery. Third, the United States Air Force Civil Engineer Enterprise has
an effort entitled “Revitalizing Civil Engineer Squadrons” to more appropriately train,
equip, and resource squadrons to enhance resiliency (United States Air Force (A4) 2020).
The tmBIIRM improves modeling and simulation of teams’ impact on recovery
operations, which is a direct element of resilient infrastructure and resilient personnel.
E.2. tmBIIRM Assumptions
The majority of the assumptions for the BIIRM remain in effect for the tmBIIRM.
This section details the exceptions. To most concisely provide this information the
assumptions being modified or challenged from the BIIRM are listed followed by the
updated assumptions for the tmBIIRM. Both a tag of BIIRM or tmBIIRM at the
beginning of the bulleted items helps identify which model the assumption is valid for.
This is also done visually with the original assumption from the BIIRM listed at the first
indentation level and those modified for the tmBIIRM at the second indentation level.
•

(BIIRM) Work crews are skilled and proficient to handle any necessary repair in
the assigned network layer.
o (tmBIIRM) Work crew personnel have varying levels of knowledge, skill,
and abilities which can be roughly classified as beginner, intermediate,
and advanced skills.
o (tmBIIRM) Skill level affects the efficiency of restoration activities
where beginner skill level yields extended processing time, intermediate
skill level yields normal processing time, and advanced skill level yields
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shortened processing time. While this is a generalization, it reflects a
closer approximation of reality that integrates skill level into task
processing time.
o (tmBIIRM) Certain tasks require specific training, skills, and abilities.
Personnel are able to support efforts across infrastructure systems so long
as their knowledge, skills, and abilities match the required restoration
activities.
•

(BIIRM) Restoration activities may only be assigned to one work crew.
o (tmBIIRM) Work crews may be assigned to the same restoration activity
which will impact the processing time of the task.
o (tmBIIRM) The effect on the processing time is restoration activity
specific. There are circumstances when increased personnel speed up the
processing time, circumstances that don’t speed up the processing time,
and circumstances where additional personnel slow down the processing
time of a task.

•

(BIIRM) When a recovery task is started it will be completed before a work crew
will be assigned to a different one. This means it is a non-preemptive
environment.
o (tmBIIRM) Restoration tasks may be started and stopped as needed. This
creates a preemptive environment.
o (tmBIIRM) Progress of a restoration activity will not be lost if a task is
stopped and restoration activities may continue from the point of stopped
progress with no additional penalty.
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•

(BIIRM) Cost for repair and recovery crew assignment with associated materials
happens when work is assigned, not completed.
o (tmBIIRM) Repair costs are summed at the completion of a repair, but
assignment costs are based on assigned personnel per manhour.

E.3. tmBIIRM Notation
This section lists the sets, parameters, and variables used in the tmBIIRM. The
listing is alphabetical with symbols from the Latin alphabet first followed by the Greek
alphabet. Unless otherwise explicitly stated the index 𝑡 denotes “during time period 𝑡 ∈
𝒯” where 𝒯 is the set of all time periods.
𝒜 = overall set of arcs, indexed as (𝑖, 𝑗);
𝒜𝑘 = subset of arcs within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒜′ = overall set of damaged arcs;
𝒜′𝑘 = subset of damaged arcs within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑎𝜋𝑡 = hourly rate cost of assigning personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π at time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝑘
𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
= supply or demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
= cost of flowing commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 through arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑘
𝑒𝑖𝑓
or 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑓
= extended processing time in manhours for repair of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc

(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 requiring skill 𝑓 ∈ ℱ;
𝐸𝜋𝑓 = parameter indicating the experience level of personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π based on the skill set
𝑓 ∈ ℱ. This serves as both an indication of the existence of a given skill set for a specific
personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π and embodies the concept of varying skill levels. For example, a master
carpentry worker with novice skills in electrical work and no skill in plumbing may have
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an 𝐸𝜋𝑓 = 1.25, 0.75, and 0 for carpentry, electrical, and plumbing work respectively.
This parameter is tunable by the modeler and is specific to each individual worker and
should typically take a value between 0 and 2, with 2 representing a worker’s efficiency
being double the standard or normal efficiency of 1;
ℱ = A set of knowledge, skills, and abilities that are required for restoration tasks,
indexed as 𝑓 = {1, … , 𝐹}. This generally can parallel the infrastructure systems –
plumbing in water network, but may include other things or finer granularity – welding in
water network vs. welding in liquid fuels network;
𝑘
𝑘
𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑠
or 𝑔𝑖𝑠
= binary variable indicating if arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is in space 𝑠 ∈

𝒮;
𝑔𝑠𝑡 = cost of geospatial site preparation of space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮;
ℒ = overall set of commodities;
ℒ 𝑘 = subset of commodities able to flow within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒩 = overall set of nodes, indexed as 𝑖;
𝒩 𝑘 = subset of nodes within a given infrastructure layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝒩 ′ = set of all damaged nodes;
𝒩 ′𝑘 = subset of damaged nodes within a given layer 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦;
𝑘
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑓
or 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓
= normal processing time in manhours for repair of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 or arc

(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 requiring skill set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ;
𝑘
𝑘
𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑞𝑖𝑡
= cost of repair for recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 ;

𝒮 = set of spaces;
𝑘
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
= capacity of arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 shared by all commodities flowing along that arc;
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𝒲 = set of all work crews, indexed as 𝑤 = {1, … , 𝑊}, where 𝑊 ≤ 𝑃/2 since all work
crews must have at least two people in them;
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
= variable representing flow of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 along arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜 𝑘 ;
−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
= slack variable representing unmet demand of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
= slack variable representing surplus of commodity 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 = binary variable indicating if arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 is operable;

𝑧𝑠𝑡 = binary variable indicating if a recovery task in space 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 is assigned during time
period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 = binary variable that is equal to 1 if personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π is assigned to work crew 𝑤 ∈
𝒲 in time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. Therefore, the number of personnel on a given work crew 𝑤 ∈
𝒲 in time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 is equal to 𝑛𝑤𝑡 = ∑𝜋∈Π 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 ;
𝑘
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
or 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
= variable indicating the number of manhours work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 is

assigned to a recovery task at arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 ;
𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
or 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 = variable indicating the number of extended processing time manhours
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

work crew 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲 is assigned to a recovery task with extended processing time during
time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑘 = binary variable equal to 1 if recovery task has been completed by the

beginning of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 and 0 otherwise;
̃

𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 = operational interdependency parameter based on parent-child node pairs 𝑖 ∈
̃

𝑘𝑘
𝒩𝑖̃𝜓
𝜉 with some operational interdependency type 𝜓 ∈ Ψ and coupling strategy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ;
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Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 or Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 = variable amount of work completed on restoration activity requiring skill
set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ by the end of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 = variable indicating what percentage of time personnel 𝜋 ∈ Π is engaged in repair
work utilizing skill set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ within time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯;
̃

𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 = node-to-node time-sensitive option deadline (other variations exist to include
̃

̃

̃

𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘
𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
, and 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
𝑗̃ );

Θ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 or Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 = variable amount representing the effective time at a restoration activity
requiring skill set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ by the end of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 based on work crews working at
a normal processing time;
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑒 𝑓𝑡 or Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑓𝑡 = variable amount representing the effective time at a restoration activity
requiring skill set 𝑓 ∈ ℱ by the end of time period 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯 based on work crews working at
an extended processing time;
𝜇𝐴 and 𝜇𝐵 = weighting parameter for cost objective and disruptive effect objective;
𝑘
𝑘
𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
or 𝜇𝑖𝑡
= weighting parameter for arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 or node 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 at time period 𝑡 ∈

𝒯;
Ξ = set of coupling strategies, indexed as 𝜉;
Π = set of workers or personnel that can be assigned to a work crew, indexed as 𝜋 =
{1, … , 𝑃};
𝑘
𝜙𝑖𝑘 or 𝜙𝑖𝑗
= number of skill sets associated with the restoration activity. An example of

this is a recovery task 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 requiring some plumbing, electrical, and carpentry work
would have a 𝜙𝑖𝑘 = 3;
Ψ = set of operational interdependency subtypes, indexed as 𝜓;
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Ω = parameter designating the amount of hours in a time period (e.g., 8 hour work shifts,
12 hour half days, etc.);
E.4. tmBIIRM Formulation
The following is the full formulation of the tmBIIRM. Equations may have a
suffix ascribed denoting a variation based on being arc-based instead of node-based (no
suffix). A suffix is also used on all restoration interdependency constraints based on
coupling of node-to-node (n2n), node-to-arc (n2a), arc-to-node (a2n), or arc-to-arc (a2a).
Additionally, an asterisk is used to denote modifications to previously listed equations if
including the applicable relationships. The formulation of the tmBIIRM builds upon the
work of González et al. (2016) and Sharkey et al. (2015).
E.4.1. Objective functions
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐴 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯(∑𝑠∈𝒮 𝑔𝑠𝑡 𝑧𝑠𝑡 + ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝑎𝜋𝑡 Ω𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 +
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ ∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝛽𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
)).

(E.1)

𝑘 𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒: 𝐵 = ∑𝑡∈𝒯 ∑𝑘∈𝒦(∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
). (E.2)

These two explicit objective functions also include a time index, thus
incorporating repair time into the combined objective functions implicitly as follows.
Minimize

𝜇𝐴 𝐴 − 𝜇𝐵 𝐵.

(E.3)

Subject to the following constraints
E.4.2. Network flow and scheduling constraints
−,𝑘
+,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑗:(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
− ∑𝑗:(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝒜𝑘 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑙𝑡
= 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+ 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
− 𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈

𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.4)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(E.5)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑗 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.6)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑙∈ℒ 𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.7)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.8)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≤

∑𝑓∈ℱ Δ𝑘
𝑖𝑓𝑡

𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
≤

Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 =

𝜙𝑖𝑘

, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

∑𝑓∈ℱ Δ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡
𝑘
𝜙𝑖𝑗

∑𝑡𝜏=1 Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑓𝜏

Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 =

𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑓

, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

∑𝑡𝜏=1 Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓𝜏
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓

(E.8.arc)

, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.9)

(E.9.arc)

(E.10)

(E.10.arc)

𝑘
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.11)
𝑘
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
, ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.11.arc)
∑𝑓∈ℱ 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.12)

∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 = 1, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.13)

∑𝜋∈Π 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 ≥ 2, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.14)

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ Ω, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.15)

E.4.3. Operational interdependencies
̃
∑𝑖∈𝒩 𝑘𝑘̃ 𝛾𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝜓𝜉𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑡 , ∀𝑖̃ ∈ 𝒩 𝑘̃ , 𝑘̃ ∈ 𝒦, 𝜓 ∈ Ψ, 𝜉 ∈ Ξ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.16)

−,𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡
+𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩𝐷𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.17)

𝑖̃ 𝜓𝜉
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E.4.4. Restoration interdependencies
E.4.4.1. Traditional precedence
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.18.n2n)
(E.18.n2a)
(E.18.a2n)
(E.18.a2a)
(E.19.n2n)
(E.19.n2a)

E.4.4.2. Effectiveness precedence
Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑓𝜏

Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑡𝜏=1 (

𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑓

+

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑒𝑓𝜏
𝑘
𝑒𝑖𝑓

) , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , (𝑖̃, 𝑖) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), 𝑖) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈

ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
(E.10*)
Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑡𝜏=1 (

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓𝜏
𝑘
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓

+

Θ𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑓𝜏
𝑘
𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑓

) , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , (𝑖̃, (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈

𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.10*.arc)

Θ𝑘𝑖𝑒 𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 , ∀ (𝑖̃, 𝑖) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), 𝑖) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈
ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.20)

𝑘
Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑒𝑓𝑡 = ∑𝑤∈𝒲 ∑𝜋∈Π 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 𝐸𝜋𝑓 𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 𝛼𝑖𝑗
, ∀ (𝑖̃, (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, ((𝑖̃, 𝑗̃), (𝑖, 𝑗)) ∈
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.20.arc)
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𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑖∈𝒩 ′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ ∑(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝒜′𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+∑

∑

𝑘
𝛼𝑖𝑗
(𝑖̃,(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
𝑒 𝑤𝑡
(
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),(𝑖,𝑗))∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝑡
(𝑖̃,𝑖)∈𝑁𝐸𝑃,
(
)
((𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ),𝑖)∈𝐴𝐸𝑃

+

≤ Ω, ∀𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇,𝑡−

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑒𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

(E.14*)
∑𝑓∈ℱ 𝑝𝑘
𝑖𝑓
]
Ω𝜙𝑘
𝑖

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈

ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.21.n2n)
𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇,𝑡−

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑒 𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

∑𝑓∈ℱ 𝑝𝑘
𝑖𝑓
]
Ω𝜙𝑘
𝑖

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝜏
, ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈

𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.21.n2a)
𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑇,𝑡−

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑒 𝑤𝜏 + ∑𝜏=1

∑𝑓∈ℱ 𝑝𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓
]
Ω𝜙𝑘
𝑖𝑗

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈

𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.21.a2n)

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
≤ ∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑒 𝑤𝜏 +

min[𝑇,𝑡−

∑𝜏=1

∑𝑓∈ℱ 𝑝𝑘
𝑖𝑗𝑓
]
Ω𝜙𝑘
𝑖𝑗

𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑘 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝜏
, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.21.a2a)
(E.22.n2n)
(E.22.n2a)

E.4.4.3. Options precedence
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑(𝑖,𝑖̃)∈𝑁𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≥ ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
Ω

1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑(𝑖,(𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ))∈𝑁𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑((𝑖,𝑗),𝑖̃)∈𝐴𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(E.23.n2n)
(E.23.n2a)
(E.23.a2n)

1

̃
𝑘
∑𝑡𝜏=1 ∑((𝑖,𝑗),(𝑖̃,𝑗̃ ))∈𝐴𝑂𝑃 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝜏
≥ Ω ∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑂𝑃, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.23.a2a)
̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.24.n2n)

̃

Ω𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ≥ 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑂𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.24.n2a)

E.4.4.4. Time sensitive options
̃

̃

̃

𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 + ∑𝑡

̃

(∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝜏 + 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝜏 ) ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘 , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆. (E.25.n2n)

𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 + ∑𝑡

̃

(∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝜏 + 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝜏 ) ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝑗̃ , … , 𝑇, ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.

𝜏=𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘

̃

𝜏=𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘
𝑗̃

̃

̃

(E.25.n2a)
̃

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ ∑𝑡

̃
𝑘𝑘
𝜏=𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃

̃

̃

𝑘𝑘
(∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑤𝜏 + 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝜏 ) ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
, … , 𝑇, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

(E.25.a2n)
𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ ∑𝑡

̃

̃

𝑘𝑘
𝜏=𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
𝑗̃

̃

̃

𝑘𝑘
(∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝑤𝜏 + 𝛽𝑖̃𝑘𝑗̃𝜏 ) ≥ 1, 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
𝑗̃ , … , 𝑇, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

(E.25.a2a)
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘̃ − 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.

(E.26.n2n)

∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑖̃𝑘𝑘𝑗̃̃ − 1, ∀(𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝑇𝑆.

(E.26.n2a)

̃
𝑘𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
− 1, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

(E.26.a2n)

̃
𝑘𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝛼𝑖̃𝑘̃𝑗̃𝑤𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑖̃
𝑗̃ − 1, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝑇𝑆.

(E.26.a2a)

E.4.4.5. Geospatial repair
1
Ω
1
Ω

𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑔𝑖𝑠
(𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ) ≤ 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.27)

𝑘
𝑘
𝑘
∑𝑤∈𝒲 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑠
(𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
) ≤ 𝑧𝑠𝑡 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯. (E.27.arc)
𝑒 𝑤𝑡
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C.4.5. Side constraints
𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.28)

−,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.29)

+,𝑘
𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡
≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑙 ∈ ℒ 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.30)

𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.31)

𝑘
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.31.arc)

𝑧𝑠𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.32)

𝑍𝜋𝑤𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.33)

𝑘
0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑡
≤ Ω, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.34)

𝑘
0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑤𝑡
≤ Ω, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.34.arc)

0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑡 ≤ Ω, ∀(𝑖, 𝑖̃), (𝑖, (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.35)

𝑘
0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖𝑗
≤ Ω, ∀((𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖̃), ((𝑖, 𝑗), (𝑖̃, 𝑗̃)) ∈ 𝐴𝐸𝑃, 𝑤 ∈ 𝒲, 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑒 𝑤𝑡

(E.35.arc)
𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑡
∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

0 ≤ Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
0 ≤ Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.36)
(E.36.arc)
(E.37)
(E.37.arc)

0 ≤ 𝜂𝜋𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝜋 ∈ Π, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.38)

𝑘
0 ≤ Θ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑓
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.39)

𝑘
0 ≤ Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
𝑘
0 ≤ Θ𝑘𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑓
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.
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(E.39.arc)
(E.40)

𝑘
0 ≤ Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑓
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ, 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯.

(E.40.arc)

0 ≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 Δ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.
0 ≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 Δ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦.

(E.41)
(E.41.arc)

𝑘
0 ≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 Θ𝑘𝑖𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑓
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ.
𝑘
0 ≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑓
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ.

(E.42)
(E.42.arc)

𝑘
0 ≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 Θ𝑘𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑓
, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝒩 ′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ.
𝑘
0 ≤ ∑𝑡∈𝒯 Θ𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑒 𝑓𝑡 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑓
, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝒜′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝒦, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ.

(E.43)
(E.43.arc)

E.4.6. Equation descriptions
Table E1 summarizes and categorizes the equations. The equations are
categorized as either objective functions, flow constraints, recovery constraints,
scheduling constraints, interdependency constraints, or side constraints. Table E1 seeks to
strike a balance between completeness and brevity by combining like equations.
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Table E.1. Summary of objective function and constraints for tmBIIRM
Ref

Category

Description

E.1

Objective func.

Least cost recovery strategies. The five terms are 1) site
preparation costs, 2) assignment costs, 3) arc repair costs, 4)
node repair costs, and 5) flow costs.

E.2

Objective func.

Weighted operability of nodes and arcs, which represents a
surrogate for mission impact or disruptive effect.

E.3

Objective func.

Weighted and combined multiobjective function using E.1
and E.2.

E.4 to
E.7

Flow constraints Standard flow balance (E.4), restriction of flow based on
operable starting node (E.5), ending node (E.6), and arc
(E.7).

E.8 to
E.10

Recovery
constraints

Ensures that a restored asset becomes operable (E.8), assets
are repaired once work is completed (E.9), and work
completed is defined as work being assigned for required
amount (E.10).

E.11 to
E.15

Scheduling
constraints

Effective work time assigned is based on worker experience
level (E.11). Ensures workers spread their time across the
skills they have (E.12), can only be assigned to one work
crew in a time period (E.13), every work crew must have at
least two people (E.14), and that every work crew isn’t
assigned more hours than in a time period.

E.16 to
E.17

Interdependency Child node operability depends on parent node’s operability
constraints
(E.16) and nodes are operable if demand is met (E.17).

E.18 to
E.19

Interdependency Traditional precedence completion order (E.18), assignment
constraints
requires operable parent node (E.19).

E.20 to
E.22

Interdependency Effective work time assigned is based on worker experience
constraints
level (E.20). Effectiveness precedence completion order
(E.21) and traditional assignment requirement (E.22).

E.23 to
E.24

Interdependency Options precedence completion order (E.23) and traditional
constraints
assignment requirement (E.24).

E.25 to
E.26

Interdependency Time-sensitive options completion requirement (E.25) and
constraints
restriction of assignment until deadline (E.26).

E.27

Interdependency Geospatial repair of nodes and arcs, which can enable cost
constraints
savings for co-located work.

E.28 to
E.43

Side constraints

Variable definitions and bounds.

269

Bibliography
“Trilemma.” (2021). Wikipedia.
“Trilemma.” (2021). Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, <https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/trilemma> (Jun. 3, 2021).
Ahmed, S., Islam, H., Hoque, I., and Hossain, M. (2020). “Reality check against skilled
worker parameters and parameters failure effect on the construction industry for
Bangladesh.” International Journal of Construction Management, Taylor & Francis,
20(5), 480–489.
Ahuja, R. K., Magnanti, T. L., and Orlin, J. B. (1993). “Multicommodity Flows.”
Network Flows: Theory, Algorithms, and Application, Prentice-Hall Inc., 649–694.
Akhtar, Z. (2021). “How to Cut your Cell Phone Bill by 80%.” US Mobile,
<https://www.usmobile.com/blog/cut-cell-phone-bill/> (Mar. 5, 2021).
Aksu, D. T., and Ozdamar, L. (2014). “A mathematical model for post-disaster road
restoration: Enabling accessibility and evacuation.” Transportation Research Part E,
61, 56–67.
Almoghathawi, Y., Barker, K., and Albert, L. A. (2019). “Resilience-driven restoration
model for interdependent infrastructure networks.” Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, Elsevier Ltd, 185, 12–23.
Almoghathawi, Y., Barker, K., and Ramirez-marquez, J. E. (2017). “Resilience-Based
Measures for Importance Ranking of Interdependent Infrastructure Networks
Components Across Uncertain Disruption Scenarios.” Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Structural Safety and Reliability, (August), 6–10.
Alwasel, A., Abdel-Rahman, E. M., Haas, C. T., and Lee, S. (2017). “Experience,
Productivity, and Musculoskeletal Injury among Masonry Workers.” Journal of
Construction Engineering and Management, American Society of Civil Engineers,
143(6), 05017003.
American Society of Civil Engineers. (2019). Future World Vision: Infrastructure
Reimagined. ASCE.
Ang, C. C. (2006). “Optimized recovery of damaged electrical power grids.” Naval Post
Graduate School.
Arora, J. S. (2017). “Multi-objective Optimum Design Concepts and Methods.”
Introduction to Optimum Design, Elsevier Inc., 771–794.
270

Atkinson, R. (1999). “Project management: Cost, time and quality, two best guesses and
a phenomenon, its time to accept other success criteria.” International Journal of
Project Management, Elsevier BV, 17(6), 337–342.
Attoh-Okine, N. O. (2016). Resilience Engineering: Models and Analysis. Cambridge
University Press, New York.
Averbakh, I., and Pereira, J. (2012). “The flowtime network construction problem.” IIE
Transactions, 44(8), 681–694.
Barker, K., Lambert, J. H., Zobel, C. W., Tapia, A. H., Ramirez-Marquez, J. E., Albert,
L., Nicholson, C. D., and Caragea, C. (2017). “Defining resilience analytics for
interdependent cyber-physical-social networks.” Sustainable and Resilient
Infrastructure, Taylor & Francis, 2(2), 59–67.
Barr, S., Alderson, D., Ives, M. C., and Robson, C. (2016). “Database, Simulation
Modelling and Visualisation for National Infrastructure Assessment.” The Future of
National Infrastructure: A System-of-Systems Approach, J. W. Hall, M. Tran, A. J.
Hickford, and R. J. Nicholls, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cornwall.
Baxter, M., Eldingy, T., Ernst, A., Kalinowski, T., and Savelsbergh, M. (2014).
“Incremental network design with shortest paths.” European Journal of Operational
Research, 238(3), 675–684.
Benmokhtar, A., Benouar, D., and Rahmoune, A. (2020). “Modeling the propagation of
the effects of a disturbance in a critical infrastructure system to increase its
resilience.” Urbanism. Arhitectura. Constructii., 11(2), 157–178.
Bianconi, G. (2018). Multilayer Networks: Structure and Function. Oxford University
Press.
Bobbio, A., Bonanni, G., Ciancamerla, E., Clemente, R., Iacomini, A., Minichino, M.,
Scarlatti, A., Terruggia, D., and Zendri, E. (2010). “Unavailability of critical
SCADA communication links interconnecting a power grid and a Telco network.”
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 95, 1345–1357.
Boccaletti, S., Bianconi, G., Criado, R., del Genio, C. I., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Romance,
M., Sendiña-Nadal, I., Wang, Z., and Zanin, M. (2014). The structure and dynamics
of multilayer networks. Physics Reports.
Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E., and Havlin, S. (2010).
“Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks.” Nature, Nature
Publishing Group, 464(7291), 1025–1028.

271

Cavallo, A., and Ireland, V. (2014). “Preparing for complex interdependent risks: A
System of Systems approach to building disaster resilience.” International Journal
of Disaster Risk Reduction, Elsevier, 9, 181–193.
Cavdaroglu, B., Hammel, E., Mitchell, J. E., Sharkey, T. C., and Wallace, W. A. (2013).
“Integrating restoration and scheduling decisions for disrupted interdependent
infrastructure systems.” Annals of Operations Research, 203(1), 279–294.
Chai, W. K., Kyritsis, V., Katsaros, K. V., and Pavlou, G. (2016). “Resilience of
interdependent communication and power distribution networks against cascading
failures.” 2016 IFIP Networking Conference (IFIP Networking) and Workshops,
IFIP Networking 2016, 37–45.
Chee, C. H., and Neo, H. (2018). “5 big challenges facing big cities of the future.” World
Economic Forum, Singapore.
Comerio, M. C. (2014). “Disaster recovery and community renewal: Housing
approaches.” Cityscape, 16(2), 51–68.
Cutter, S. L. (2016). “The landscape of disaster resilience indicators in the USA.” Natural
Hazards, Springer Netherlands, 80(2), 741–758.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (n.d.). “Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program.” cisa.gov, <https://www.cisa.gov/pciiprogram> (Mar. 26, 2021).
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2005). “Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program Fact Sheet.” Fact Sheet,
<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pcii-program-factsheet-final19jul05-508.pdf> (Mar. 26, 2021).
Deparment of Defense (DoD). (2020). UFC 3-701-01, Change 6, DoD Facilities Pricing
Guide.
Department of Defense (DoD). (2010). Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-740-05,
Handbook: Construction Cost Estimating, with Change 2.
Department of Homeland Security. (2013). NIPP 2013: Partnering for critical
infrastructure security and resilience. National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
Department of Homeland Security. (2009). The National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP): Partnering to enhance protection and resiliency.

272

Dilley, J. (2021). “How Much Should I Be Paying for High-Speed Internet?”
HighSpeedInternet.com, <https://www.highspeedinternet.com/resources/how-muchshould-i-be-paying-for-high-speed-internet-resource> (Mar. 5, 2021).
Dinardi, G. (2019). “How Much is A Business Phone Line? (Pricing + Phone Types).”
Nextiva Blog, <https://www.nextiva.com/blog/how-much-is-a-business-phoneline.html> (Mar. 5, 2021).
Eusgeld, I., and Kröger, W. (2008). “Comparative evaluation of modeling and simulation
techniques for interdependent critical infrastructures.” 9th International Conference
on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 2008, PSAM 2008, 1(January
2008), 484–491.
Eusgeld, I., Nan, C., and Dietz, S. (2011). “‘System-of-systems’ approach for
interdependent critical infrastructures.” Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
Elsevier, 96(6), 679–686.
Faturechi, R., and Miller-Hooks, E. (2014). “Measuring the Performance of
Transportation Infrastructure Systems in Disasters: A Comprehensive Review.”
Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014025.
Fletcher, S. (2001). “Electric power interruptions curtail California oil and gas
production.” Oil and Gas Journal, (February).
Frost, B. (2020). “Comcast Business Internet Review: 2021.” Business.org,
<https://www.business.org/services/internet/comcast-business-internet-review/>
(Mar. 5, 2021).
GAMS Development Corp. (2021). “The GAMS Call and Command Line Parameters.”
GAMS Documentation,
<https://www.gams.com/latest/docs/UG_GamsCall.html#GAMSAOoptcr> (Jun. 24,
2021).
Givetash, L. (2020). “Australian wildfires declared among the ‘worst wildlife disasters in
modern history.’” NBC News.
González, A. D. (2017). “Resilience optimization of systems of interdependent
networks.” Rice University, Dissertation.
González, A. D., Chapman, A., Dueñas-Osorio, L., Mesbahi, M., and D’Souza, R. M.
(2017). “Efficient Infrastructure Restoration Strategies Using the Recovery
Operator.” Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering, 32(12), 991–
1006.

273

González, A. D., Dueñas-Osorio, L., Sánchez-Silva, M., and Medaglia, A. L. (2016).
“The Interdependent Network Design Problem for Optimal Infrastructure System
Restoration.” Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering, 31(5), 334–
350.
Griot, C. (2010). “Modelling and simulation for critical infrastructure interdependency
assessment: a meta-review for model characterisation.” International Journal of
Critical Infrastructures, 6(4), 363–379.
Guha, S., Moss, A., Naor, J. (Seffi), and Schieber, B. (1999). “Efficient recovery from
power outage (extended abstract).” Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM
symposium on Theory of computing - STOC ’99, ACM Press, New York, New
York, USA, 574–582.
Haimes, Y. Y., Lasdon, L. S., and Wismer, D. A. (1971). “On a bicriterion formulation of
the problems of integrated identification and system optimization.” IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, SMC-1(3), 296–297.
Haimes, Y. Y., Santos, J., Crowther, K., Henry, M., Lian, C., and Yan, Z. (2007). “Risk
Analysis in Interdependent Infrastructures.” Critical Infrastructure Protection, 253,
297–310.
Hall, J. W., Nicholls, R. J., Hickford, A. J., and Tran, M. (2016). “Introducing National
Infrastructure Assessment.” The Future of National Infrastructure: A System-ofSystems Approach, J. W. Hall, M. Tran, A. J. Hickford, and R. J. Nicholls, eds.,
Cambridge University Press, Cornwall.
Hanley, T., Daecher, A., Cotteleer, M., and Sniderman, B. (2019). “The Industry 4.0
paradox.” Deloitte Review, (24).
Henry, D., and Ramirez-Marquez, J. E. (2012). “Generic metrics and quantitative
approaches for system resilience as a function of time.” Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, Elsevier, 99, 114–122.
Holden, R., Val, D. V., Burkhard, R., and Nodwell, S. (2013). “A network flow model for
interdependent infrastructures at the local scale.” Safety Science, Elsevier Ltd, 53,
51–60.
homeadvisor.com. (2021). “2021 Plumbing Cost Estimates: Leak, Pipe Repair Prices.”
<https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/plumbing/> (Mar. 2, 2021).
homeadvisor.com. (2021). “2021 Electrician Costs & Average Hourly Rates.”
<https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/electrical/hire-an-electrician/> (Mar. 2, 2021).

274

homeadvisor.com. (2021). “2021 Costs of Trenching | Cost to Dig a Trench Per Foot.”
<https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/landscape/trenching/> (Mar. 1, 2021).
Hosseini, S., Barker, K., and Ramirez-Marquez, J. E. (2016). “A review of definitions
and measures of system resilience.” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 145,
47–61.
howmuch.net. (2020). “How much does it cost to clear a land and prepare a building
site?” <https://howmuch.net/costs/land-clearing-building-site-preparation> (Mar. 1,
2021).
IEEE Computer Society. (2010). “IEEE Standard for Modeling and Simulation (M&S)
High Level Architecture (HLA) - Federate Interface Specification (IEEE 1516.1).”
Iloglu, S., and Albert, L. A. (2018). “An integrated network design and scheduling
problem for network recovery and emergency response.” Operations Research
Perspectives, Elsevier Ltd, 5, 218–231.
Iloglu, S., and Albert, L. A. (2020). “A maximal multiple coverage and network
restoration problem for disaster recovery.” Operations Research Perspectives,
Elsevier Ltd, 7, 100132.
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). (2014). “ISO 55000: Asset
Management - Overview, Principles, and Terminology.”
Jenkins, K., Surminski, S., Hall, J., and Crick, F. (2017). “Assessing surface water flood
risk and management strategies under future climate change: Insights from an
Agent-Based Model.” Science of the Total Environment, Elsevier B.V., 595, 159–
168.
Johari, S., and Jha, K. N. (2020). “Interrelationship among Belief, Intention, Attitude,
Behavior, and Performance of Construction Workers.” Journal of Management in
Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), 36(6), 04020081.
Kalinowski, T., Matsypura, D., and Savelsbergh, M. W. P. (2018). Incremental Network
Design with Maximum Flows.
Kammouh, O., Nogal, M., Binnekamp, R., and Wolfert, A. R. M. R. (2021). “Multisystem intervention optimization for interdependent infrastructure.” Automation in
Construction, Elsevier, 127, 103698.
Karakoc, D. B., Almoghathawi, Y., Barker, K., González, A. D., and Mohebbi, S. (2019).
“Community resilience-driven restoration model for interdependent infrastructure
networks.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Elsevier Ltd,
38(February), 101228.
275

Karakoc, D. B., Barker, K., Zobel, C. W., and Almoghathawi, Y. (2020). “Social
vulnerability and equity perspectives on interdependent infrastructure network
component importance.” Sustainable Cities and Society, Elsevier, 57(November
2019), 102072.
Kennedy, K. T. (2003). “An Analysis of Multiple Layered Networks.” Air Force Institute
of Technology.
Khanh, H. D., Kim, S.-Y., Khoa, N. Van, and Tu, N. T. (2021). “The relationship
between workers’ experience and productivity: a case study of brick masonry
construction.” International Journal of Construction Management, Taylor &
Francis.
kompareit.com. (2021). “Site Preparation & Land Clearing .”
<https://www.kompareit.com/homeandgarden/developers-engineers-landprep.html> (Mar. 1, 2021).
Kong, J., Simonovic, S. P., and Zhang, C. (2019). “Resilience Assessment of
Interdependent Infrastructure Systems: A Case Study Based on Different Response
Strategies.” Sustainability (Switzerland), 11(23).
Lee, E. E., Mitchell, J. E., and Wallace, W. A. (2007). “Restoration of services in
interdependent infrastructure systems: A network flows approach.” IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics Part C: Applications and Reviews,
37(6), 1303–1317.
Legal Information Institute. (2021). “10 U.S. Code § 101 - Definitions.”
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/101> (Jul. 5, 2021).
Lewe, J. H., Hivin, L. F., and Mavris, D. N. (2014). “A multi-paradigm approach to
system dynamics modeling of intercity transportation.” Transportation Research
Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier Ltd, 71, 188–202.
Lewis, T. G. (2009). Network Science: Theory and Practice. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Liberda, M., Ruwanpura, J., and Jergeas, G. (2003). “Construction Productivity
Improvement: A Study of Human, Management and External Issues.” Construction
Research Congress, Winds of Change: Integration and Innovation in Construction,
Proceedings of the Congress, American Society of Civil Engineers, 1–8.
Little, R. G., Loggins, R. A., Mitchell, J. E., Ni, N., Sharkey, T. C., and Wallace, W. A.
(2020). “CLARC: An Artificial Community for Modeling the Effects of Extreme
Hazard Events on Interdependent Civil and Social Infrastructure Systems.” Journal
of Infrastructure Systems, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), 26(1),
04019041.
276

Loggins, R., Taylor, J., Brehm, S., and Wallace, W. A. (2013). CLARC County.
Loggins, R. A., and Wallace, W. A. (2015). “Rapid Assessment of Hurricane Damage
and Disruption to Interdependent Civil Infrastructure Systems.” Journal of
Infrastructure Systems, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), 21(4).
Loggins, R., Little, R. G., Mitchell, J., Sharkey, T., and Wallace, W. A. (2019). “CRISIS:
Modeling the Restoration of Interdependent Civil and Social Infrastructure Systems
Following an Extreme Event.” Natural Hazards Review, American Society of Civil
Engineers (ASCE), 20(3), 04019004.
Matthews, R. B. (2005). “Nuclear Safety: Expect the unexpected.” Professional Safety,
50(12), 20–27.
McLaren, C., Havlak, C., and Stewart-Wilson, G. (2015). “What is the full cost of your
commute?” The Discourse, <https://thediscourse.ca/scarborough/full-costcommute> (Mar. 5, 2021).
Merriam-Webster.com. (2021). “Inter- vs. Intra-: What is the Difference?” Usage Notes,
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/intra-and-inter-usage> (Jun. 2,
2021).
Minkel, J. (2008). “The 2003 northeast blackout-five years later.” Scientific America.
Moore, B., Jacques, D., and Schuldt, S. (2021). “Leveraging Network Interdependencies
to Overcome Inaccessible Civil Infrastructure Data.” Submitted to Proceedings of
the 2021 Winter Simulation Conference, S. Kim, B. Feng, K. Smith, S. Masoud, C.
Szabo, and M. Loper, eds., INFORMS.
Moore, B., Schuldt, S., Grandhi, R., and Jacques, D. (2021). “Impact of Operational and
Restoration Interdependencies on Recovery Time, Cost, and Disruptive Effect in
Multilayered Infrastructure Networks.” Under review in Journal of Infrastructure
Systems.
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC). (2018). Surviving a Catastrophic
Power Outage: How to Strengthen the Capabilities of the Nation.
Nurre, S. G., Cavdaroglu, B., Mitchell, J. E., Sharkey, T. C., and Wallace, W. A. (2012).
“Restoring infrastructure systems: An integrated network design and scheduling
(INDS) problem.” European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier B.V.,
223(3), 794–806.
OECD. (2021). “Working age population (indicator).” doi: 10.1787/d339918b-en.

277

O’Rourke, T. D. (2007). “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience.” The
Bridge, 22–29.
Oughton, E. J., Tran, M., Jones, C. B., and Ebrahimy, R. (2016). “Digital
Communications and Information Systems.” The Future of National Infrastructure:
A System-of-Systems Approach, J. W. Hall, M. Tran, A. J. Hickford, and R. J.
Nicholls, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cornwall.
Ouyang, M. (2014). “Review on modeling and simulation of interdependent critical
infrastructure systems.” Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, 121,
43–60.
Pathirage, C., Amaratunga, D., and Haigh, R. (2005). “Recognising the importance of
‘Tacit’ skills of the construction worker in a knowledge environment.” Conference
Item, University of Salford, Manchester, UK.
payscale.com. (2021). “Average Highway Maintenance Worker Hourly Pay.”
<https://www.payscale.com/research/US/Job=Highway_Maintenance_Worker/Hour
ly_Rate> (Mar. 2, 2021).
payscale.com. (2021). “Average Telecommunications Line Installer / Repairer Hourly
Pay.”
<https://www.payscale.com/research/US/Job=Telecommunications_Line_Installer_
%2F_Repairer/Hourly_Rate> (Mar. 2, 2021).
Pederson, P., Dudenhoeffer, D., Hartley, S., and Permann, M. (2006). Critical
Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling: A Survey of U.S. and International
Research. Idaho National Laboratory Report.
Peretti, K. (2014). “Cyber Threat Intelligence: To Share or Not to Share-What Are the
Real Concerns?” Bloomberg BNA Privacy and Security Law Report.
Pew Research Center. (2019). “Demographics of Mobile Device Ownership and
Adoption in the United States.” Pew Research Center,
<https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/mobile/> (Mar. 25, 2021).
Pinedo, M. L. (2016). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer
International Publishing AG.
Poulin, C., and Kane, M. (2021). “The Effect of Time-Varying Value on Infrastructure
Resilience Assessments.” Under review in IEEE Access.
Ramirez-Marquez, J. E. (2019). “Towards engineering paradigms of social and
community resilience.” 2019 World Congress on Engineering Asset Management:
Resilience, Reliability, and Asset Management.
278

Ramirez-Meyers, K., Mann, W. N., Deetjen, T. A., Johnson, S. C., Rhodes, J. D., and
Webber, M. (2021). “How different power plant types contribute to electric grid
reliability, resilience, and vulnerability: a comparative analytical framework.”
Progress in Energy, IOP Publishing, 3(3), 033001.
Rinaldi, S. M., Peerenboom, J. P., and Kelly, T. K. (2001). “Identifying, understanding,
and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies.” IEEE Control Systems
Magazine, IEEE, 21(6), 11–25.
Roberson, D. L., and Stafford, M. C. (2017). The Redesigned Air Force Continuum of
Learning: Rethinking Force Development for the Future.
Robert, B., Morabito, L., Cloutier, I., and Hémond, Y. (2013). “Interdependent critical
infrastructure: from protection towards resilience.” Critical Infrastructure
Symposium (TISP), West Point, NY, USA.
Rojas, E. M., and Aramvareekul, P. (2003). “Labor Productivity Drivers and
Opportunities in the Construction Industry.” Journal of Management in
Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, 19(2), 78–82.
Rutgers, V., and Sniderman, B. (2018). “Around the Physical-Digital-Physical Loop: A
Look at Current Industry 4.0 Capabilities.” Deloitte Insights: The Industry 4.0
Paradox, A. Rao, J. Kaji, B. Hurley, R. Bhat, and A. Khan, eds., Deloitte
Development LLC, 1–5.
Satumtira, G., and Dueñas-Osorio, L. (2010). “Synthesis of modeling and simulation
methods on critical infrastructure interdependencies research.” Sustainable and
Resilient Critical Infrastructure Systems: Simulation, Modeling, and Intelligent
Engineering, 1–51.
Sharkey, T. C., Cavdaroglu, B., Nguyen, H., Holman, J., Mitchell, J. E., and Wallace, W.
A. (2015). “Interdependent network restoration: On the value of informationsharing.” European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier Ltd., 244(1), 309–
321.
Sharkey, T. C., Nurre, S. G., Nguyen, H., Chow, J. H., Mitchell, J. E., and Wallace, W.
A. (2016). “Identification and classification of restoration interdependencies in the
wake of hurricane sandy.” Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 22(1).
Sharkey, T., Ni, N., Little, R., Loggins, R., Wallace, W., and Nurre, S. (2018). “CLARC:
An Artificial Community for Modeling the Effects of Extreme Hazard Events on
Interdependent Civil Infrastructure Systems.” Design Safe Data Depot, DesignSafeCI, <https://www.designsafeci.org/data/browser/public/designsafe.storage.published//PRJ-2158> (Feb. 18,
2021).
279

Sotres, P., Santana, J. R., Sanchez, L., Lanza, J., and Munoz, L. (2017). “Practical
Lessons from the Deployment and Management of a Smart City Internet-of-Things
Infrastructure: The SmartSantander Testbed Case.” IEEE Access, 5, 14309–14322.
Theony, C. M. (2020). “Infrastructure readiness in the United States Space Force.” Over
the Horizon: Multidomain Operations and Strategy.
Thoung, C., Beaven, R., Zuo, C., Birkin, M., Tyler, P., Crawford-Brown, D., Oughton, E.
J., and Kelly, S. (2016). “Future Demand for Infrastructure Services.” The Future of
National Infrastructure: A System-of-Systems Approach, J. W. Hall, M. Tran, A. J.
Hickford, and R. J. Nicholls, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cornwall.
Turton, W., and Mehrotra, K. (2021). “Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using
Compromised Password.” Bloomberg Cybersecurity.
U.S. Department of Energy. (2017). Water and Wastewater Annual Price Escalation
Rates for Selected Cities across the United States.
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2020). “Table 1.2. Summary Statistics
for the United States, 2009-2019.” Annual Report,
<https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_01_02.html> (Mar. 3, 2021).
United States. (2017). National Security Strategy of the United States of America.
Washington D.C.
United States Department of Defense. (2019). Annual Energy Management and
Resilience Report (AEMRR) FY2018.
United States Department of Defense. (2018). Summary of the National Defense Strategy.
2018 National Defense Strategy.
Valencia, V. V. (2013). “Network interdependency modeling for risk assessment on built
infrastructure systems.” ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 179.
Webber, R. (2019). “Average Cell Phone Bill Now $114 per Month.”
MoneySavingPro.com, <https://www.moneysavingpro.com/cell-phoneplans/comparing-us-and-uk-bills/> (Mar. 5, 2021).
White, R., Burkhart, A., George, R., Boult, T., and Chow, E. (2016). “Towards
comparable cross-sector risk analyses: A re-examination of the Risk Analysis and
Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) methodology.” International
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, 14, 28–40.

280

Yan, S., and Shih, Y. L. (2009). “Optimal scheduling of emergency roadway repair and
subsequent relief distribution.” Computers and Operations Research, Pergamon,
36(6), 2049–2065.
Yianni, P. C., Neves, L. C., Rama, D., Andrews, J. D., and Dean, R. (2016).
“Incorporating local environmental factors into railway bridge asset management.”
Engineering Structures, Elsevier Ltd, 128, 362–373.
Zhang, C., Kong, J., and Simonovic, S. P. (2018). “Restoration resource allocation model
for enhancing resilience of interdependent infrastructure systems.” Safety Science,
102, 169–177.

281

